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Executive summary 
 
Each year, more than 9,000 people die from diseases attributable to smoking 
in Switzerland. This corresponds to 15% of the total number of deaths per year. 
According to the OECD/WHO report on the Swiss health system, tobacco use is the 
leading risk factor for disease, as it accounted for 11.2% of total disability-adjusted 
life years (DALYs) lost in the country in 2002. Intuitively, as human beings, our 
primary reaction would be to consider these numbers per se as justifications for 
intervention in the tobacco market, with a substantial reduction in tobacco 
consumption as the objective. Yet, is any intervention justified in the economic 
sense? If yes, what is the optimal level of intervention, and what measures are the 
most effective and, as we must deal with limited resources, cost-effective? Many of 
these questions remain unresolved. The economic approach benefits from 
sophisticated analytical instruments, both theoretical and empirical, that have the 
virtue of providing fairly objective insights into the decision to smoke. 
This dissertation focuses on the influence of tobacco policies on smoking 
behavior, on the perception of smoking risks of young individuals, and on the 
valuation of smoking cessation treatments. It is divided into two main parts. In the 
first part, I discuss the rationale of analyzing smoking decisions from an economic 
perspective, based on the specificities of the product. I then briefly present the main 
models of smoking decisions, and I review the recent literature on the “best-practice” 
interventions aimed at reducing tobacco use, i.e., price increases, information, 
advertising bans, smoking bans, and cessation support. The second part consists of 
three empirical essays related to smoking decisions. The first essay sheds light on the 
ability of tobacco control expenditures to influence individual smoking decisions. In 
2007, in Switzerland, approximately 20 million francs, or 2.6 francs per capita, were 
spent on non-price policy interventions aimed at reducing tobacco use in the 
population. While I provide evidence that these resources were effective in increasing 
the number of quitters, it seems likely that they did not have any significant influence 
on smoking onset. Besides price increases, tobacco control measures implemented in 
the last decade hardly influenced smoking participation among youths. Another 
strategy that could potentially influence the behavior of this population is the 
dissemination of proper deterrent messages. The second essay specifically looks at 
the relative importance that young individuals put on the consequences of smoking. I 
show that apart from lung cancer, reduced life expectancy, and cardiovascular 
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diseases, youths are also concerned by more immediate consequences, such as a 
reduction of physical capacity and sexual dysfunction. I also show that smoking 
participation is negatively associated with the level of far-sightedness, defined as the 
level of concern for long-term health risks. The last essay focuses on smoking 
cessation. Smokers make repeated attempts to quit and are rarely successful, mainly 
due to the negative effects of addiction, i.e., physical and psychological craving.  One 
way to improve the cessation rates is to increase the use in the population of an 
appropriate smoking cessation support. To understand what drives the demand for 
smoking cessation drugs and how smokers value their potential benefits and 
disadvantages, I collected data on hypothetical choices and focused on treatment 
efficacy, minor side effects, price, availability, and ability to prevent smoking-
cessation-associated weight intake. I was able to estimate willingness-to-pay for each 
dimension and for improved medications as a whole and also to point out some 
individual characteristics that determine the decisions to use such products. 
 
Keywords: smoking, smoking initiation, smoking cessation, tobacco control, public 
health, health behaviors, health economics, smoking cessation treatments, risk 
perception, hazard models, discrete choice experiments, best-worst scaling. 
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“Tobacco is a dirty weed,   
I like it. 
It satisfies no normal need,   
I like it. 
It makes you thin, it makes you lean, 
It takes the hair right off your bean. 
It's the worst darn stuff I've ever seen. 
I like it.” 
 
Graham Lee Hemminger, 1915 
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1 General introduction 
 
 
Life is a succession of choices that can have unexpectedly severe 
consequences. Making informed choices involves being properly informed of the 
consequences of these choices, even if they may occur only in the distant future. In 
addition, uncertainty often plays a preponderant role in decisions, especially those 
related to health. In this regard, smoking is an interesting, and somewhat unexpected, 
consumption decision made by individuals. Indeed, deciding to consume an 
expensive product, even in small quantities, that can potentially kill you and harm 
others’ health (including relatives) does not seem trivial. Thus the question that comes 
to mind is obvious: why do people smoke? Are the immediate rewards provided by 
consumption so important that they outweigh all perceived costs, including potential 
future adverse consequences? If this is the case, is it true for any consumption, or only 
for the initial decision, which subsequently leads to excessive levels of consumption 
due to addiction? Another explanation lies in the unpredictability of the 
consequences, significantly reinforced by the important time dimension (indeed, you 
only potentially will get lung cancer only 50 years after initiation). The corollary is 
the notion of risk, which can be ignored, inaccurately assessed, or even denied by 
individuals. Making wise trade-offs between immediate gratification and future, 
uncertain, and not well-understood consequences is obviously not an easy task, at 
least for the quarter of the Swiss population that is currently smoking. Economics, as 
the science of choices, can shed some light on the reasons that push people to take 
such risky decisions. In his article “Economics of tobacco: myths and realities” 
Kenneth Warner (2000) concludes with the following sentence: “If the tobacco 
control community can develop a sophisticated appreciation of the essence of tobacco 
economics, and convey that understanding to public decision makers, perhaps we can 
force the issue of tobacco back where it properly belongs, in the domain of public 
health.” This assertion synthesizes the main motivations that prompted me to do 
research in the field of tobacco economics: applying sophisticated methods rooted in 
economic theory to a concrete and complex public health issue and developing my 
ability to convey sound messages to decision makers.  
Each year, more than 9,000 people die from diseases attributable to smoking 
in Switzerland. This corresponds to 15% of the total number of deaths per year. 
According to the OECD/WHO report on the Swiss health system, tobacco use is the 
leading risk factor for disease, as it accounted for 11.2% of total disability-adjusted 
life years (DALYs) lost in the country in 2002. Intuitively, as human beings, our 
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primary reaction would be to consider these numbers per se as justifications for 
intervention in the tobacco market, with a substantial reduction in tobacco 
consumption as the objective. Yet, is any intervention justified in the economic 
sense? If yes, what is the optimal level of intervention, and what measures are the 
most effective and, as we must deal with limited resources, cost-effective? Many of 
these questions remain unresolved. The economic approach benefits from 
sophisticated analytical instruments, both theoretical and empirical, that have the 
virtue of providing fairly objective insights into the decision to smoke.  
The Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH), in its objectives included in the 
2008-2012 “National Tobacco Program,” targets a 23% prevalence rate in the general 
population by the end of 2012; the actual smoking participation rate is currently 
approximately 27%. To achieve this goal and to ensure that the proportion of smokers 
does not concentrate more in the most deprived classes of the population, careful 
measures must be implemented and a good understanding of smoking decisions must 
be achieved. It is crucial for public health decision makers to rely on scientific 
findings to make informed decisions, to implement effective policies, and to achieve 
goals in terms of improved health in the population. Despite the important literature 
related to tobacco use and tobacco control in the fields of public health and health 
economics, many issues remain unresolved and much research needs to be done to 
most efficiently curb the tobacco epidemic. Some issues directly relate to the behavior 
of individuals, i.e., to the determinants of their consumption decisions. Other issues 
relate to the extent to which interventions should be implemented to influence 
individual decisions, i.e., externalities, a lack of information, or even psychological 
issues that justify interventions. Finally, if a desired level of intervention or a stated 
objective in terms of a reduction of the prevalence of a risky behavior in the 
population is determined, also considering equity issues, economics allows evaluating 
the available policies and then informing policy makers on a sound allocation of 
resources. 
This dissertation delivers novel insights on the influence of tobacco policies 
on smoking behavior, on the perception of smoking risks of young individuals, and on 
the valuation of smoking cessation treatments. It is divided into two main parts. The 
first part sets the scene. I discuss the rationale of analyzing smoking decisions from 
an economic perspective, based on the specificities of the product. I then briefly 
present the main models of smoking decisions, and I review the recent literature on 
the “best-practice” interventions aimed at reducing tobacco use, i.e., price increases, 
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information, advertising bans, smoking bans, and cessation support. The second part 
consists of three empirical essays related to smoking decisions.  
The first essay (Chapter 3) sheds light on the ability of tobacco control 
expenditures to influence individual smoking decisions. In 2007, in Switzerland, 
approximately 20 million francs, or 2.6 francs per capita, were spent on non-price 
policy interventions aimed at reducing tobacco use in the population. While I provide 
evidence that these resources were effective in increasing the number of quitters, it 
seems likely that they did not have a significant influence on smoking onset. Besides 
price increases, tobacco control measures implemented in the last decade hardly 
influenced smoking participation among youths. Another strategy that could 
potentially influence the behavior of this at-risk population is the dissemination of 
proper deterrent messages. The second essay (Chapter 4) specifically looks at the 
relative importance that young individuals put on the consequences of smoking. I 
show that apart from lung cancer, reduced life expectancy, and cardiovascular 
diseases, youths are also concerned by more immediate consequences, such as a 
reduction of physical capacity and sexual dysfunction. I also show that smoking 
participation is negatively associated with the level of far-sightedness, defined as the 
level of concern for long-term health risks. Chapter 5 focuses on smoking cessation. 
Smokers make repeated attempts to quit and are rarely successful, mainly due to the 
negative effects of addiction, i.e., physical (withdrawal) and psychological craving.  
One way to improve the cessation rates is to increase the use in the population of an 
appropriate smoking cessation support. To understand what drives the demand for 
smoking cessation drugs and how smokers value their potential benefits and 
disadvantages, I collected data on hypothetical choices and focused on treatment 
efficacy, minor side effects, price, availability, and ability to prevent smoking-
cessation-associated weight intake. I was able to estimate willingness-to-pay for each 
dimension and for improved medications as a whole and also to point out some 
individual characteristics that determine the decisions to use such products.  
I obviously do not pretend to answer all relevant questions that remain open 
in the field of smoking decisions and its determinants. However, I believe that this 
work adds to the existing knowledge on smoking decisions and on the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of interventions to curb smoking. 
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Part I 
Background 
In this part, I first define what makes cigarettes such a particular commodity. Then, 
after giving an overview of the theoretical framework within which the consumption 
of addictive goods is analyzed, I present the various tobacco-related market failures, 
and discuss the extent to which governments should intervene in individual smoking 
decisions. Finally, I review the available policy instruments intended to reduce 
smoking, their efficacy, and provide some figures related to Switzerland.  
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2 Economics of smoking and public policy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Cigarettes have particular characteristics that influence the analytical 
framework within which smoking decisions are analyzed. If we aim to understand the 
rationale for an economic analysis of smoking decisions, it is essential that we 
identify these particularities. In short, cigarettes generate adverse health consequences 
for users and exposed non-users (most of which manifest in the distant future), 
cigarettes are addictive, and consumption mostly begins during childhood. 
It is well known and has been widely documented that even occasional and 
moderate tobacco use is harmful to health. In other words, smokers cannot achieve a 
“safe” level of cigarette consumption. The only way to avoid smoking-related health 
consequences is abstinence and the avoidance of exposure to the smoke of others. 
Smoking is a major risk factor associated with a large number of diseases, including 
pulmonary complications (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchitis, 
influenza, emphysema, pneumonia, lung cancer), cardiovascular diseases (acute 
myocardial infarction, stroke), and various other cancers (kidney, mouth, stomach, 
pancreas, larynx). In addition to causing serious chronic conditions, smoking also has 
non-lethal health consequences, including the reduction of physical capacity 
(shortness of breath), sexual impairment, and impact on appearance (teeth, skin). It 
has been estimated that a lifelong regular smoker will die about 14 years earlier, on 
average, than a non-smoker with the same characteristics (CDC 2002). Although 
smoking has some immediate impacts on health, the most serious health 
consequences manifest late in life. Because of this lag between consumption and its 
associated risks, individuals naturally do not put much weight on these consequences 
in making decisions regarding smoking. In economic terms, they are said to discount 
the future quite heavily, especially while young. Moreover, individuals are not fully 
aware of the health risks associated with smoking. Some have been extensively 
communicated, but others, such as COPD, are much less well known. This potential 
lack of awareness, the over-optimism of individuals who think that they cannot be 
personally affected, and the time lag between consumption and the impact on health 
suggest that individuals do not fully incorporate the health consequences of smoking 
in their decisions. Furthermore, smoking can have adverse health consequences for 
non-smokers through environmental tobacco smoke (second-hand smoke).  
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According to economic theory, a good is addictive if its consumption during a 
particular period depends strongly on past consumption patterns. Cigarette addiction 
is both physical (because of the impact of nicotine on the brain) and psychological (as 
associated with gesture, ritual, habits). Three concepts are used to characterize 
addiction: tolerance, reinforcement and withdrawal. When an individual develops 
tolerance for a substance, the higher the cumulative past consumption, the less utility 
is derived from a given level of present consumption. In other words, the body 
becomes used to the drug, and an increasingly larger quantity is required to satisfy the 
individual1. The notion of reinforcement is directly linked to the benefits of 
consumption (pleasure, the effects of nicotine, psycho-social effects, the gesture, the 
“ritual”) and the costs avoided (one smokes to avoid cravings). Withdrawal is the 
body’s reaction to a lack of nicotine after the cessation or reduction of consumption. 
The associated symptoms include nausea, high blood pressure, abnormal heart rate, 
irritability, nervousness, and anxiety.  
Finally, the fact that smoking initiation mostly occurs before the age of 20 has 
important implications for the analysis of smoking decisions2. Individuals in this age 
group are more short-sighted, are often less informed, and feel the need to be 
accepted by their peers. Young individuals are usually not fully aware of the addictive 
potential of cigarettes when they start smoking and are overoptimistic about their 
ability to quit. They thus often regret their choice later in life.  
In summary, smoking is harmful to both direct and indirect smokers (i.e., 
those who are exposed to “second-hand” smoke). Furthermore, it is essential that we 
consider the time dimension if we aim to understand smoking decisions, both in 
relation to the occurrence of health consequences and to the development of addiction 
over time. In the next section, I describe smoking decisions from an economic 
perspective, relying on the specific character of this particular commodity as 
described above.  
 
  
                                                            
1
 In the case of tobacco use, consumption increases only up to a certain level and then remains stable 
 
2
 More than 80% of current smokers in Switzerland started before 20 years old, and almost no initiations are observed 
after the age of 25 (see Chapter 3) 
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2.2. Theoretical framework  
The specific qualities of cigarettes as a consumer good (or rather “bad”) lead 
us to extend the standard microeconomic framework of individual behavior. When 
they face the decision to consume such goods, individuals are assumed to consider the 
immediate benefits that they draw from consumption in tandem with the monetary 
(and non-monetary) present and future costs of consumption. The dynamic and 
temporal dimension is central because of the addictive nature of the good and because 
of the harmful dimension of cigarette smoking, the consequences of which mostly 
manifest in the distant future. In his conceptual framework for analyzing smoking 
decisions, an economist should then take into account the past (addiction, habit 
formation), the present (price and other non-monetary costs), and the future (the 
potential disutility associated with smoking-related health risks, the risk of becoming 
addicted, and the future effects of addiction). Given that the consumption decisions of 
an individual who has already experienced cigarettes are likely to be influenced by its 
addictiveness, it is reasonable to separately analyze the decisions of those who have 
never smoked cigarettes. It also makes sense to distinguish between current and past 
users. Thus, we can define smoking decisions as the decision to start smoking (new 
users), to change the quantity consumed or to quit (current users), and to relapse 
(former users). 
The tobacco history of an individual is better understood when divided into 
several phases. A young individual will look for immediate reward, has low self-
control, and has limited information. Youths perceive cigarette consumption as an 
opportunity to rebel, to show that they belong to a group, or to simply look more 
mature. Their decision to smoke is likely to be influenced by their peers and will 
usually not be very costly (at least in monetary terms) because experimentation with 
cigarette smoking is often not related to the purchase of the product. In this age group, 
other immediate costs of consumption include bypassing family rules and laws 
regarding minimum purchase age. Young individuals are likely to be less aware than 
adults about the health risks associated with smoking, and even if they know some of 
the risks, they are prone to put little weight on those that are distant in time. This lack 
of awareness is also related to the addictive potential of the product, which is often 
deemphasized, leading to over-optimism about future personal smoking status. Once 
an individual has smoked his first cigarette, he starts to accumulate “addictive capital” 
that will have a significant impact on his future decisions. Both the effects of nicotine 
on the body and the psychological gratification associated with smoking 
reinforcement have a positive impact on utility. Moreover, at least some of the 
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benefits of consumption come from avoiding the costs that would be associated with 
reduced consumption. With this in mind, the smoker smokes at least partly to avoid 
disutility rather than to increase utility. Moreover, the greater the addictive stock, the 
more the individual will have to consume during the next period to achieve the same 
level of utility. These considerations have important consequences for the smoking 
decisions of current and past smokers. Because the marginal utility of cigarettes 
increases with the addictive capital, new smokers will progressively increase their 
level of consumption. Furthermore, when a smoker decides whether or not to quit, the 
perceived benefits of quitting are often offset by the huge perceived withdrawal costs. 
After an attempt to quit, the withdrawal costs experienced are such that former 
smokers often relapse. When a smoker ages, two effects compete, and the resulting 
effect on smoking behavior is unclear. First, long-term smokers have accumulated an 
important addictive stock, and thus, the associated costs of quitting might then be 
very important for them. However, as they become older, the health risks associated 
with smoking become imminent and therefore may have a larger influence on 
consumption decisions.  
 
Economic models of addiction 
Here I present some models of individual behavior that incorporate 
considerations related to addiction (see also Chaloupka and Warner 2000). In these 
models, individuals are said to be myopic, fully rational or imperfectly rational.  
Myopic individuals know that smoking is addictive but do not anticipate the 
consequences of addiction when they make smoking-related decisions. Fully rational 
individuals are assumed to be very aware of the future implications of addiction and 
to incorporate those considerations into their decisions. This point of view, mostly 
developed by Becker and Murphy (1988), implies perfect foresight. Imperfectly 
rational individuals have preferences that are not consistent over time.  
When we model the demand function for a particular good, the standard 
method involves defining a utility function that depends on the current consumption 
of the good of interest (
t
C ) and on a composite good that reflects all other 
consumption (
t
Y ). The utility function at time t is then 
t t t
U = f(C ,Y )
         
(2.1) 
The consumer is assumed to maximize this utility function subject to income 
constraints such that we attain a demand function that depends on current price (and 
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other usual factors). This model of consumption is not well suited to addictive goods 
because it does not incorporate the idea that past consumption has an influence on 
present consumption, which in turn influences future consumption. The concept of 
habit formation has been introduced by several authors, including Pollak (1970). The 
idea is to include elements of past consumption in the utility function. In these 
models, referred as myopic addiction models, a good is addictive if past consumption 
increases current consumption. Past consumption is summarized in a stock of 
addictive capital (
t
S ) that depreciates over time, at rate δ .   
t t t t
U = f(C ,S ,Y )
        (2.2) 
with  
t t-1 t-1S = C +(1 - δ)S         (2.3) 
In addition to conventional current factors, the resulting demand function includes 
past consumption. In these models, tastes are allowed to change over time in relation 
to past consumption. However, it is assumed that individuals do not take into account 
the future implications of their addiction in their current consumption decisions.  
Whereas the future consequences of consumption are ignored in myopic 
models, individuals maximize their lifetime utility in the rational addiction model 
(Becker and Murphy 1988), taking into account the correlations between past, 
current, and future consumption. The idea of “adjacent complementarity” is 
introduced, in which the same goods consumed in two adjacent periods are 
complements. In this framework, the rational smoker knows that he will become 
addicted and is fully aware of all of the consequences of his consumption. Demand is 
therefore assumed to depend on past and future anticipated price and on past and 
future consumption3. Chaloupka (1991) presents the rational addiction model in an 
original way. He defines three elements that are included in the utility function: health 
capital,
t
H , euphoria generated by the consumption of the addictive good,
t
E , and a 
composite good,
t
Y : 
t t t t
U = f(H ,E ,Y )
        (2.4) 
In the model, 
t
E
 is assumed to depend on the addictive stock 
t
S , which depreciates 
over time (see (2.3)), and on current consumption 
t
C : 
 
                                                            
3
 The structural form of the model could be 
t 0 1 t 2 t-1 2 t+1 3 t-1 3 t+1C = β + β P + β P + δβ P + β C + δβ C , with δ , the 
discount factor reflecting the rate of time preferences.  
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t t t
E = g(S ,C )
        
(2.5) 
This view allows us to understand the interdependency between past and current 
consumption based on two aspects of the addictive good: reinforcement and 
tolerance. It is first simply assumed that current consumption increases utility, i.e., 
that E C > 0∂ ∂ . It is also assumed that the addictive stock has a negative impact on 
health, i.e. H S < 0∂ ∂ . Furthermore, the marginal pleasure provided by additional 
consumption depends on the stock of past consumption, i.e., 2E C S > 0∂ ∂ ∂  
(reinforcement). Tolerance is reflected by the negative relationship between the 
addictive stock and current pleasure (euphoria), i.e. E S 0∂ ∂ ≤ . The last 
characteristic of addictive goods is the important drop in utility associated with zero 
consumption, reflecting withdrawal. The rational addiction model has many 
implications for behavior and for the responsiveness of the individual to policies such 
as price increases or information dissemination. Because of adjacent 
complementarity, it is assumed that a permanent price increase will have a greater 
effect in the long run than in the short run. Perfect foresight, as assumed here, does 
not exclude individual heterogeneities in terms of time preferences; therefore, the 
extent to which individuals incorporate the future into their decisions has an 
important impact on the interpretation of the model. Some subgroups within the 
population are assumed to have greater rates of time preference (they are assumed to 
be more present-oriented), e.g., young, less educated individuals. These individuals 
will be more sensitive to immediate changes in product cost. Less present-oriented 
individuals are likely to assign more weight to the future consequences of their 
current consumption and will thus be more responsive to changes in risk perceptions.  
In their review of models of addiction, Chaloupka and Warner (2000), cite a 
quotation by Winston (1980) that summarizes the criticism of rational models of 
addiction: "The addict looks strange because he sits down at period j=0, surveys 
future income, production technologies, investment/addiction functions, and 
consumption preferences over his lifetime to period T, maximizes the discounted 
value of his expected utility, and decides to be an alcoholic. That's the way he will get 
the greatest satisfaction out of life. Alcoholics are alcoholics because they want to be 
alcoholics, ex ante, with full knowledge of its consequences." Moreover, the rational 
addiction model assumes exponential discounting of future consequences. As an 
alternative, an emerging literature proposes another category of models that includes 
elements of behavioral economics in the formalization of smoking decisions and 
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particularly in the evolution of preferences over time. In the rational addiction 
framework, utility at time t equals the exponentially discounted lifetime utility:  
T -t
i
t t t+i
i=1
U = U(C ) + δ U(C )∑        (2.6) 
Exponential discounting implies that the consumer is time-consistent, i.e. that he puts 
the same relative weight on utility between two consecutive periods in the immediate 
future than between two consecutive periods in the distant future. Consumer time-
inconsistencies were formally introduced by Gruber and Koszegi (2001, 2004). The 
authors assumed another type of discounting – hyperbolic discounting – under which 
the relative weight of the future changes over time (see also Phelps and Pollak 1968, 
Laibson 1997). Specifically, the discount factor between two periods in the future is 
higher than the discount factor between time t and t+1. The consumers therefore put a 
higher relative weight on immediate rewards and costs than on future consequences. 
Formally, a quasi-hyperbolic discrete discount function is used: 
 
T -t
i
t t t+i
i=1
U = U(C ) + β δ U(C )∑        (2.7) 
With β = 1  we are back to exponential discounting. Hyperbolic discounting occurs 
when 0 < β < 1 , reflecting the degree of orientation toward the present. “Impatience” 
in the short run ( βδ ) is then in conflict with “patience” in the long run ( δ ), and the 
story repeats at each period (Gruber and Koszegi 2004). This type of time-
inconsistency leads to consumption levels than are in conflict with the preferences of 
the “future self”.  
Two alternative approaches to modeling departure from rationality are 
proposed by Orphanides and Zervos (1995 and 1998). At the age of smoking 
initiation, people are not legally allowed to take part in many processes (they cannot 
vote, drive, etc.). Their status in this way reflects their lack of ability to decide for 
themselves and lack of consumer sovereignty as recognized by the society. Most 
young people who try smoking are not aware of the risks of addiction, and they will 
probably regret their decision later in life. This consideration is formally presented by 
authors who consider the subjective probability that young individuals will become 
addicted to cigarettes (Orphanides and Zervos 1995). The same authors (Orphanides 
and Zervos 1998) model the potential impact of random shocks on the discount factor 
(i.e., in time preferences). Some critical life events might have an important influence 
on individual time-preferences, and these events are often not perfectly anticipated. 
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The discount factor depends on the stock of addictive consumption and on these 
random shocks: 
t t
θ = f(S ,η )          (2.8) 
This modeling leads to discontinuities in optimal consumption patterns induced by 
brutal changes in the discount factor. Other models of imperfect rationality include 
studies by Bernheim and Rangel (2004 and 2005) in which the authors assume the 
cue-triggered use of addictive substances, leading to heterogeneous price 
responsiveness among individuals. Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) have also developed a 
model of addiction that includes notions of self-control (temptation, irresistibility).  
 
General conceptual framework 
To analyze smoking decisions and related policies, I use a simple analytical 
framework that incorporates the main issues raised above about the particularities of 
tobacco consumption. The decision to start, quit, or relapse depends on the perceived 
net benefits of this decision over those of the alternative (not starting, continuing 
smoking, and continuing not to smoke). The individual is assumed to weigh the 
benefits and the immediate and potential futures costs of the decision. For current 
(former) smokers, utility derived from additional (potential) consumption is 
influenced by past consumption (through the addictive stock).  
While immediate costs of smoking - mainly market price and time costs - are 
easily assessed, the appraisal of future consequences is much more complex. They 
have a perceived probability of occurrence, have particular perceived implications, 
and are discounted by individuals. I assume here that the consumer only knows a 
fraction of the potential costs that his consumption could induce and that he does not 
precisely know his personal probability of being affected. I define the discounted 
expected costs of cigarette smoking for an individual i as follows: 
m
* *
i i ij j j
j=1
E[Cost] = δ ρ π H∑
  
j = 1, ...,m  consequences   (2.9) 
Where δ  is the individual discount factor, *jπ  is the true probability that consequence 
j occurs, *jH  are the true costs of consequence j, and ijρ reflects the individual over- 
or under-estimation of the risks and of the costs of consequence j. Individual 
heterogeneities are thus included in parameters δ and ρ . For never-smokers deciding 
whether or not to start smoking, the uncertainty is not limited to health consequences 
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but instead also concerns the extent to which they will become addicted (in other 
words, the higher the perceived subjective ability to quit in the future, the lower the 
perceived future consequences). 
For potential “starters”, the perceived benefits of smoking include peer 
acceptance, rebellion, self-esteem, pleasure, and experimentation. The present costs 
are market price, time costs, and access limitations (including family rules). We 
expect individuals, mostly youths, to under-estimate future consequences because of 
their lack of information, over-optimism (leading to a small ijρ ) and high orientation 
toward the present (high δ ). If we look at smoking cessation, the benefits are mainly 
averted costs (lower expenses, diminution of future long-term and short-term 
consequences) and the costs depend strongly on the addictive stock and are mostly 
associated with withdrawal.  
This framework allows us to understand how public policies should be 
developed to influence smoking-related decisions. The objectives might be to prevent 
potential new smokers from starting, to encourage current smokers to quit or at least 
to cut down consumption, and to prevent relapse among former smokers. These 
objectives can be accomplished by increasing present costs of consumption, e.g., 
raising taxes to raise market prices, implementing access limitations (minimum age at 
purchase), reducing the number of points-of-sale (including vending machines), and 
smoking bans (it is less “comfortable” to smoke). Policies might also be targeted at 
increasing perceived future costs, mainly by increasing jρ . In other words, policies 
can be targeted at improving the personal risk perceptions of individuals and 
increasing knowledge about the real consequences of the various health risks. 
Another strategy is to reduce the positive influence that tobacco industry advertising 
has on the perceived benefits of smoking. Additionally, to reduce the costs of 
smoking cessation, policies might facilitate access to cessation support, including 
pharmaceutical products. The extent to which the government should intervene to 
influence smoking-related decisions is discussed in section 2.3, and evidence about 
the effectiveness of various tobacco control policies is reviewed in section 2.4.  
 
2.3. Market failures and rationale for a government intervention  
If one assumes that smokers are forward-looking and rational, have perfect 
information about the consequences of tobacco use with respect to both its impact on 
health and its addictive potential, and support the entire cost of their consumption, 
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then from an economic perspective, there is no room for government intervention. 
However, this description does not reflect reality. The tobacco market involves 
numerous market failures that make the efficient market viewpoint inapplicable and 
that justify tobacco control interventions. I classify the main market failures of 
tobacco use into three broad categories: external costs, lack of information, and 
limited rationality. The last category is related to departures from the rationality 
assumption that leads to what is referred to as “internalities” (or intrapersonal 
externalities). 
The rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988) model posits that because 
the consumer takes all future consequences of his consumption into account in his 
decisions, the only justification for government intervention is the costs that smokers 
impose on others (external costs). However, whether these costs are really important 
is still subject to debate. Thus, with perfect information, and if rational and forward-
looking smokers do not impose large costs on others, the government should not 
intervene too much. At the other extreme, some public health advocates suggest that 
even the smallest level of consumption is unacceptable and therefore that taxes should 
be set accordingly, i.e., at a very high level. The “intermediate” level of intervention 
(or rather the “efficient” level) lies somewhere between these two approaches. The 
three conceptual cases are presented in Figure 2.1 and lead to different desirable 
levels of consumption. The first diagram presents the extreme case for which there is 
no room for intervention. The consumer is rational and forward-looking and has full 
information; the externalities (and thus the external costs) are inexistent. The diagram 
in the center shows the intermediate description, with lower optimal consumption 
because of a lack of rationality, imperfect information, and a broader view of external 
costs. Finally, the last diagram depicts the public health approach, for which zero 
consumption is the optimal level. 
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Figure 2.1: Optimal level of cigarette consumption - three perspectives 
Rationality, full 
information, no 
externalities 
 
Intermediate 
Perspective 
 
Public health 
perspective 
 
 
 
The three approaches can be assessed with respect to the difference between 
marginal private and social cost at the equilibrium (i.e., at QR*, QI*, and QPH*, 
depending on the perspective), that reflect the desirable degree of intervention. If the 
first perspective is considered, the level of intervention is null, whereas from the 
public health perspective, the government should implement very intensive and 
somewhat paternalistic interventions to reach the zero level of consumption. The two 
extreme cases seem difficult to justify economically, the efficient level of intervention 
probably lies in-between.   
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External costs, lack of information, and lack of rationality 
The external costs are the costs that a smoker imposes on other individuals or 
on the society as a whole without paying the full cost, i.e., the costs that are not 
reflected in the price paid by the smoker. The most salient types of external costs are 
those related to the health impact of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS, or passive 
smoking). Whereas the costs of ETS mostly include the medical costs of heart 
diseases and prenatal effects (low birth weight), the exact burden of ETS remains 
unclear and is still under debate (see section 2.4.4). Other classical external costs are 
damage to property, fire and pollution caused by cigarette smoking. Smoking-related 
health expenditures are also often presented as a major source of smoking 
externalities. Each year in Switzerland, the health care sector devotes approximately 
3% of its resources to treating the four most prevalent smoking-related illnesses (the 
direct costs of smoking, Jeanrenaud et al. 2010). In the United States, Warner et al. 
(1999) estimate that 6-8% of health care resources are used to treat tobacco-related 
diseases. Smoking imposes a high burden in terms of years of life lost and loss of 
quality of life4, and the average smoker costs more in terms of medical expenditures 
than the average non-smoker. By reducing smoking, a country could reduce that 
spending and reallocate the funds to treat other diseases. However, the excess medical 
costs of smokers should be considered an external cost only if medical expenditures, 
or a portion of them, are borne by the society and not the individual himself. Smokers 
do not pay higher premiums in Switzerland, which means that they do not fully bear 
(internalize) the excess costs that they incur for the group insurance. Moreover, a 
portion of health expenditures is publicly funded. However, there is still an important 
debate taking place about the net impact of smoking on lifetime medical expenditures. 
This is because premature death among smokers reduces high expenditures at an 
advanced age. The “benefits” of smoking in terms of avoided future medical costs 
could even offset excess costs resulting from smoking-related conditions. The impact 
on the pension system should also be taken into consideration in a complete analysis 
of the net costs of smoking. It is often argued that smokers, in dying earlier, subsidize 
non-smokers’ pensions and do not fully benefit from their pensions. So, on the one 
hand, smokers have higher health expenditures due to expensive smoking-related 
diseases, whereas on the other hand, they die earlier, resulting in lower health 
expenditures. However, if we use the argument that the peak in health expenditures 
always occurs in the last year(s) of life, non-smokers will just “shift” their peak 
                                                            
4
 It has been estimated that 11.2% of the total disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in Switzerland in 2006 were 
attributable to smoking (WHO 2006). 
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expenditures several years later (in other words, most of their additional years of 
living as compared with smokers will not be very costly).  
Studies have investigated the net cost approach, which compares the 
“lifetime” costs of smokers and non-smokers. The results presented in the literature 
are quite mixed because of the variety of approaches used and assumptions made, but 
they tend to confirm that smoking imposes additional health costs, albeit at a 
relatively low level. In Switzerland, Leu and Schaub (1985) find that the ratio of the 
lifetime costs of smokers to the lifetime costs of non-smokers is around 0.95 and thus 
conclude that smoking leads to lower health expenditures (a ratio of 0.85 was found 
in the Netherlands, as presented in Barendregt et al. 1997). Manning et al. (1991) 
estimates that each pack of cigarette increases the net present value of health costs in 
the United States by approximately 30 cents. Also in the US, Hodgson (1992) 
estimates that the population of smokers in 1992 will increase health care costs by 
US$500 billion over the remaining years of their lives. In Australia, Collins and 
Lapsley (1996) show that avoided costs because of premature death represent only 
half of the gross health care costs of smoking. In addition, many social costs studies 
include production losses. Production losses are caused by smoking-related disability 
(sick leave) and by premature mortality (loss of productive life years). In conclusion, 
even if lifetime health care costs were consistently higher for non-smokers and not 
offset by production losses, it would be difficult to argue that society would be better 
off with more people dying earlier. Life absolutely has a value per se that should be 
accounted for in cost calculations. In Switzerland, smoking-related health care costs 
in 2007 were estimated at CHF 1.7 billion, production losses at CHF 3.9 billion, and 
human costs at CHF 4.3 billion (Jeanrenaud et al. 2010). 
The second category of market failures is related to the lack of information 
about the consequences of smoking. Individuals are not fully aware of smoking-
related risks, and they are often over-optimistic about how they will be personally 
affected by smoking. Moreover, non-smokers, mainly young people, do not fully 
understand the addictive properties of cigarettes. As a result, smokers often later 
experience unexpected future difficulties trying to quit. Information-related costs, or 
uninformed costs (Chaloupka 2002), result in greater consumption than would be 
observed if individuals had perfect information on health risks and addiction. 
Beyond classical externalities, part of the cost that a smoker imposes to 
himself can be considered external, depending on the assumed degree of rationality. If 
the smoker is fully rational, he fully takes into account the impact that his 
consumption has on himself in his current decisions, the costs are thus internalized. 
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However, under limited rationality, preferences are not consistent over time, and there 
might be important gaps between what an individual decides today and what his 
“future self” would decide.  Individuals are time-inconsistent and then impose 
unexpected costs on themselves because today’s individual differs from the individual 
in the long term. For instance, the individual today might postpone attempting to quit, 
as he is confident in his ability to quit later, but later, that same individual might 
postpone the decision again. This time-inconsistency is formally incorporated in the 
behavioral economics model of smoking decisions developed by Gruber and Koszegi 
(2004) (see also Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a 1999b). In this 
framework, the more the individuals are time-inconsistent, the more important the 
intervention should be. Interventions such as tax increases are seen as a remedy for 
this lack of self-control and thus should be important if limited rationality is 
widespread in the population. In contrast, other models that incorporate psychological 
aspects, such as cue-triggered consumption, or temptation and irresistibility conclude 
that, for some types of individual, price increases would be clearly welfare reducing 
(Bernheim and Rangel 2004 and 2005, Gul and Pesendorfer 2004).  
In summary, the level of tobacco consumption might be too high because 
individuals do not take into account the full consequences of their own consumption 
on others and on themselves. Moreover, the less informed a smoker is about the 
smoking-related health adverse effects, the higher is the excess consumption. Many 
aspects of smoking externalities and internalities are even better justified when we 
look at youth smoking. Indeed, orientation toward the present, lack of self-control, 
lack of information, and underestimation of the risk of addiction are more likely in 
this subgroup of the population. 
 
Smoking inequalities 
An important feature of the tobacco epidemic model proposed by Lopez et al. 
(1994) is the widening of socioeconomic differences in the context of smoking 
prevalence. In the early stages of the process, smoking prevalence was higher in 
upper socioeconomic groups. Today, however, this trend has reversed, resulting in 
major socioeconomic inequalities in terms of both smoking prevalence and smoking-
related morbidity and mortality.  Smoking has been identified as a primary cause of 
inequalities in death rates between different social classes (Jha et al. 2006). In a study 
conducted among European men, Mackenbach et al. (2004) find that 20% of the 
educational differences in those who suffer premature mortality are attributable to 
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smoking. Extensive international literature offers evidence that tobacco does not 
affect all socioeconomic subgroups of the population equally (it is estimated that 
smoking prevalence is about 50% higher in lower socioeconomic groups than in 
higher groups (Mackenbach et al. 2007)). Giskes et al. (2005) analyzed trends in 
smoking behavior by education level between 1985 and 2000 in Western Europe. 
They find a greater decline in smoking prevalence and consumption levels among 
more educated individuals. Huisman et al. (2005) also find that education is a strong 
predictor of smoking in Europe. In a study among British women, Harman et al. 
(2006) identify socioeconomic gradients for ever-smoking, quitting and current 
smoking. Using six socioeconomic indicators, Laaksonen et al. (2005) identify a 
strong association between education, occupational status and current smoking. 
Cavelaars et al. (2000) find higher rates of current and ever-smoking among less 
educated individuals in northern European countries. 
  Barbeau et al. (2004) find the same type of association in the United States, 
where they note an increased prevalence of current smoking and an independent 
association between current smoking and lower-paid jobs, low education levels and 
lower income levels. Moreover, they find a positive association between success in 
quitting and socioeconomic resources. This last finding is supported by the studies of 
Borland et al. (1991), and more recently Lee and Kahende (2007), in which the 
authors find an association between certain socioeconomic indicators and the 
probability of successfully quitting. In a recent review by Schaap and Kunst (2009), 
the authors notice that the majority of studies on socioeconomic inequalities in 
smoking were focused on education and used smoking prevalence as the outcome of 
interest. The authors emphasized the importance of analyzing smoking inequalities 
with respect to other socioeconomic indicators and various smoking outcomes related 
to initiation and cessation. In Appendix A, I briefly show the results of the analysis of 
pooled cross-sectional Swiss data that indicate an evidence of a socioeconomic 
gradient in successful cessation with respect to education level and income. These 
inequalities justify an intervention of the government if we rely on a more normative 
approach of economics. 
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2.4. Policies 
This section is intended to describe the most recommended policies aimed at 
reducing tobacco use. The focus is threefold: How does the policy influence smoking 
decisions? What is the existing evidence? What is the situation in Switzerland? 
 
2.4.1. Tobacco taxation  
Following the Ramsey Rule (Ramsey 1927), relatively price-inelastic goods 
are good candidates for taxation. For such commodities, important tax increases will 
lead to a less than proportionate drop in consumption and will therefore generate 
additional revenues. Historically, this has been the central argument for cigarette 
taxation, and it remains important nowadays (with cigarettes an inelastic good 
consumed by one of every four individuals). The increasing awareness that smoking 
is harmful has encouraged the use of cigarette taxation as a health policy tool for 
reducing consumption and smoking-related harm. As mentioned earlier, the extent to 
which it seems this policy tool should be used depends on the perspective used to 
analyze tobacco taxation. Based on the public health perspective, the right tax level is 
the highest that is politically acceptable, whereas within the economic framework, the 
optimal rate should take into account specific market failures related to the 
consumption of these products, including externalities resulting from secondhand 
smoke, excess life-time healthcare costs among smokers, lack of information, and 
lack of rationality. Even in the economics literature, the issue of optimal taxation is 
left unresolved. Indeed, individual behavior is shown to be consistent using various 
models of consumption, and depending on which model is used to describe smoking 
decisions, an increase in the cigarette excise tax that leads to a price increase can be 
seen as welfare increasing or as an additional burden to consumers for which desired 
consumption is reduced. The issues surrounding the identification and valuation of 
the negative externalities and the so-called internalities at play are numerous and 
complicated.  
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Figure 2.2: Real price of cigarettes in Switzerland (1958-1007, price index 1958=100) 
 
Until the mid-1980s, the real price of cigarettes in Switzerland remained 
stable, and it even decreased during some periods (Figure 2.2). However, during the 
last decade, we have witnessed important tax increases. The average price of a 
cigarette pack in 2009 was CHF 6.90, with taxes representing 64% of the price. In 
Table 2.1, I show the various components of cigarette price. In addition to the main 
tobacco tax, with revenues (2.19 billion in 2008) that are used to finance ageing and 
disability insurance (AVS/AI), two types of taxes are earmarked for specific tobacco-
related uses: one for a tobacco prevention fund (to finance prevention programs and 
prevention-related research) and one to subsidize Swiss tobacco producers (farming).  
 
Table 2.1: Price of a cigarette pack (20 units) in Switzerland, 2009 
 CHF 
Industry share 2.45 
Taxes 4.45 
Tobacco tax 3.91 
Value-added tax 0.49 
Tobacco prevention fund  0.026 
Tobacco farming 0.026 
Price 6.90 
(% tax) (64.5%) 
Source: Customs General Directorate (2008), own 
computations 
 
However, tobacco prices remain quite low compared to those in other 
countries. In addition, the purchasing power of Swiss citizens is high, making these 
products highly affordable for them. Guindon et al. (2002) illustrates this, using the 
Economist’s Big Mac PPP index as suggested by Scollo (1996) to assess the 
affordability of cigarettes in different countries in 2001. In Figure 2.3, we see that 
Switzerland is among the countries in which cigarettes (in this case Marlboros) are 
relatively cheap. In the same paper, the authors compute that for individuals living in 
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Geneva, 12 minutes of work are sufficient, on average, to pay for a pack of cigarettes, 
whereas 18-30 minutes are needed in other OECD countries. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: International brand prices of a 20-unit pack at Big Mac PPP, 2001 
 
Source: adapted from Guindon et al. (2002) 
 
In this section, I review some issues related to tobacco taxation as a health 
policy tool under the general framework presented in Figure 2.4, and I illustrate some 
of the concepts using Swiss data.  
 
Figure 2.4: Tax as a health policy tool 
 
The relevant policy tool for influencing price-to-consumer numbers (which in 
turns can lead to a change in the demand) is the taxation of tobacco products. One 
essential question is whether tax increases lead to price increases. In Switzerland, the 
tobacco market is mainly held by three firms, and this has important implications for 
the tax-price relationship. Chaloupka et al. (2000), in their chapter on tobacco 
taxation, conclude that “increases in cigarettes taxes, because of their addictive 
nature and because of the oligopolistic structure of the industry, will lead to increases 
in the prices of tobacco products that are likely to match or exceed the increase in the 
tax in most countries.” Considering alcohol tax hikes, Kenkel (2005) provides 
empirical evidence that the policy tool (a tax increase) has led to more than 
proportional increases in price (“taxes are more than fully passed through price”). In 
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Figure 2.5, I show the evolution of the real price and real tax of tobacco products. In 
addition, in Table 2.2, I show the last important tax increases and the subsequent price 
increases that were observed. The value of 1.57 (Table 2.2.) does not reflect the exact 
tax to price rate because other influential factors, such as trends in cigarette prices and 
increases in production costs, should also be considered. However, this number 
suggests that the pass-through rate is likely to be greater than one. Similarly, Keeler et 
al. (1996) find that a one cent increase in the cigarette tax will lead to a price increase 
of 1.1 cents. However, the average price does not reflect the potential heterogeneity in 
unit prices in the country. A concern lies in the promotional reductions (“buy one get 
two”), mostly targeted at young individuals, and the consumption behavior of heavier 
smokers that often benefit from unit price reduction in buying cartons of cigarettes.  
 
Figure 2.5: Tax and price increases in Switzerland 
 
Source: Customs General Directorate (2008), own 
computations 
 
 
Table 2.2: Tax and price increases in Switzerland 
Date Tax 
increase 
Subsequent 
price 
increase 
Ratio price 
increase/ tax 
increase 
01.01.1999 0.3 0.4 1.33 
01.01.2001 0.1 0.2 2.00 
01.10.2003 0.3 0.5 1.67 
01.12.2004 0.5 0.6 1.20 
01.01.2007 0.3 0.5 1.67 
  Average 1.57 
Source: Customs General Directorate (2008), own computations  
 
Once the price has increased, the relevant question is whether or not it has an 
influence on smoking behaviors. An extensive body of international literature 
provides evidence that taxes are an effective policy tool for changing behaviors. 
Many empirical studies have shown a significant negative link between price 
increases and tobacco consumption. Chaloupka and Warner (2001) provide an 
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excellent review of the studies of the demand for tobacco products and show that, 
independently of the method used, most studies conclude to a price-elasticity of 
consumption around -0.4, confirming the idea that cigarette demand has relatively 
low price responsiveness. As reduced overall quantity consumed may be a 
consequence of reduced individual consumption or of lower smoking participation, 
the authors also list some empirical studies that have separated the impact of price 
into its effects on participation and consumption (conditional on participation). These 
studies mostly conclude that the effect is split equally between the two (Harris 1994, 
Chaloupka et al. 1996). Moreover, the data on tobacco consumption have been 
extensively used to provide empirical applications for new econometric techniques 
such as double-hurdle models or, more recently, the zero-inflated ordered probit 
model (Jones 1989, Yen and Jones 1996, Labeaga 1999, Harris and Zhao 2007). 
Because reduced smoking participation (stock of smokers) is achieved by reducing 
the flow of new smokers (preventing initiation) and increasing the flow of new 
quitters (enhancing cessation), an increasing number of studies has separately 
considered the impact of price on smoking initiation and smoking cessation. These 
studies conclude that there is a significant impact of price on smoking cessation. 
However, despite evidence that young individuals are more responsive to taxes than 
adults (see, e.g., Glied 2003, Farrelly and Bray 1998) results are mixed concerning 
the impact of price on smoking initiation (Douglas 1998, Douglas and Hariharan 
1994, Lopes-Nicolas 2002, DeCicca et al. 2002, Cawley et al. 2004, Tauras et al. 
2001). In the third chapter of this dissertation, I provide evidence that tobacco prices 
are effective in increasing the probability of initiation and cessation, taking tobacco 
control spending into account. Under the behavioral economics framework, Fletcher 
et al. (2009) recently showed that the extent to which adolescents were price 
responsive was partly determined by self-control and by the degree to which 
individuals discount the future. Recently, DeCicca et al. (2008a) used various 
approaches to study the impact of price on smoking onset and cessation among young 
adults. After controlling for a antismoking sentiment, the authors found no evidence 
that tax increases deter individuals from starting and some evidence that they are 
effective in enhancing cessation rates. Similar conclusions were obtained in DeCicca 
et al. (2008b), in which the authors show that price might be a more relevant 
determinant of cessation and consumption decisions than it is for smoking initiation. 
Liu (2009) finds an important influence of price on smoking cessation and relapse, 
whereas there is no apparent effect on its ability to prevent smoking initiation.  
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Significant tax increases might also have an impact on the consumption of 
less-taxed tobacco products, such as self-made cigarettes. Hanewinkel et al. (2008) 
highlight the significant cross-price elasticity between cigarettes and less taxed 
cigarettes and therefore provide support for the view that “the availability of low-
taxed loose tobacco may undermine the public health benefits of higher cigarette 
prices”. To develop a preliminary sense of this phenomenon in Switzerland, I 
gathered some data about hand-rolled cigarette sales in Switzerland. Based on the 
quantity of hand-rolled cigarette tobacco sold in Switzerland (in tons), I estimated the 
consumption of hand-rolled cigarettes nationally. For this purpose, I assumed that 
0.75 grams of tobacco were needed to make one cigarette. The results are presented in 
Figure 2.6. We observe a sharp increase in the sale of such products beginning in 
2003/2004 (years in which there were important tax hikes). 
 
Figure 2.6: Sales of hand-rolled cigarettes in Switzerland 
 
Source: Customs General Directorate 
(2008), own computations 
 
Compensating behavior by smokers in response to tax increases have also 
been studied by Evans and Farrelly (1998), who showed that tax hikes can result in 
increased nicotine intake. Similar findings are presented in Farrelly et al. (2004). 
More recently, Irvine (2008), cited by Gospodinov and Irvine (2009), proposed a 
model in which smokers experience a trade-off between the quantity smoked and the 
intensity of smoking. Tax increases could also lead to smuggling. In Switzerland, 
unlike in the United States, there are no cigarette price differences across regions. 
There, smuggling is much more likely to occur from Switzerland to other countries; 
cigarette prices in neighboring countries are higher or are very close to Swiss prices. 
Additionally, according to Joossens and Raw (1998), smuggling is not a significant 
issue in Western Europe, where “it is not caused by market forces” but rather “by the 
illegal evasion of import duty”.  
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Efficiency and equity issues 
In Switzerland, as in many other Western countries, smoking is more 
prevalent among more disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Moreover, low-income 
smokers spend a larger share of their income on cigarettes than do their more affluent 
counterparts. To illustrate this issue, I computed the share of monthly net household 
income spent on cigarettes in different income groups. We see that in the lowest 
income group, the share of income spent on cigarettes reaches 4.3% on average, 
whereas it is only 0.7% for individuals with monthly income higher than CHF 10,000 
(Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: Spending for cigarettes as a share of household income 
 Net monthly household income groups 
 <4000 4000-6000 6000-8000 8000-10000 >10000 
Share of 
income 
4.3% 2.2% 1.4% 1.1% 0.7% 
N 312 575 553 394 377 
Source: Swiss Health Survey 2007. Spending on cigarettes was estimated using data on 
daily consumption and cigarette price in 2007 
 
The tax burden is thus higher for individuals in the lowest income group, and 
the issue of vertical equity (according to the ability-to-pay principle) must therefore 
be raised. The real regressivity of cigarette taxes has been widely debated and 
depends on the viewpoint used to analyze the issue. Although the tax burden is 
undoubtedly higher for low-income groups, some authors suggest that equity can be 
maintained if the consumption of more deprived individuals is more sensitive to price 
changes. Some authors have found that low-income and less educated individuals are 
much more price responsive (see, e.g., Farrelly and Bray 1998, Townsend et al. 
1994). Such results have encouraged a “dynamic” way of looking at regressivity in 
which a proportionately higher reduction in consumption among the poor occurs after 
a price increase, resulting in a greater reduction of the burden in this subgroup. A tax 
increase might then reduce inequalities, with a more rapid decline of the burden 
among deprived smokers. However, this argument is also subject to debate. We see 
that two dimensions must be taken into account and considered in tandem to analyze 
equity: the share of income spent on the specific good and price responsiveness. 
Nevertheless, when relying on this way of assessing progressivity, we do not take into 
account the fact that people who “must” cut back consumption are probably worse off 
(because they derived some utility from using tobacco). It is also important to 
consider horizontal equity, i.e., equity in a particular group within the population (the 
poor). The central idea is that tax increases are a high burden for smokers who do not 
quit. Remler (2004) illustrates this issue using an example of three smokers who react 
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differently to a tax increase. Smoker A quits smoking and therefore bears no financial 
burden. Smoker B continues smoking the same amount, resulting in a high financial 
burden, and smoker C cuts back smoking such that the tax burden is exactly the same 
as before. The authors show that whatever point of view we use to analyze the 
response of these three individuals following a tax increase, the individuals who do 
not quit smoking or diminish consumption are always worse off. The tax burden 
would then be excessively large for strongly addicted poor smokers. Another debate 
exists in response to the question of whether, and to what extent, the welfare losses 
associated with lower cigarette consumption should be taken into account in an 
analysis of the impact of a tax (price) increase. The traditional view is simply that 
people who still consume the good after a tax increase are worse off because they pay 
higher price. Additionally, one should take into account the fact that people who 
consume less are worse off (because they had a positive willingness to pay (WTP) for 
those goods). However, we must ask whether WTP for addictive goods such as 
cigarettes really reflects true WTP. Weimer et al. (2009) study this question and find 
that welfare losses because of reduced consumption of an addictive good represent 
only a fraction of the “traditional” WTP (only 75%). The issue of welfare and 
cigarette taxes is raised in an original way by Gruber and Mullainathan (2002). The 
authors investigate the relationship between tax increases and self-reported well-being 
using survey data and find that smokers are better off (in terms of self-reported 
happiness), after a tax increase. The field of behavioral economics also presents some 
arguments that support the view that WTP for cigarettes does not reflect value for 
smokers. These arguments rely on time-inconsistency. Based on this point of view, 
smokers are motivated to quit but cannot kick the habit and always postpone their quit 
attempts. Gruber and Koszegi (2004) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) argue that 
taxes play the role of a self-control “device” for individuals and thus should be 
substantially increased.  Hersch (2005) also argues that taxes are useful self-control 
mechanisms. In contrast, other authors argue that taxes will have no impact on 
behavior because smoking decisions result from cue-triggered behaviors (Bernheim 
and Rangel 2004 and 2005), i.e., because environmental “cues” trigger mistaken 
tobacco use or because of temptation and inability to resist (Gul and Pesendorfer 
2004). Another recent paper looks carefully at the regressivity of cigarette taxes 
(Gospodinov and Irvine 2009). The authors find no evidence to contradict the 
regressivity argument against taxes using data from Canada, in which prices were 
high in comparison with those presented in previous studies (mostly for the US). The 
authors conclude that a tax increase probably does not benefit low socio-economic 
subgroups. They argue that when cigarette prices reach a particular level ($7-$8), 
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public health authorities should focus on alternative ways to curb the smoking 
epidemic (other tobacco control intervention programs). In this study, the authors also 
point out that low-income individuals are likely to look to the illegal market. One way 
to circumvent the regressivity problem associated with cigarette taxes would be to 
dedicate part of the tax revenues to developing smoking cessation programs (smoking 
cessation therapies, for instance) targeted at lower income populations.  
 
2.4.2. Information 
Information dissemination about the adverse consequences of tobacco use has 
always been part of the tobacco control strategy in developed countries and is usually 
seen as being less “paternalistic” than smoking bans or tax increases. Such 
intervention is economically justified if one assumes that the population, especially 
young individuals, might not be fully aware of the risks associated with smoking. 
This potential lack of information includes information on short-term and long-term 
health effects, the addictive nature of the product, and the health benefits of smoking 
cessation.  The tobacco industry is also a key actor in the dissemination of 
information about smoking risks and can spread misleading facts or attempt to 
mitigate the negative impression that available information on smoking should create. 
These facts make the use of information dissemination as a tobacco control tool a 
challenge. The messages in question must be carefully selected, targeted at specific 
groups within the population, and spread efficiently. The issue of tobacco industry 
advertising is the subject of the next section.  
In the framework presented in section 2.2, the diffusion of information about 
the health-related and non-health-related consequences of smoking are intended to 
increase the perceived costs of consumption, leading fewer individuals to begin 
smoking and more to stop. The relevant messages, if effectively disseminated, are 
assumed to have a direct impact on risk awareness and perception, which in turn 
should have an impact on behaviors. Here, I make an important distinction between 
the level of awareness of the population regarding the negative consequences of 
tobacco use and the accuracy of their subjective assessment of these risks. Knowledge 
about smoking-related health consequences is not limited to knowledge about what 
types of diseases and other negative effects are associated with smoking. Individuals 
should also know how smoking affects the probability of one’s being hurt. Moreover, 
there is an important discrepancy between the true, objective probability of being 
affected and the perceived, subjective probability of being affected. In addition, if 
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people’s understanding of the adverse effects of smoking within a population is 
better, it is likely that that population will become more inclined to accept new anti-
smoking policies (e.g., increases in tobacco control spending or smoking bans), which 
will create indirect benefits of information. The objective of this section is to indicate 
how new information can influence risk assessments among the population and to 
what extent this can leads to changes in smoking-related behaviors. For this purpose, I 
present notions related to risk awareness and perception, I list the various channels of 
information dissemination, and I review some empirical evidence of the effectiveness 
of new information in reducing tobacco use within the population.  
 
Risk awareness and risk perception 
A comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with tobacco use first 
involves the knowledge of all existing risks and their implications in terms of 
increased mortality and morbidity (i.e., decreased quality of life). This information 
forms what I call risk awareness as opposed to risk perception. Risk perception 
reflects the extent to which individuals understand the true risks, i.e., the subjective 
absolute or relative probability of being affected. The relative notion of risk is 
complex and is often not well understood, giving rise to the underestimation of risk. 
The question arises of what one’s own risk is relative to that of other individuals and 
how important this risk is in comparison with risks associated with other causes of 
mortality or morbidity. Another central issue is the addictive nature of cigarette 
consumption. In other words, individuals should be aware of the high addictive 
potential of the product and of how difficult future cessation attempts will be.  
That smoking is bad for one’s health is not really subject to debate. There is a 
consensus within the scientific community and the population at large that tobacco 
use is harmful. Since the early 1960s, general information has been widely 
disseminated about the lethal health risks of smoking, including lung cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. However, the routinely available knowledge is far from 
complete. For instance, individuals often underestimate their personal likelihood of 
being affected. Moreover, a number of other negative effects are not widely 
discussed, and it is likely that the true impact of smoking-related disease on quality of 
life is not well understood. As shown by Sloan et al. (2003), the idea of disability 
(i.e., that of being more dependent on relatives and friends) as related to a particular 
smoking-related condition (COPD), is highly repulsive and is a matter for concern 
among smokers.  Recent scientific findings have also identified various other ailments 
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for which smoking is a risk factor, including subarachnoid hemorrhage (Anderson et 
al. 2004) and multiple sclerosis (Riise et al. 2003). 
Risk perception in the population and its impact on behavior have been 
assessed in a large number of empirical studies. Research by Viscusi (1990, 1991 and 
1992) has been widely cited and criticized. The author assesses risk perception using 
the answer to the following question: “Among 100 cigarette smokers, how many do 
you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?” The results indicate that smokers 
and non-smokers both overestimate the risk of getting lung cancer. With these results 
in mind, and using a microeconomic model, Zweifel (2001) argues that more accurate 
information about health risks would lead to increased consumption. However, 
Viscusi’s measure is an absolute measure of the risks and focuses only on lung 
cancer, the most famous smoking-related lethal condition. It is less likely that 
individuals really understand the consequences of lung cancer in terms of loss of 
quality of life, for instance. Moreover, smokers are often said to be overoptimistic 
about their personal risk of being affected by a serious health condition in the future. 
In a study conducted in the US, Weinstein et al. (2005) find evidence that smokers 
underestimate their personal risk of getting lung cancer as compared to non-smokers 
and other smokers. Sloan et al. (1999) use another measure of risk perception, 
comparing the subjective probability of survival at age 75 to the “true” probability 
(based on life-tables) and showing that smokers overestimate this probability. A 
recent study by Heikkinen et al. (2010) shows that smokers, even if they are aware of 
the health risk associated with smoking, try to justify their behavior using arguments 
such as “moderate use is not harmful” or “my own consumption is not harmful to me”.  
Slovic (2001) shows that, consistent with Viscusi’s findings (1992), young 
individuals overestimate the risk of getting lung cancer. However, the authors also 
show that individuals underestimate the consequences of lung cancer in terms of 
mortality and the number of years of life lost because of smoking. Moreover, when 
comparisons are made between smoking and other lethal risks, young individuals tend 
to underestimate smoking risks. They also witness an optimism bias among young 
smokers regarding their future ability to quit. Several authors have studied the impact 
of risk perception on behavior. Liu and Hsieh (1995) find that greater risk perception 
has a negative impact on the probability of smoking. Slovic (2001) disentangles the 
effect of risk perception into two parts: the effect on smoking initiation and the effect 
on cessation. The results indicate that risk perception plays a more important role in 
cessation decisions than in initiation decisions. Without addressing the question of 
causality, a cross-sectional study by McCoy et al. (1992) shows that smokers who 
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have higher risk perceptions are more likely to be engaged in smoking cessation 
treatment (in clinic). A study by Jonhson et al. (2002), shows that the association 
between young individuals’ risk perceptions and their involvement in risky behaviors 
(smoking and unprotected sex) is sensitive to the way in which the question about 
risks is formulated (in terms of absolute or comparative risk). Slovic (2001) also 
shows that the level of risk perception of smokers depends on the formulation of the 
risk assessment question. Furthermore, it is indicated that individuals think that 
“others” are more likely to be affected than themselves. Using Swedish data on 
adolescents, Lundborg (2007) shows that greater perceptions of the mortality risk and 
the addictiveness of cigarettes are both associated with lower levels of smoking 
participation. These results are confirmed by Lunborg and Andersson (2008), who go 
a step further in showing that risk perceptions differ by gender. Although girls seem 
to put more weight on mortality, they seem to perceive the addictive potential of 
tobacco less clearly. The authors also show a negative association between these 
perceptions and smoking behavior. Finally, Song et al. (2009) find that the degree of 
personal risk perception among adolescents is negatively associated with smoking 
initiation. Interestingly, although most studies focus on perceptions regarding the 
negative effects of tobacco use only, these authors have also investigated the effect of 
perceptions regarding the benefits of smoking initiation. They find that high 
perceived benefits of smoking (including looking cool, feeling relaxed, and becoming 
popular) are associated with higher initiation rates. Another important issue is that 
risk perception is heterogeneous in the population, with the lack of information more 
pronounced among the most deprived (Siahpush et al. 2006).  
 
Vectors of information diffusion and their effectiveness 
The relevant vectors of information diffusion can be classified into two broad 
categories: public and private. The public sources include official public reports on 
the health risks involved (such as the Surgeon General’s report in the US), scientific 
articles (relayed by the media), warning labels on cigarette packs, information 
campaigns, and school-based programs. Private information sources include 
observations regarding the adverse consequences of smoking for friends or relatives, 
personal experience with a negative consequence of tobacco use, or more generally, 
informal discussions. Here, I review some empirical findings related to the impact of 
these vectors on reducing tobacco use.  
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The most widely cited scientific work about the link between smoking and 
lung cancer is that of Doll and Hill (1954 and 1956). This information, along with 
information on chronic bronchitis, was relayed in the US Surgeon General’s report of 
1964. Later, the Surgeon General’s reports progressively conveyed information about 
other health risks, including other types of cancers and cardiovascular diseases (see 
Slovic 2001 for a good review). The Royal College of Physicians in the UK conveyed 
the same type of information in 1962. In the US, Blaine and Reed (1994) have shown 
that the publication of the 1964 Surgeon General report led to an independent 
decrease of 1-1.3% in per capita cigarette consumption the following year. In the UK, 
the short-term decrease was found to be stronger (4.6%), but a subsequent increase of 
1% a year was also identified (Atkinson and Skegg 1973). In Switzerland, Leu (1984) 
has studied the impact of the dissemination of various antismoking and health 
information messages on consumption. The results indicate that the publication of the 
1964 report led to an immediate 15% reduction in consumption that consequently 
partly faded away. In 1966, in parallel to a large tax increase, antismoking messages 
were disseminated in the mass media in Switzerland, and a temporary reduction of 
11% in consumption was observed. The results presented in these studies consistently 
indicate that the impact of the information depreciates over time. 
Warning labels on cigarette packs have been introduced in many countries 
and range from rather simple messages such as “smoking is hazardous” to pictures 
depicting the shocking health consequences of smoking. In Switzerland, the first set 
of information was mandatory in 1978 (“smoking can be bad for your health”). In 
2004, the law was amended to require text to cover at least 50% of the pack; the use 
of the terms “light” and “mild” was also banned. More recently (beginning in 2008 
with a transitional period of two years), it has been required that cigarette packs show 
colored pictures developed by the Federal Office of Public Health and include a short 
paragraph of information about the following negative consequences of smoking: 
shorter life expectancy, lung cancer, the impact on children, the danger for pregnant 
women, addiction, mouth cancer, skin problems, fertility, the presence of chemicals, 
impotence, and heart attack. Packs also contain contact information on cessation 
support (FOPH 2009). Hammond et al. (2003), in trying to assess the effectiveness of 
warning labels at changing behavior, find that smokers who have carefully thought 
about the new labels are more likely to have quit and have attempted to quit or 
reduced their smoking after a three-month follow up period. The results indicate that 
more than 90% of smokers have already seen the warnings and pay attention to them. 
The impact of the labels on knowledge about tobacco-related risks has also been 
35 
 
assessed by Hammond et al. (2006). They study the beliefs of smokers from the USA, 
the UK, Canada, and Australia about several smoking-related risks. Their results 
indicate a lack of knowledge about these risks among smokers and show that to 
communicate the risks efficiently, the warnings should be large, graphic, and should 
focus on diverse issues. They show that smokers who have stated that they have 
noticed the warnings are more aware about the corresponding smoking risks. In 
contrast, Robinson et al. (1997) find no evidence that warning labels are effective in 
reducing smoking among young individuals. Most of them do not even read or 
remember the labels. Some studies did not provide evidence of changes in behavior 
but rather indicated weaker intentions to smoke and indicated a significant perceived 
efficacy of the information in changing behaviors (Vardavas et al. 2009, White et al. 
2008, Moodie et al. 2010, Nascimento et al. 2008). O’Hegarty et al. (2006) also 
indicate the perceived efficacy of graphic labels to be higher than that of text-only 
labels. 
Information campaigns and school-based programs are also vectors of 
information dissemination. In Switzerland, national and regional campaigns are 
regularly implemented. The evaluation of these campaigns is based on intermediate 
indicators, such as recall rates and awareness, and not on their ability to influence 
behaviors. Most of the empirical studies that make the link between campaigns and 
behavior have been conducted in the US. Lewit et al. (1981) studied the first national 
information campaign (1966-1970). The authors found that the diffusion of anti-
smoking messages reduced youth smoking participation. Later studies have 
investigated the impact of California’s statewide anti-smoking campaign (Hu et al 
1995a and 1995b). The authors find an elasticity of cigarette sales with respect to 
media campaign expenditures of approximately -0.05 (in other words, a 10% increase 
in media campaigns expenditures should lead to a 0.5% decrease in cigarette sales). 
More recently, Farrelly et al. (2009) have found the US youth smoking prevention 
campaign truth® to have a significant negative impact on the probability of smoking 
initiation among adolescents age 12-17 years old. Davis et al. (2009) consider the 
influence of recall related to two antismoking campaigns (the truth® campaign and 
one industry-sponsored campaign, “Think Don’t Smoke) on beliefs, smoking 
intentions and smoking initiation. They find that although higher recall for the truth® 
campaign was associated with more virulent antismoking beliefs, lower smoking 
intentions and lower smoking initiation, recall for the tobacco-industry sponsored 
campaign was not associated with tobacco beliefs or smoking initiation (and was even 
associated with greater intention to smoke). Several other studies found no 
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association between recall for specific campaigns and smoking behavior. The impact 
of two antismoking ads on smoking cessation (attempts to quit and abstinence) is 
studied in Niederdeppe et al. (2008). The authors do not find any impact of recall on 
smoking behavior in the general population. However, they show that the impact on 
more educated individuals is significantly higher, suggesting a link between cognitive 
ability and the effectiveness of information diffusion. 
Lee et al. (2010) have recently shown that increased dissemination of 
information on smoking-related health risks has reduced consumption in Taiwan. 
Their information measure was based on the number of journal articles published 
between 1980 and 2004 that contained information about the health risks associated 
with smoking (such as lung cancer and emphysema). Wakefield et al. (2008) use a 
time-series analysis of smoking prevalence to assess the impact of several tobacco 
control policies, including antismoking advertising on television, on smoking 
behavior. They find that sufficient exposure (almost 4 times per month) to 
antismoking messages on TV can lead to a 0.3 percent reduction in smoking 
prevalence. Increasing the costliness of tobacco products should have a similar effect. 
There is not much evidence that school-based prevention programs are effective in 
the long term (Wiehe et al. 2005, Thomas and Perera 2006). Other tobacco control 
policies, such as smoking bans, advertising restrictions, or access limitations, also 
play the role of signals (information vectors), contributing to the idea that smoking is 
not the norm. Finally, the impact of general spending on tobacco control in 
Switzerland on tobacco use, which at least partly reflects the impact of information 
dissemination, is reviewed and analyzed in Chapter 3. 
It is worth noting that information shocks are not merely conveyed by public 
information. Private experience with the health consequences of smoking through the 
experience of friends, colleagues, or relatives or through personal experience with 
such consequences is likely to have a stronger impact than public information. 
Because the probability of experiencing such an event is higher at higher ages, the 
studies that have aimed to assess the impact of health shocks on smoking decisions 
have focused on the population of individuals aged 50 and over. Smith et al. (2001) 
find that smokers are more sensitive to smoking-related health shocks than are non-
smokers. A study by Clark and Etilé (2002) provides some evidence that health 
changes influence smoking later in life. 
37 
 
2.4.3. Advertising, and advertising bans 
In 1993, Swiss citizens voted on a modification of the Constitution that would 
create a comprehensive tobacco advertising ban. The ban was strongly rejected, 
mostly because of the influence of numerous interest groups that campaigned against 
it (the tobacco industry, the media, and cultural events organizers) and because of the 
unbalanced financial resources of the proponents and opponents (Cornuz et al. 1996).  
Further investigations showed that, contrary to one of the main arguments of the 
opponents, a ban would have had only a limited impact on the economy (FOPH 
2007). One argument that was also frequently advanced by the tobacco industry is 
that advertising is only effective in modifying the market share of competing brands 
and does not increase the number of consumers. However, it seems likely that without 
advertising and with a steady smoking cessation rate (estimated at around 4-5% in 
Switzerland (see Chapter 3)) there would have been a sustainable reduction in the 
number of consumer that could have had long-term consequences for the industry. 
Cigarette advertising does not aim to convey objective information about the 
product but rather seeks to create positive emotions and feelings associated with 
smoking. This notion is especially important for young people because it leads to 
increased experimental smoking and then to increased regular consumption. More 
generally, as mentioned by Chaloupka and Warner (2000), advertising “contributes to 
a social environment in which smoking is perceived to be socially acceptable”.   
Tobacco advertising spending falls into the following categories: traditional media 
(i.e., in the press, at the movies5, and on billboards in public places), sponsorship (at 
music festivals, night clubs, and cultural events), direct marketing, and promotion at 
the point of sale. Also included are promotional activities related to price, including 
“buy one get two” promotions. Despite the increasingly restrictive legislation of 
tobacco advertising in traditional media in the cantons – mostly limiting billboard 
advertising – the tobacco industry spent more than CHF 15 per capita to advertise 
their products in 2007 (Jeanrenaud et al. 2010). Although the amount that the tobacco 
industry has spent to advertise using traditional media fell by approximately 30% 
between 1997 and 2007 (FOPH 2007), the use of sophisticated strategies to 
circumvent the legislation is growing. For instance, it has been estimated that in the 
2007-2008 period, almost one third of young individuals aged 14-19 received a gift 
(cigarettes, lighters, or other promotional products) from the tobacco industry (Radtke 
et al. 2008). Gifts with purchase have also been investigated by Slater and Chaloupka 
                                                            
5In a recent study, Sargent and Hanewinkel (2009) showed the importance of exposure to movie smoking as a 
predictor of smoking initiation in Germany.  
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(2001) and have been found to be more frequent in states with stricter tobacco control 
legislation, indicating a willingness of the tobacco industry to actively act against 
antismoking efforts.  
In the US, after the implementation of the MSA Billboard advertising ban, 
Wakefield et al. (2002) showed the shift that occurred in the industry toward point-of-
sale advertising. Another strategy, one that is again mostly aimed at encouraging 
initiation, uses promotional activities to directly change consumer prices. An 
important shift towards the use of this promotional tool has been observed in 
Switzerland, and Pierce et al. (2005) investigate its influence on smoking initiation in 
the US, noting that this strategy has offset the effect of price increases for youth.  
Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide a good review of the link between 
tobacco advertising and smoking. They review both econometric and non-economic 
evidence and show that there was no strong consensus about the effect of advertising 
on behavior. A detailed analysis of past results on this issue is also conducted by 
Saffer and Chaloupka (2000), who classify past studies into three categories and 
highlight the main shortcomings of each approach. The categories are time-series, 
cross-sectional, and ban studies that have as their main limitations the small amount 
of variation in the data, the expansive and difficult data collection processes, and the 
substitution of types of advertising in response to partial bans, respectively. The same 
paper provides evidence that a complete ban can reduce tobacco use but that partial 
bans have little to no impact, mainly because of the re-allocation of resources to non-
banned vectors. A review focused on ban studies that uses time-series data indicates 
comparable conclusions (Quentin et al. 2007). Similar conclusions have been drawn 
for developing countries, with an even higher impact discovered than found in OECD 
countries (Belcher 2008). Other empirical studies have shown the impact of 
advertising on behavior. Nine longitudinal studies provide evidence that tobacco 
advertising increases smoking initiation among youth (Lovato et al. 2003). Moodie et 
al. (2008) show that the implementation of the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion 
Act (advertising ban) in the UK in 2003 had a negative impact on marketing 
awareness, perceived prevalence, and intention to smoke among youth. In the US, 
Keeler et al. (2004) estimate a demand function for cigarettes and find that an 
increase of 10% in tobacco advertising should lead to an increase of 2.7% in 
consumption  (i.e., an advertising elasticity of demand equal to 0.27).   
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2.4.4. Protection against passive smoking  
Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), or passive smoking, is known to affect 
health and is a source of smoking-related externalities. Protection against ETS is 
considered a best practice in most comprehensive tobacco control strategies in 
developed countries. In Switzerland, smoking bans in public places were only 
recently implemented at the cantonal level. The first canton to adopt a comprehensive 
ban was Ticino in 20076. At the national level, a general smoking ban (including 
some exceptions) came into force in April 2010 only. A smoking ban has several 
potential implications, and a comprehensive assessment of this policy intervention 
requires that we take into account all related considerations. Do smoking bans reduce 
exposure to ETS? Do smoking bans have any immediate health impact besides 
reducing long-term effects on health through reduced exposition to ETS? Is this 
policy effective at deterring people from smoking or encouraging them to quit? Does 
it have any impact on the economic activity of bars and restaurants? And finally, is 
this policy cost effective? 
Evidence that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) increases the 
risk that adults will develop fatal diseases first emerged in 1981 (Hirayama 1981, 
Trichopoulos 1981). Since then, many epidemiological studies have been carried out, 
and reviews have now concluded that passive smoking is a cause of serious disease in 
adults and children (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2006, Gerbase 
et al. 2006). As findings from Ireland, Spain and the USA suggest, smoking bans are 
effective in reducing ETS in indoor air (Goodman et al. 2007, Lopez et al. 2007, 
Repace et al. 2006). Evaluating the impact of the Finnish national smoke-free work-
place legislation, Heloma and Jaakkola (2003) find that employee exposure to ETS 
for at least 1 hour per day decreased during a 4-year follow-up period: from 51% in 
1994 to 17% in 1995 and 12% in 1998. Edwards et al. (2008) demonstrate that the 
New Zealand smoke-free regulations resulted in a 12% decrease in self-reported ETS 
exposure. Similarly, Verdonk-Kleinjan et al. (2007), who examined the consequences 
of the workplace smoking ban in the Netherlands, find a significant decline in self-
reported ETS exposure. 
To assess the health impact of smoking bans in bars and restaurants, several 
international studies have examined the decrease in self-reported sensory symptoms 
(eye, throat and nose irritation) and respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness of breath, 
increased mucus production) (Schaller and Pötschke-Langer 2005). In Ireland, the 
                                                            
6
 Smoking bans were implemented in 2007 in Ticino, in 2008 in Grisons, in seven cantons in 2009 and in the rest of 
the country in 2010. 
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percentage of bar staff reporting any respiratory symptoms has declined significantly, 
from 65% to 49%, and reporting of sensory symptoms has declined from 67% to 45% 
(Allwright et al, 2005). In Scotland, sensory and respiratory symptoms in bar workers 
decreased from 79.2% to 53.2% after only 1 month of follow-up (Menzies et al., 
2006). Farrelly et al. (2005) find a significant decrease of sensory symptoms in New 
York hospitality workers (from 88% to 38%). Goodman et al. (2006) find a 28% 
decline in respiratory symptoms and a 50% decline in sensory symptoms among pub 
workers in Dublin. It has also been shown that reductions in exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke had a negative short-term impact on hospital 
admissions for coronary heart disease (Khuder et al. 2007). Smoke-free legislation 
affecting workplaces, restaurants, and childcare facilities has been shown to be 
effective in reducing death by Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (Markowitz 2008). 
Effects on the behavior of current smokers are also of interest, as it is 
important to determine if these bans were effective in reducing tobacco use. Several 
studies report positive effects of smoking bans on intentions to quit smoking, smoking 
cessation, and sales of tobacco products (Asthma and Respiratory Foundation of New 
Zealand 2005, Fong et al. 2005). A review of 26 studies on the effects of smoke-free 
workplaces by Fichtenberg and Glantz (2002) concludes that workplaces that are 
completely smoke-free are associated “with a reduction in absolute smoking 
prevalence of 3.8%”. The impact of protection against passive smoking on smoking 
behavior has been investigated in previous studies, mostly with respect to smoking 
bans on the workplace and with a focus on the health behaviors of workers in the 
hospitality sector rather than those of the general population (Longo et al. 2001, 
Evans et al. 1999, Fichtenberg et al. 2002, Bitler et al. 2009). These studies have 
rather heterogeneous conclusions regarding policy effectiveness. Gallus et al. (2007) 
examine the effects of the Italian smoke-free regulations and find a significant 
decrease in the prevalence of smoking in the Italian general population between the 
pre- and post-ban surveys (from 26.2% in 2004 to 24.3% in 2006). Also, the number 
of cigarettes smoked per day decreased from 15.4 in 2004 to 13.9 in 2006. Heloma 
and Jaakkola (2003) show that the Finnish smoke-free legislation has resulted in a 
drop in prevalence of 5%. Further evidence comes from Levy et al. (2004), who 
review studies on the effect of tobacco control policies on smoking rates. They 
estimate the magnitude of the effects of different tobacco control policies and 
conclude that clean air laws, in addition to higher taxes, can have a large impact on 
smoking rates. Hyland et al. (2008) examine whether smoke-free regulations will 
cause customers to transition from smoking inside pubs to smoking inside homes. 
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They find that smoking at home is not more frequent in a smoke-free country 
(Ireland) than in the United Kingdom, where there are no smoke-free laws in place. 
An exhaustive review of 97 studies assessing the economic impact of 
smoking bans on the hospitality sector revenues is presented by Scollo et al. (2003). 
The authors focus on the methodological quality and the funding sources of the 
studies. Quality is assessed using four criteria (Siegel, 1992), i.e., whether the study 
uses objective data (tax receipts, turnover, employment statistics), multiple points in 
time (before and after the law was created), statistical methods that control for 
random fluctuation and statistical methods that control for overall economic trends. 
The authors find that none of the tobacco industry-funded studies meet all four 
criteria and that only 3% of studies funded by an independent source report that a 
smoking ban has had a negative impact. In the studies published in peer-reviewed 
journals, two main methodologies emerge. When many longitudinal observations are 
available (for example, monthly data on turnover several years before the law and for 
the whole period after the law), time-series analysis is usually used. The models 
estimated account for underlying economic trends, and the data are seasonally 
adjusted (Wakefield et al., 2002; Bartosch and Pope, 2002; Lal et al., 2004). 
However, when such data are not available, other econometric techniques are used. 
Adda et al. (2007) measures the impact of a smoking ban in Scotland as the net 
difference between the outcomes (turnover, clients) before and after the law for a 
treatment and a control group.  
To date, only a few studies have analyzed the health economic effects of a 
smoking ban. Glantz and Ong (2004) make projections regarding the cardiovascular 
health and economic effects of a smoke-free law one year after implementation and 
also estimated its evolution after 7 years. They estimate that the law will prevent 
1,500 myocardial infarctions and 350 strokes in the USA in one year. This represents 
savings of $49 million in medical costs. Other studies have also provided an estimate 
of the savings that would be possible if exposure were prevented. Zollinger et al. 
(2002) estimate the economic costs of second-hand smoke exposure for the residents 
of Marion County in Indiana (USA). The morbidity and mortality costs are assessed 
separately for both adults and children. Using the costs related to seven different 
illnesses, the authors isolate total costs of $316.3 million that would be avoided if 
exposure is prevented. A similar study by Waters (2008) based on data from 
Maryland indicates $597.5 million in total estimated costs that could be avoided, 
including the cost of physician visits, visits to the emergency room, hospitalizations, 
and premature death.  
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The first-best policy for reducing exposure to ETS is clearly to ban smoking 
in public places. However, such measures do not resolve the problem entirely because 
exposure in private homes still remains a key concern. Because it seems difficult to 
ban smoking at homes, a second-best policy such as an increase in taxes or the 
provision of information about the consequences of ETS might therefore be essential. 
 
2.4.5. Smoking cessation support 
A significant proportion of current smokers express a desire to quit. In 2007, 
54% of Swiss smokers wanted to quit, but only 10% wished to do so within the next 
thirty days and 30% within the next 6 months (Keller et al. 2008). These numbers 
indicate a significant desire to quit among smokers but also reflect the high perceived 
cost of quitting. A large proportion of these individuals eventually make an attempt to 
quit, but long-term success rates are quite low, and individuals often make several 
attempts before successfully quitting. The justification for smoking cessation 
intervention has often been debated, with the main counter-argument being, 
regardless of the effectiveness of the measure employed, that resources should not be 
used to correct unwise past (informed) decisions on the part of particular individuals 
(i.e., smokers are seen as responsible for their consumption). 
The benefits of smoking cessation have often been underrated. Smoking 
cessation has both immediate and long-term health benefits. Short-term benefits 
include decreased blood pressure, improved sense of taste and smell, and better 
breathing. Long-term benefits include a significant drop in the risk of premature death 
(mainly associated with coronary heart disease, stroke, and lung cancer), especially if 
individuals quit in early adulthood (Doll et al. 2004). However, even later in life, 
cigarette smoking remains one of the most preventable causes of disease and 
premature death (Allen 2008), and there is compelling evidence of benefits of 
smoking cessation for older individuals (Vaupel et al. 2003, Doll et al. 2004). The 
perceived costs of smoking cessation - mainly withdrawal symptoms such as craving, 
insomnia, or irritability – are important and can be lowered via appropriate smoking 
cessation support. In addition, potential weight gain after cessation – with the average 
gain reaching approximately 4-5 kg (Froom et al. 1998, Klesges et al. 1997, 
Williamson et al. 1991) - can seriously deter those who otherwise might attempt to 
quit (Meyers et al. 1997).  
Smoking cessation interventions include any intervention that aims to 
improve the long-term abstinence rate and to prevent relapse. A large number of 
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intervention programs exist, some of which have proven to be highly effective at 
improving long-term abstinence rates. The most widely used smoking cessation 
method is unaided cessation, often referred as “cold-turkey” quitting. The long-term 
success rate of cold-turkey cessation is around 5% and can be significantly improved 
with effective cessation intervention devices, including pharmaceutical cessation 
support. However, it is likely that underlying individual characteristics that are 
positively correlated with successful cessation might also be correlated with use of 
smoking cessation medical help. Among the wide range of smoking cessation 
intervention tools, non-pharmaceutical methods should be distinguished from 
pharmaceutical ones. Non-pharmaceutical methods include numerous strategies 
besides cold-turkey cessation. For instance, one might reduce in consumption 
gradually in preparation for stopping smoking, seek self-help sources (i.e., web-based 
programs, books), find a substitute (i.e., smokeless tobacco, an electronic cigarette), 
use quit lines, engage in medical counseling (i.e., brief clinical interventions), attend 
group therapy, or use alternative medical approaches (i.e., acupuncture and hypnosis). 
There is conflicting evidence or even no scientific evidence of the effectiveness of 
some of these approaches.  Falba et al. (2004) provide some evidence that reduced 
consumption can increase the probability of quitting, but a recent Cochrane review 
indicates no difference between the quit rates associated with suddenly quitting and 
gradually reducing consumption (Lindson et al. 2010).   
 
Table 2.4: Effectiveness of smoking cessation interventions 
Intervention Improved long-term abstinence 
rate vs. no intervention, OR 
(95 % C.I.) 
Na) 
Advice to quit by a physician 1.3 (1.1-1.6) 7 
Clinical intervention  43 
Minimal counseling 1.3 (1.01-1.6)  
Low intensity counseling 1.6 (1.2-2.0)  
High intensity counseling 2.3 (2.0-2.7)  
Counseling  58 
Self-help 1.2 (1.02-1.3)  
Telephone counseling 1.2 (1.1-1.4)  
Group counseling 1.3 (1.1-1.6)  
Individual counseling 1.7 (1.4-2.0)  
Acupuncture 1.1 (0.7-1.6) 5 
NRT 1.7 (1.6-1.9) 70 
Bupropion SR 1.6 (1.1-2.2) 12 
Varenicline 3.0 (2.1-4.1) 4 
Source: Fiore et al. (2000) and Wu et al. (2006). a) Number of studies used in the meta-
analysis. 
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Pharmaceutical interventions include nicotine replacement therapies (NRTs) 
and nicotine-free medications. NRTs partially relieve the withdrawal symptoms that 
people experience when they quit by compensating for the lack of nicotine in the 
organism. There are several NRTs currently available over the counter in Switzerland, 
including patches, gum, inhalers, lozenges and nasal sprays. Two nicotine-free 
medications are available in Switzerland by medical prescription only (A-list): 
bupropion (brand name Zyban ®), the exact mode of action of which is still unclear 
(Compendium of Swiss Drugs 2002), and varenicline (brand name Champix ®), 
which relieves symptoms of nicotine withdrawal and blocks the reinforcing effect of 
continued nicotine use through an antagonist and agonist action (Gonzales et al. 
2006). Bupropion and varenicline have been found to be effective versus a placebo in 
several randomized controlled trials. Fiore et al. (2000) and Wu et al. (2006) provide 
a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of various approaches. The results of 
these treatments, indicated in terms of their effect on the treatment group as compared 
to that of a placebo on a control group, are summarized in Table 2.4. 
Smoking cessation drugs has been found to be cost-effective in several 
studies (Bertram et al. 2007, Hall et al. 2005, Warner 1997, Cornuz et al. 2006). In 
comparison with other cessation interventions, the use of SCT has a higher cost per 
life-year, but it is essential to a comprehensive tobacco control strategy and might be 
the only effective way for long-term smokers to quit. Other economic considerations 
focused on the effect of price (Tauras and Chaloupka 2003), OTC status conversion 
(Keeler et al. 2002), health insurance coverage (Halpin et al. 2007), or advertising 
(Avery et al. 2007). The analysis of smokers’ preferences for such products 
constitutes one of the empirical areas of study of this dissertation (see Chapter 5). The 
flexibility of public health policy with respect to pharmaceutical products is limited 
because they are privately delivered (produced and sold by private firms). One can 
argue that because of excess regulation and limited financial resources, access to such 
products is not optimal (Novotny et al. 2000), providing a justification for 
government intervention. However, the perceived benefits of these products could be 
enhanced by better information on the benefits of smoking cessation. Governments 
could also create less strict regulations for some of these products by converting them 
to OTC status, facilitating the drug registration process, deciding on the 
reimbursement by the social health insurance (Curry et al. 1998, Burns et al. 2004), 
and creating incentives for innovations (Novotny et al. 2000). Public intervention 
could also be used to adjust the high price of these products, which currently limits 
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access for disadvantaged individuals among whom smoking is more prevalent and 
cessation often less successful.  
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Appendix A: Successful cessation, education, and income 
I pooled data from the 2001-2007 editions of the Swiss Tobacco Monitoring 
Survey (Keller et al. 2008), a nationwide, cross-sectional survey of 14–65 year-olds 
conducted annually in Switzerland since 2001. Each quarter about 2,500 individuals 
are interviewed by phone in French, German or Italian, resulting in a total of about 
10,000 observations per year7. Combined, the seven cross-sections consisted of 
70,216 respondents. In addition to demographic and socioeconomic information, the 
database contains a large number of variables related to smoking history and current 
smoking behavior. From the base sample, I constructed one subsample which 
consisted of current and former smokers, aged 18 and over, who had recently 
attempted to quit. To distinguish between successful and unsuccessful quitters I had 
to exploit information about individual smoking history. I based the construction of 
this variable on the work of Lee and Kahende (2007), who conducted a similar type 
of analysis in the United States. Unsuccessful quitters were defined as current 
smokers who had tried to quit at least once during the last 12 months, i.e., current 
smokers who answered yes to the question “Did you seriously try to quit smoking 
during the past 12 months?” Successful quitters were defined as ex-smokers who quit 
between seven and sixty months ago8. As suggested by Lee and Kahende (2007), I 
excluded smokers who quit in the past six months because the risk of relapse is often 
very high for these individuals. To study the association between education level, 
income, and successful cessation, I conducted multivariate logistic regressions for 
men and women separately, and controlled for age, marital status, alcohol use, and 
interest in healthy diet. Year dummies were included to account for potential trend. 
Estimation results are shown in Table A.1. We observe a significant 
socioeconomic gradient in successful cessation with respect to both education level 
and income. In the group with higher education, the odds of being a successful quitter 
in comparison with the reference category (compulsory education) reached 1.39 for 
men and 1.78 for women. The influence of higher income levels is comparable in size 
for both subgroups (ORmen = 1.65 and ORwomen = 1.47). We observed that the odds of 
being a successful quitter were linked with marital status for both men and women 
(ORmen = 1.36 and ORwomen = 1.36).  
 
                                                            
7
 Several subgroups of the population were oversampled—men aged 14–24, women aged 14–44 and individuals from 
the Italian and French linguistic regions. 
 
8
 The analysis focuses on recent cessation activity, which is the reason why I did not include individuals who quit 
more than five years ago. 
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 Table A.1: Successful cessation—Multivariate logistic regressions 
 
Odds of successfully 
quitting 
Variables Men Women 
Education (reference 
category: compulsory)   
Secondary 1.13 (0.15) 
1.40** 
(0.15) 
Higher 1.39
**
 
(0.21) 
1.78*** 
(0.23) 
Household income 
(reference category: up to 
CHF 4,000) 
  
CHF 4,000-8,000 1.13 (0.12) 
1.27** 
(0.11) 
More than CHF 8,000 1.65
***
 
(0.21) 
1.47*** 
(0.16) 
Age (reference category: 18-
24 years old)   
25-44 years old 2.20
***
 
(0.30) 
1.32** 
(0.15) 
45-65 years old 2.59
***
 
(0.37) 
1.18 
(0.15) 
Married 1.36
***
 
(0.12) 
1.36*** 
(0.10) 
Heavy drinking (“regular 
drinker”) 
0.91 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.09) 
Interest in healthy diet 1.08 (0.11) 
1.50*** 
(0.18) 
N 2,691 3,599 
Standard errors in parentheses;***significant at 1%; **significant at 
5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Part II 
Empirical essays 
This section consists of three empirical essays looking at different aspects of 
smoking-related decisions. In Figure I, I present these decisions as taken successively 
over time in order to visually locate the three contributions. In the first essay, I 
investigated at the impact of tobacco control expenditures on smoking behavior. 
Specifically, I used retrospective information on smoking behavior of individuals 
from a cross-sectional sample to reconstruct their smoking history. Individual 
smoking status over time was linked to national price changes and to per capita 
tobacco control spending in the Swiss regions, controlling for a set of individual 
characteristics. The second essay uses best-worst scaling, a survey based method, to 
rank the adverse effects of tobacco use according to their potential to deter 14-19 
years old individuals from smoking. The relative importance of 15 items, including 
long-term and short-term health and non-health consequences, were assessed. The 
third essay analyzes the demand for smoking cessation drugs using stated preferences 
data from a discrete choice experiment. Such medications are aimed at relieving 
withdrawal symptoms associated with smoking cessation in order to prevent relapse, 
i.e., to increase the chance of successfully quitting in the long term. I assessed the 
relative importance of the most important characteristics of such treatments (i.e. price, 
efficacy, side-effects, weight gain attenuation and availability) and was able to attach 
monetary values to these characteristics and to medications as a whole.  
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Figure I: Overview of the empirical essays
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3 The impact of tobacco control expenditures on 
smoking initiation and cessation 
 
 
Abstract 
In 2007, regular and occasional smokers accounted for 28% of the 
Swiss population aged 15 and above, whereas the proportion was 
significantly higher ten years earlier (33 %). This paper uses data 
from the 2007 edition of the Swiss Health Survey to investigate 
the association between overall tobacco control expenditures and 
the decline in smoking prevalence. Smoking initiation and 
cessation were analyzed separately using discrete and continuous 
time hazard models. After controlling for prices and individual 
characteristics, I find evidence that tobacco control expenditures 
significantly increase the probability of smoking cessation. In 
contrast, in most specifications the impact of tobacco control 
spending on smoking initiation is not statistically significant.  
 
 
Keywords: tobacco control expenditures, smoking initiation, 
smoking cessation, hazard models 
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3.1. Introduction  
The epidemiologic transition from communicable diseases to chronic diseases 
such as cancers and cardiovascular diseases that occurs in developed countries has 
given rise to increasing worry about unhealthy behaviors like smoking as a public 
health issue (Kenkel 2000). In Switzerland, smoking-related conditions accounted for 
more than 11% of all disability-adjusted life years lost in 2002 (OECD/WHO 2006), 
making it the major risk factor for burden of disease; indeed, its importance 
significantly outweighed that of alcohol misuse or high cholesterol. In 2007, regular 
and occasional smokers accounted for 28% of the Swiss population ages 15 and 
above, whereas the proportion was significantly higher (33 %) ten years earlier. This 
decline in tobacco use has many potential explanatory factors, including tobacco 
control, cultural changes, or even demographic effects. During the same period 
(1997-2007), there was a substantial increase in the resources devoted to tobacco 
control, which allowed the implementation of various interventions aimed at 
preventing initiation, enhancing cessation and lowering exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke at both the national and the local levels. In addition to regular 
increases in cigarette prices, tobacco control interventions include information 
campaigns, advertising restrictions, cessation support, smoking bans in public places, 
and knowledge management. Overall spending dedicated to tobacco control 
amounted to approximately 2.7 Swiss Francs9 (CHF) per capita in 2007, with the 
Tobacco Prevention Fund, financed by a special tax on cigarettes, as the main funding 
source.  
The aim of this study is to assess if, and to what extent, recent tobacco control 
efforts are independently associated with the decline in smoking prevalence. Because 
changes in prevalence (i.e., the “stock” of smokers) are the result of changes in 
smoking initiation and cessation rates (i.e., the “flows” of new/former smokers) and 
because both decisions may have substantially different determinants, I separately 
analyzed the association between tobacco control efforts and the propensity to start 
and quit smoking. The best way to study the initiation-cessation process would be to 
exploit a panel dataset that covers a sufficiently long time period and that contains 
detailed information about smoking behavior. Because such a database is not 
available in Switzerland, I used an alternative approach. Drawing from the works of 
Douglas and Hariharan (1994), Douglas (1998), Forster and Jones (2001) and López 
Nicolás (2002), I constructed a pseudo-panel using individual retrospective 
information about smoking behavior from a cross-sectional survey (smoking status, 
                                                            
9
 1CHF ≈ 1 USD. 
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age at initiation, and time elapsed since cessation) and analyzed the data using hazard 
models. This type of analysis has numerous advantages over a simple cross-sectional 
approach. First, as cigarette prices are uniform in Switzerland, it is not possible to 
identify the effect of price in a cross-sectional framework. Second, this type of 
analysis is well suited to the theoretical framework in which an individual makes the 
decision to start (or to quit) smoking at each point in time by comparing the utility he 
derives from starting (quitting) and the utility he derives from staying abstinent 
(continuing to smoke). Finally, the longitudinal nature of the data allowed me to 
control for potential time-invariant unobserved regional factors that might influence 
both smoking outcomes and tobacco control spending. Several studies that have used 
hazard models in the field of tobacco consumption have been conducted in the UK, 
USA and Spain, but such studies have never been conducted in Switzerland, and none 
accounted for overall tobacco control expenditures.  
I used individual data from the 2007 edition of the Swiss Health Survey in 
addition to price and tobacco control information to assess the extent to which 
tobacco control expenditures influence the probability of initiation and cessation. I 
modeled both decisions separately using continuous time and discrete time hazard 
models, controlling for gender, education, nationality and cohort effects. The results 
consistently show that tobacco control spending have a positive impact on smoking 
cessation rates, but I do not find compelling evidence that tobacco control spending 
influenced smoking onset. In the next two sections, I provide an overview of the 
related literature and of tobacco control in Switzerland. I then present the empirical 
methodology, describe the data and present the results along with a sensitivity 
analysis. Finally, I discuss the policy implications and the limitations of the study. 
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3.2. Related work 
There is an extensive body of international literature that discusses the 
relationship between cigarette price changes and tobacco use, making it the most 
documented economic determinant of smoking. Despite the diversity of the applied 
methods – i.e. time-series, cross-sections, aggregated data, individual-level data – 
most of the studies identify relatively similar figures for the price elasticity of tobacco 
consumption in the general population (with the results clustered around -0.4) 
(Chaloupka and Warner 2000). The effect of cigarette prices on smoking among 
young people has also been extensively investigated, but the results are more 
ambiguous. Some arguments indicate that young people are more responsive to price 
changes: e.g., they are less addicted and have fewer financial resources (DeCicca et 
al. 2002). However, other factors could explain the potential lack of responsiveness of 
youth to price changes, such as their need to be accepted by their peers at almost any 
cost. In contrast, only a few econometric studies have assessed the impact of tobacco 
control expenditures on smoking prevalence or consumption. Most of these studies 
were conducted in the United States and were limited to particular states (CDC 2001, 
Hamilton et al. 2000). Some of them are focused on youths (e.g., Tauras et al. 2005), 
or do not account for price changes. In a study by Farrelly et al. (2003), the authors 
compare the data for states in which large-scale programs were implemented with 
data for the rest of the country and show that increases in funding for tobacco control 
reduce tobacco use. In another recent study, Farrelly et al. (2008) examine the 
association between tobacco control program expenditures and changes in adult 
smoking prevalence, controlling for price, and find an independent association 
between expenditures and reduced smoking prevalence. Tauras et al. (2005) estimate 
a two-part model of cigarette demand using repeated cross-sections to investigate 
youth smoking decisions. They find that per-capita funding for tobacco control has a 
significant and negative effect on smoking participation and on the number of 
cigarettes smoked per day. In contrast, Marlow (2010) finds no association between 
tobacco control spending and smoking participation.  
These analyses, however, do not indicate what portion of the reduction in 
tobacco use is due to reduced initiation and what part is attributable to enhanced 
cessation. Previous studies using retrospective information on smoking to estimate 
hazard models focus on the effect of price (Douglas and Hariharan 1994, Douglas 
1998, Forster and Jones 2001 and López Nicolás 2002). These authors, in line with a 
recent study by DeCicca et al. (2008a), find a positive association between price 
changes and the probability of quitting and identify a weak or non-existent effect of 
55 
 
price increases on smoking initiation. Contrariwise, Tauras et al. (2001) find that 
higher prices induce fewer initiations. Focusing on young adults and also using time-
to-event data, Tauras (2004) find that increases in cigarette prices significantly 
increased the number of quitters in this age group.  
Using discrete-time hazard models, Farrelly et al. (2009) investigated the 
effectiveness of a specific national smoking prevention campaign targeted at youth. 
The authors find that greater exposure to the campaign decreased the probability of 
initiation. A recent study by Ciecierski et al. (2010) considers the impact of state 
tobacco control program expenditures on young adults’ smoking behaviors and finds 
that increased expenditures are associated with a larger number of quit attempts. In 
Europe, Schaap et al. (2008) shows that countries with better developed tobacco 
control policies have higher cessation rates. No study of this type has been previously 
conducted in Switzerland, and no study has considered the impact of price and 
tobacco control spending on both initiation and cessation.  
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3.3. Tobacco control in Switzerland 
According to the WHO, the best practices in tobacco control include five 
categories: price increases, the dissemination of information, advertising bans, 
protection against environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and cessation support (WHO 
2003). These measures not only are effective in influencing smoking-related behavior 
but also have been proven to generate high returns: i.e., their benefits in terms of 
disability-adjusted life years (DALY) are high compared to their costs. Table 3.1 
presents estimated cost effectiveness ratios in dollars per DALY saved as computed 
by Shibuya et al. (2003) for the western European region. 
 
Table 3.1: Cost effectiveness of tobacco control interventions  
Intervention Average cost-effectiveness 
ratio (USD/DALY) 
Doubling the highest tax 13 [10-17] 
Smoking ban in public places 358 [263-503] 
Comprehensive advertisement ban 189 [140-266] 
Information dissemination 337 [248-479] 
Nicotine replacement therapy 2,164 [1,604-3,024] 
Source: Shibuya et al. (2003); 95% confidence intervals in brackets. 
 
Switzerland was late to enter the field of tobacco control in comparison to 
other developed countries. In 2006, a scale was constructed to evaluate the national 
efforts dedicated to tobacco control (i.e., the price of cigarettes, smoke-free public 
places, information campaigns, advertising bans, health warning labels and 
accessibility of cessation treatments). Among 30 OECD countries, Switzerland was 
ranked 18th, mainly due to its relatively low prices and fairly permissive legislation 
regarding product availability, tobacco advertising and ETS (Joossens and Raw 
2006).  In recent years, we have observed a clear political will to strengthen tobacco 
control at both the federal and the cantonal level. This tendency is well illustrated by 
the recently implemented smoking bans, by more informative pack labeling and by 
important price increases. In Appendix A, I present a brief overview of tobacco 
control in Switzerland. 
The actors in tobacco control in Switzerland are numerous and can be sorted 
into three categories: the federal government, the cantonal governments and non-
governmental organizations (e.g., AT, the Swiss Cancer league, CIPRET). Broad 
policies for tobacco control are defined at the federal level, and as a result, nationwide 
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programs involving a series of measures have been implemented. The first large 
national program, the “Global Tobacco Program,” was in place from 1996 to 1999. 
Although it did not achieve its prevalence reduction goal, the program funded 
research projects and helped to construct a network of partners that are active in 
tobacco control. The second nationwide program, conducted from 2001 to 2008, was 
built on three main objectives: preventing initiation, supporting cessation and 
protecting against ETS. In line with its objectives, legislative measures were adopted 
and information campaigns were launched. In Table 3.2, I list some behavioral and 
legislative measures that were implemented within the national programs.  
 
Table 3.2: Selected list of tobacco control interventions 
Behavioral interventions   Description Year(s) 
New enjoyment – without tobacco Nationwide campaign 1992-2000 
Smoking hurts Nationwide campaign 2001-2003 
Smoking hurts – more air!  Nationwide campaign 2004-2005 
BRAVO, life, not smoke Nationwide campaign 2006-2007 
Life, not smoke Nationwide campaign 2008 
Life, not smoke  – makes sense, doesn’t it Nationwide campaign 2009 
Stop smoking site  Help to stop smoking As of 1997 
Smoke-free workplace Help geared toward businesses 2006-2009 
Non-smoking experience  Help geared toward schoolchildren 2000-2010 
Cool and clean National tobacco control program for 
sports  2004-2009 
Legislative interventions Source Enactment on:  
Warning on cigarette packs; obligation to 
declare the tar and nicotine content; 
prohibition of advertising aimed at those 
under 18 years old 
Ordinance on tobacco (OTab) from 
1st March 1995 
01.07.1995 
Fixing maximum nicotine, tar and 
carbon monoxide levels with mandatory 
declaration on the packet; warning labels 
printed in large and explicit letters on the 
packet; prohibition of the terms « light » 
or « mild »;  
Ordinance on tobacco (OTab) from 
27th October 2004 (complete revision 
of OTab 1995) 
01.11.2004 
Prohibition of smoking in trains and 
enclosed public areas and in open public 
areas and anywhere in underground 
railway stations and shopping malls. 
Measures adopted by the Swiss 
Federal Railways and enterprises 
affiliated with the Public Transport 
Union (UTP) 
11.12.2005 
Additional warnings: color photographs, 
visual warnings (« stop smoking ») 
Ordinance of the FDI (Federal 
Department of the Interior) on the 
combined warnings on tobacco 
products of 10th December 2007 
01.01.2008 
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An important turning point for tobacco control in Switzerland was the 
creation of the Tobacco Prevention Fund (TPF) in 2004, which was intended to 
subsidize large information campaigns, specific interventions and research projects. 
While former interventions had been funded via general revenues, TPF revenues 
come from a CHF 0.026 tax on each cigarette pack. Overall, we estimate that total 
investments in tobacco control at all levels amounted to CHF 20.6 million in 2007 or 
CHF 2.63 per capita.  It is worth noting that in its 2007 report on best practices for 
comprehensive tobacco control programs, the U.S. Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) recommended minimum average per capita expenditures of USD 
8.43 in the following fields: state and community interventions (USD 3.99), health 
communication interventions (USD 1.30), cessation interventions (USD 2.04), 
surveillance and evaluation (USD 0.73) and administration and management (USD 
0.37). By comparison, we estimate that in 2007, the tobacco industry spent 
approximately CHF 120 million (i.e., CHF 15.3 per capita) in the following 
categories: traditional media, sponsorship (music festivals, nightclubs, and cultural 
events), direct marketing (hostessing), and promotion at the point of sale. We observe 
that the tobacco industry shifted its promotional activities toward new vectors to 
circumvent legal limitations on advertising. We also note that the tobacco industry 
acquired a very comprehensive knowledge of the behavior and motivations of 
smokers and was able to develop complex strategies to counter tobacco control efforts 
(Jeanrenaud et al. 2010). 
Evaluations of the programs as listed in Table 3.2 did not provide clear 
evidence of an independent link between prevention efforts and changes in tobacco-
related behavior (Rudolf et al. 2009, Boggio and Zellweger 2007, Honegger and 
Rudolf 2004, Ensmann et al. 2002). In fact, these evaluations were based on 
intermediate indicators (e.g., recall rates, understanding, and awareness) and provided 
evidence of an adequate level of smoking-related risk perception within the 
population, a high acceptance of tobacco control programs and clear intentions to 
change behavior. This study is intended to fill a gap in evaluations of the association 
between tobacco control efforts and smoking-related behaviors in Switzerland.   
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3.4. Empirical strategy 
Framework and construction of the outcome variables 
The retrospective information on smoking included in the Swiss Health 
Survey allowed me to reconstruct the smoking history of individuals - e.g. the year of 
initiation, the number of smoking years, and the date of smoking cessation - until the 
year of the survey (i.e. 2007). Therefore, I know the yearly smoking status of each 
individual in the sample from his birth to 2007.  At each time point, an individual is 
whether smoking or not smoking and our interest lies in modeling the probability of 
transition between the two possible states10. The decisions to start and to quit smoking 
are analyzed separately. We first focus on the years before smoking initiation, and 
then on the years preceding smoking cessation. In the initiation analysis, we follow 
never-smokers that are assumed to start smoking at a given time point if the utility 
they derive from starting is higher than the utility they derive from staying abstinent. 
Similarly, the cessation analysis focuses on smokers who are supposed to quit if the 
utility they derive from quitting is higher than the utility they derive from continuing 
to smoke (see DeCicca et al. 2008a for a formal presentation of this framework). We 
are thus interested in the probability that an individual chooses to start (quit) smoking, 
given that he runs the risk of starting (quitting) that year. In other words, we are 
dealing with conditional probabilities of starting (quitting) at a given time point given 
that one has not started (quit) at that point, which is the definition of the hazard of 
starting (quitting). For comparison purpose, I use two different modeling approaches 
to deal with this time-to-event data: discrete and continuous time hazard models. In 
both frameworks the same information is needed to construct the outcome variables, 
and to end up with a data set that has the appropriate format.  
We first define the period, usually called a spell or episode, during which 
individuals face the risk that an event or failure will occur. In the initiation analysis, I 
analyzed during what time never-smokers are at risk of starting smoking. The relevant 
spell is thus the non-smoking period, and failure is associated with smoking initiation. 
I first had to distinguish between all individuals who had ever smoked before11 
(current and former smokers) and never-smokers. The length of the non-smoking 
period for never-smokers is simply their age in 2007, minus ten12. Because they did 
                                                            
10
 Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to identify a detailed history of quit attempts and relapses.  
 
11
 Individuals who answered yes to the question “Have you smoked more than 100 cigarettes in your lifetime?” 
 
12
 I make the assumption that individuals are at risk of smoking at the age of ten years old (in the Swiss Health 
Survey, only three individuals over 18,760 started before that age). 
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not begin smoking, the spells for never-smokers are not complete; they are said to be 
right-censored. For both current and former smokers, the relevant duration is defined 
as the age at which the individual started smoking, minus ten. In the cessation 
analysis, only current and former smokers are included. The measure of interest is the 
number of smoking years: i.e., the period during which individuals face the “risk” of 
quitting. For current smokers, the duration corresponds to their current age minus the 
age at which they started smoking. These spells are not complete13  (right-censored). 
For ex-smokers, the figure is their actual age minus the number of years since they 
quit minus the age at which they started14. In Figure 3.1, I schematically present the 
spells and failures for both analyses.  
  
                                                            
13
 We assume that these individuals never quit previously. As mentioned above, our data does not contain information 
about possible previous quit attempts or relapses of current smokers.  
 
14
 For example, the smoking spell of a 42-year-old ex-smoker who started at age 18 and quit 10 years ago, is equal to 
14.  
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Figure 3.1: Duration variables – Spells and failures 
 
 
 
In both frameworks – continuous and discrete time – the aim is to estimate 
the impact of covariates on the hazards of starting (quitting). The main difference 
between the two approaches lies in the functional form of the underlying (or baseline) 
hazard rate. In the continuous time framework, the baseline hazard is a continuous 
function of time, whereas in the discrete time framework it takes discrete values at 
each observation time. However, I expect both approaches to lead to similar results. 
The main covariate of interest is the amount of per-capita tobacco control spending.  
The identification strategy was based on the fact that amounts allocated to tobacco 
control vary over years and across regions. This allowed me to assess the impact of 
overall tobacco control expenditures on the probability of smoking initiation and 
cessation, controlling for price changes and a set of individual characteristics. I 
present the two modeling approaches separately.  
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Continuous time semi-parametric hazard model 
Several parametric and semi-parametric regression models are available to 
investigate the association between the independent variables and the hazards of 
starting and quitting in the continuous time framework. Parametric models require the 
researcher to make an assumption about the shape of the hazard function; they 
provide inconsistent estimates if the distribution of the hazard is misspecified. Some 
parametric specifications are flexible enough to overcome this problem (e.g., the 
generalized gamma model), but they are often difficult to estimate. Semi-parametric 
models are less restrictive because they do not impose any assumptions about the 
shape of the hazard over time. For this reason, I chose to use the Cox proportional 
hazard (Cox 1972) semi-parametric regression model in both smoking initiation and 
cessation analyses. In addition, its results are easily interpretable, and, as mentioned 
by Greene (2003), it is “a good compromise between the strictly non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier estimator and the excessively structured parametric models.” Within 
this framework, it is assumed that there is a common baseline hazard function and 
that the variables shift this baseline hazard multiplicatively. We have the following 
general specification: 
0h(t x(t), z) = h (t) (x(t), z)φ        (3.1) 
Where 0h (t)is the baseline hazard that only depends on time (t). The function 
(x(t), z)φ includes both time-varying ( x(t) ) and time-invariant ( z ) covariates. An 
interesting feature of this model is that no parameterization is needed for 0h (t) . 
However, functions related to 0h (t)  can be retrieved after the estimations conditional 
on the coefficients estimated from the Cox model. The functional form for (x(t), z)φ  
must be fully specified and is usually exponential. With k time-varying and j time-
invariant covariates, we end up with: 
1 1 k k 1 1 j j(x(t), z) = exp(β x (t) + ...+ β x (t) + δ z + ...+ δ z )φ    (3.2) 
I employed the following general specification for an individual i at year t in region r: 
i 0 1 t 2 t,rh (t) = h (t)exp(β P + β TC + δ'Z)       (3.3) 
Where h(t) is the hazard of starting (or quitting),
 
0h (t)  is the baseline hazard, Pt is the 
real price of cigarettes at year t, TCt,r is the per-capita tobacco control expenditures at 
year t and in region r, and
 
Z is a vector of individual characteristics. Our main 
63 
 
coefficient of interest is 2β . The exponentiated coefficients are interpreted as the 
factor by which the hazard is multiplied following a 1-unit increase of the covariate.  
 
Discrete time hazard model 
We focus on the conditional odds of starting (quitting) smoking at each time 
point, given still being in the sample at that time. Keeping the same notation as above, 
we have:  
0
1 1 k k 1 1 j j
0
h(t x(t), z) h (t)
= exp(β x (t) + ...+ β x (t) + δ z + ...+ δ z )
1 - h (t)1 - h(t x(t), z)
   (3.4) 
After taking the logs, we obtain the logit of the hazard as dependent variable: 
0
1 1 k k 1 1 j j
0
h(t x(t), z) h (t)
ln = ln + β x (t) + ...+ β x (t) + δ z + ...+ δ z
1 - h (t)1 - h(t x(t), z)
   
        
  (3.5) 
Practically, the time is treated as discrete, and a dummy variable for each analysis 
time point is introduced, giving rise to discrete values of the baseline hazard. We thus 
have the following general specification for an individual i at year t in region r: 
( )i t 1 t 2 t,rlogit h (t) = α + β P + β TC + δ'Z       (3.6) 
where tα  are time dummies. The effects of the covariates on the outcome are 
straightforward to interpret. 
 
Dealing with recall bias 
When providing retrospective information in self-reported surveys, 
responding to questions such as “How long ago did you stop smoking?” or “How old 
were you when you started smoking?”, individuals are likely to give answers that are 
clustered in specific years (values), leading to what is called recall bias or recall error. 
I illustrate this issue using Figure 3.2, in which I show the distribution of years since 
the individuals in our sample quit. From ten years since quitting, we observe a high 
density of responses that are multiples of 5. Because the survey was conducted in 
2007, the corresponding “problematic” years are 1997, 1992, 1987, etc. When we 
look at the reported age at smoking initiation (Figure 3.3), we observe clustering of 
responses at ages 16, 18, and 20 years old.  
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Figure 3.2: Reported years since quitting 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Reported age at initiation 
 
 
Kenkel et al. (2004) shows that reporting errors produce downward biased 
estimates of the effect of price on smoking decisions. As suggested by Lopéz Nicolás 
(2002), I simply control for recall error using indicator variables that equal one for 
years at which recall error is more likely, i.e. for years corresponding to 10, 15, 20, 
25, and 30 years since quitting in the cessation analysis. Kenkel et al. (2004) show 
that smokers consistently report the age at which they began smoking, even 20 years 
later. However, it seems likely that initiation ages such as 15, 17, or 19 years old are 
underreported in favor of 16, 18, and 20 years old. The excess probability of starting 
at these ages is already accounted for in the value of the baseline hazard for 6, 8, and 
10 years at risk.  
 
Dealing with potential endogeneity 
It is likely that unobserved region-specific factors influence both smoking 
outcomes and the evolution of tobacco control spending. For instance, the attitude of 
the general population towards smoking might also influence political decisions 
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regarding the implementation of anti-smoking policies15. In order to reduce the 
potential upward bias of the tobacco control spending coefficient if stronger attitudes 
against smoking influence both the implementation of policies and smoking 
outcomes, I exploit the longitudinal nature of the data in including region fixed-
effects (FE) in every model. In the continuous time framework I also use an 
alternative approach, assuming that the differences in attitudes towards smoking 
might be included directly in the baseline hazard. I therefore conducted a stratified 
Cox estimation in which the baseline hazard is allowed to differ by region. In other 
words, with the stratified approach, we relax the assumption that everyone faces the 
same baseline hazard 0h (t) . Stratifying by regions, we obtain the following: 
 
i 01h (t) = h (t)exp(x(t), z,β,δ)   if individual i  is in region 1;    
i 02h (t) = h (t)exp(x(t), z,β,δ)   if individual i  is in region 2;   
          (3.7) 
…      … 
i 06h (t) = h (t)exp(x(t), z,β,δ)   if individual i  is in region 6. 
 
It is worth noting that the issue of endogeneity is probably not completely 
solved here. There are other potential sources of bias, such as the influence that 
changes in smoking participation might have on the acceptability of new tobacco 
policies. 
 
Estimated models 
I first conducted a simple analysis of smoking prevalence. Using annual 
prevalence data for the regions from seven waves of the Swiss Tobacco Surveys and 
price and tobacco control expenditure data for the corresponding years and regions, I 
conducted a simple panel analysis with region fixed effects. Then I used Cox’s partial 
likelihood estimator to estimate the continuous time models (see Greene (2003) for 
details), and logistic regression to estimate the discrete-time hazard models. I used the 
same set of variables in the initiation and cessation analysis, except for recall bias and 
                                                            
15
 DeCicca et al. (2008b) propose an explicit measure of the “anti-smoking sentiment” that they use in smoking 
participation and initiation models.  
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cohort dummies. All estimations were performed using Stata version 10.0 (Stata 
Corp., Texas, USA). 
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3.5. Data 
Sources 
The data analyzed in this research come from several sources. I distinguish 
between micro-level data on smoking-related behavior and individual characteristics 
and macro-level data on tobacco control expenditures and tobacco prices. Micro-level 
data are drawn from the 2007 edition of the Swiss Health Survey16, which contains 
detailed information on 18,760 individuals ages 15 and above. Price data and data on 
aggregated per-capita tobacco control expenditures come from other sources as 
described below.  
 
Analysis samples 
 I restrict the analysis to individuals that face the risk of starting (quitting) in 
1980 and later. I therefore end up with a sufficiently long time period to capture the 
effect of price, without straying too far from the period during which tobacco control 
spending substantially varies (i.e., 1997-2007). The initiation analysis was focused on 
individuals with complete relevant information born in 1970 and later, i.e. at risk of 
starting in 1980 and later (n=4,353). For the cessation analysis we kept all individuals 
with complete relevant information that were at risk of quitting in 1980 (n=6,464) and 
later (Table 3.3.) 
 
Table 3.3: Analysis samples corresponding to “at-risk” years 1980-2007 
Analysis At risk since n N 
Initiation 10 years old 4,353 82,245 
Cessation Smoking 
initiation 
6,464 106,502 
n is for the number of individuals; N is for the 
number of person-years. 
 
 
Tobacco control expenditures and price data 
Various parties are engaged in tobacco control in Switzerland at the national 
and local levels, including cantonal health promotion services and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Unfortunately, there is no data source that contains detailed 
                                                            
16
 The Swiss Health Survey has been carried out every 5 years since 1992. The 2007 edition was conducted on a 
representative sample of about 30,000 households, in which one person aged 15 or above was randomly selected. 
With a 60% response rate, the whole sample contained 18,760 individuals. 
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and disaggregated information about tobacco control expenditures. Information is 
available on overall expenditures, but it is not possible to determine precisely how 
much was spent on individual interventions. Information on tobacco control 
expenditures at the national level is fairly complete, especially for years after the 
creation of the TPF in 2004. At the regional level, data was collected through 
telephone interviews and questionnaires were sent to the person in charge of health 
promotion in the 26 cantons. The respondents were asked to indicate the total amount 
spent on tobacco control for each year between 1997 and 2007 in the following fields: 
youth information campaigns, information and public awareness, cessation support, 
protection against ETS and knowledge management. Respondents were also asked to 
describe the trend of tobacco control expenditures between 1990 and 1997, and if 
easily available, to provide data on this period. 
I aggregated tobacco control data for six of the seven major regions of 
Switzerland. The seven major regions are the Lake Geneva Region, Mittelland, 
Northwest Switzerland, Zurich, Eastern Switzerland, Central Switzerland and Ticino. 
Observations from the Northwest region were excluded due to a lack of accurate 
information about tobacco control expenditures for the two main cantons in the 
region. The data were aggregated for two reasons. First, since expenditures in one 
canton could have some impact in neighboring cantons, there might be some cross-
canton influence of tobacco control spending. I assumed that this “overlapping” 
impact is likely to be more severe between cantons than between larger regions. 
Second, I did not observe sufficient policy variation within the period for small 
cantons such as AI or GL. I did not account for the effect of legislative measures such 
as smoking bans in our analysis because almost all of them came into force at the end 
of the observation period (in 2007 and later for smoking bans).   
To obtain comparable figures, I divided the total tobacco control expenditures 
in each region by the mean population in the corresponding year. I thus obtained per 
capita tobacco control expenditures, which reflected the overall resources allocated to 
tobacco control in each region from 1997 to 2007. For the years prior to 1997, I made 
the assumption that expenditures were null before 1990, and used the estimated trends 
about the evolution of expenditures between 1990 and 1997 expressed by the 
respondents in each region.  Other assumptions about pre-1997 expenditures are 
tested in the sensitivity analysis. 
Tobacco control expenditures can be considered as either a flow or a stock 
variable. For the first variable type, the amount spent during a particular year has an 
immediate and exclusive effect during that year. However, we can expect that 
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“measures implemented in any one year have lasting effects on smoking behavior in 
future years” (Farrelly et al. 2008). For these reasons, I constructed two distinct 
tobacco control expenditures variables that I tested using different models: 1) 
expenditures in the current year and 2) cumulative expenditures (current expenditures 
and past expenditures discounted by 25% per year as suggested by Farrelly et al. 
2008), computed as follows for each year t : 
cum_exp = exp + 0.75exp + 0.5exp + 0.25expt t t-1 t-2 t-3     (3.8) 
I combined information from the Swiss Statistical Office and Swiss 
Cigarette17 to obtain a series of price data for the average cigarette pack (20 units) at 
the country level (there are no regional differences between cigarette prices in 
Switzerland). I deflated price and tobacco control data by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) to account for inflation. 
 
Individual characteristics 
In both the initiation and the cessation analyses, I controlled for gender, 
nationality (whether the respondent is Swiss or not) and education level (primary, 
secondary and higher education). To account for potential cohort effects, I added 
dummy variables corresponding to specific birth periods. In the initiation analysis, the 
cohort dummies corresponded to the following birth years: 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 
and 1986-1992 (reference period: 1970-1975). In the cessation analysis, the birth 
years were: 1941-1950, 1951-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1992 (reference 
period: 1930-1940). The Swiss health survey contains rich information about 
individual characteristics such as mental and physical health status, personal and 
household income and risky behaviors. I did not include these variables because they 
may have varied significantly during the period of analysis. The use of education 
level as part of the initiation analysis might be questionable because most people start 
smoking before they complete their education. Nevertheless, I see it as a proxy for 
parental education and have therefore decided to retain it as part of the analysis.  
To use the information about tobacco control expenditures and price (the 
time-varying covariates), I had to split the cross-sectional database to obtain a “panel” 
that contains one observation per non-smoking year for the initiation analysis and one 
observation per smoking year for the cessation analysis. This approach allowed me to 
match the values for price and tobacco control expenditures with the corresponding 
                                                            
17
 Swiss association of tobacco producers. 
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calendar years and regions for each individual. Table 3.4 shows an example of 
cessation data for two individuals (individual 1 started smoking in 2004 and was still 
smoking in 2007, individual 2 started smoking in 1997 and quit in 2001). 
 
Table 3.4: Data example 
ID Smoking 
Duration  
Failure 
(Cessation) 
Gender Region TC per 
capita 
spending 
Calendar 
Year 
1 0 0 1 TI 2.120 2004 
1 1 0 1 TI 2.698 2005 
1 2 0 1 TI 3.345 2006 
1 3 0 1 TI 3.486 2007 
2 0 0 0 MIT 0.569 1997 
2 1 0 0 MIT 0.575 1998 
2 2 0 0 MIT 0.649 1999 
2 3 0 0 MIT 0.748 2000 
2 4 1 0 MIT 1.157 2001 
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3.6. Descriptive statistics 
Outcome variables  
To take a first look at the initiation and cessation processes, I constructed the 
empirical survival and hazard rate functions without restricting the sample. I used the 
non-parametric Kaplan-Meier (KM) product limit estimator (Kaplan and Meier 
1958). For the survival function, we have the following: 
T
i i
KM
i=1 i
n - f
S (t) =
n
ˆ ∏
        
(3.9) 
where in  is the number of individuals who did not quit (or who are “at risk”) at time i 
and if  is the number of failures observed at time i. In other words, this formula 
computes the yearly ratio of the number of people who have not started smoking (or 
have not yet quit) and the total number of people at risk of starting (or quitting) in the 
same year. The empirical hazard function is obtained for each failure time by taking 
the ratio of the number of failures and the number of individuals at risk: i.e., we 
compute the following:
 
i
i
f
h(t) =
n
ˆ
         (3.10) 
Figure 3.4 shows the Kaplan-Meier product-limit estimators of the survival 
and hazard functions for the entire sample. The survival functions represent the 
proportion of individuals at each point in time who did not start (or quit) smoking, 
whereas the hazard rate graphs give the probability of starting (or quitting) with 
respect to the duration of the non-smoking (or smoking) episode. 
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Figure 3.4: Empirical Kaplan-Meier hazard and survival functions – Initiation and cessation 
Empirical hazard rate 
Initiation Cessation 
Empirical survival function 
 
Initiation 
 
Cessation 
 
We observe that the survival function for smoking initiation decreases sharply 
between 15 to 20 years of age and then stabilizes. We obtain the same information in 
observing the hazard rate function, which increases sharply between the ages of 15 to 
20 and then also drops sharply. This means that the probability of initiation is high for 
people between 15 and 20 years old and then decreases to a figure close to zero. The 
hazard rate (the survival function) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the 
case of the cessation analysis. This implies that the probability of quitting increases 
steadily with respect to smoking years. The peaks that can be observed in the 
initiation graph are due to the above-mentioned problem of recall bias. In Appendix 
B, I show the empirical hazard rates of initiation and cessation by region and keeping 
only individuals used in the analyses, i.e. using restricted samples as presented in 
Table 3.3. 
 
Independent variables 
Summary statistics for individual characteristics are presented in Table 3.5 for 
both subsamples (initiation and cessation analysis). 
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Table 3.5: Individual characteristics 
 Initiation analysis sample 
(%) 
Cessation analysis sample 
(%)  
Gender     
Men  46.8  49.3 
 Women  53.2  50.7 
 Nationality     
Non-Swiss  17.8  14.0 
 Swiss 
 
 82.2  86.0 
Education     
Compulsory  9.0  10.9 
 Secondary   65.0  63.5 
 
Higher  26.0  25.6 
 Birth cohort 1970-1975 36.2 1930-1940 4.9 
 1976-1980 22.8 1941-1950 19.8 
 1981-1985 16.5 1951-1960 20.7 
 1986-1992 24.5 1961-1970 24.6 
   1971-1980 17.6 
   1981-1992 12.4 
N  4,353  6,464 
 
 
Figure 3.5 presents the evolution of the real price of a pack of cigarettes 
(100=1980), and Table 3.6 shows the evolution of aggregated tobacco control 
expenditure between 1997 and 2007. Expenditures rose substantially during the last 
ten years, increasing from about 0.70 to 2.70 CHF per capita at the national level.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Real price of cigarettes (1980-2007) 
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Table 3.6: Per-capita tobacco control expenditures in the Swiss 
regions (1997-2007) 
 Period average 1997-2007 
increase 
 
  
Lake Geneva 1.93 185.5% 
   
Mitteland 1.49 360.5% 
   
Zürich 1.47 281.2% 
   
East 1.15 475.6% 
   
Center 1.14 342.6% 
   
Ticino 1.96 223.4% 
The Northwest region is excluded due to a lack of accurate data. 
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3.7. Results 
In Table 3.7, I first present the results of the simple analysis of changes in 
prevalence between 2001 and 2007 in the six regions. Both price and per capita 
tobacco control expenditures seem to have a negative impact on smoking prevalence 
in the general population. However, only the impact of price is significant. Even if it 
provides some insight into the impact of price and tobacco control spending on 
smoking decisions, this result must be interpreted with caution because many 
potential confounding factors are not accounted for.  
  
Table 3.7: Analysis of smoking prevalence (2001-2007) 
 General population 
Real per capita 
tobacco control 
expenditures 
-1.09 
(-1.59) 
[-0.086] 
 
 
  
Real price of 
cigarettes 
-2.07**  
(-2.53) 
[-0.395] 
N 42 
Dependant variable: smoking prevalence among 14-
64 years old individuals (current and occasional 
smokers). The model includes region FE. Standard 
errors in parentheses, elasticities in brackets. 
***significant at 1%; **significant at 
5%;*significant at 10%. 
 
In Table 3.8 and 3.9, I present the estimation results for the initiation analysis 
obtained with both modeling approaches. For the continuous time case (Table 3.8), I 
reported the exponentiated coefficients, also known as hazard ratios18. I find that 
tobacco control expenditures did not influence the probability of smoking initiation 
(except in Models 4, 8, and 10, i.e. in FE and stratified models that used cumulative 
expenditures). The results for the cessation models (Table 3.10 and 3.11) consistently 
show that tobacco control expenditures are positively associated with the probability 
of smoking cessation. The resulting cessation elasticities vary from 0.05 to 0.11 
depending on the nature of expenditures (annual or cumulative) and on the 
specification used. A 10% increase in per capita tobacco control spending would then 
result in a 1% to 1.1% increase of the probability of smoking cessation according to 
models using annual expenditures. In most initiation models (again, except in Models 
4, 8, and 10), real price has a significant negative impact on smoking initiation 
(elasticity of initiation varies from -0.64 to -0.88). In the cessation analysis, real 
cigarette price has a positive and significant impact on the cessation probability. An 
                                                            
18
 Hazard ratios represent the factor by which the expected initiation (or cessation) probability is multiplied as a result 
of a one-unit increase in the corresponding covariate. A hazard ratio of 1.10 associated with a continuous independent 
variable indicates that an increase of 1 unit in the variable will result in a 10% increase in the expected probability. 
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increase of 10% in real cigarette price would result in a 9.4% to 12.7% increase of the 
cessation probability. Education level has a significant impact on both decisions. 
Individuals with higher education are approximately 30% less likely to start smoking 
than individuals with only compulsory education. Individuals with secondary (and 
tertiary) education are about 10% (respectively 18%) more likely to quit than the less 
educated individuals. Men are more likely to start smoking (hazard ratio of about 
1.13, p<0.01), and they are less likely to quit (hazard ratio around 0.89, p<0.05). 
Whether or not an individual is Swiss does not have any significant effect on the 
onset and the termination of smoking. 
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Table 3.8: Initiation analysis – Discrete time hazard models (logit) 
 Without region fixed-
effects 
With region fixed-effects 
 Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Tobacco 
control 
0.0178  
(0.059) 
-0.0307 
(0.0340) 
-0.0629 
(0.080) 
-0.0900*** 
(0.035) 
 
[0.01] [-0.04] [-0.04] [-0.11] 
     
Price  -0.9152***  
(0.262) 
[-0.88] 
-0.6630**  
(0.256) 
[-0.64] 
-0.6663** 
(0.300) 
[-0.64] 
-0.2606  
(0.256) 
[-0.25] 
Education  
    
Secondary 
education -0.1278  (0.095) 
-0.1327  
(0.096) 
-0.1317  
(0.099) 
-0.1367  
(0.101) 
Higher 
education -0.3990*** (0.094) 
-0.4031*** 
(0.095) 
-0.4256*** 
(0.105) 
-0.4324*** 
(0.107) 
Gender 
    
Male 0.1405*** 
(0.031) 
 0.1413*** 
(0.032) 
 0.1371*** 
(0.0300) 
0.1387*** 
(0.031) 
Nationality 
    
Swiss 
-0.0232 
(0.032) 
-0.0269  
(0.032) 
 -0.0041 
(0.038) 
-0.0032 
(0.038) 
N=4353. Robust SE in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within regions). 
Elasticities in brackets. Models include one dummy variable for each possible 
observation time. Models also control for birth cohort (1970-1975, 1976-1980, 
1981-1985,1986-1992). Omitted categories are compulsory education, female, and 
non-Swiss. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Table 3.9: Initiation analysis – Continuous time hazard models (Cox) 
 Without region fixed-
effects 
With region fixed-effects Stratified by region 
 Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual 
exp. 
Cumulative 
exp. 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Tobacco 
control 
1.0136  
(0.046) 
0.9731 
(0.025) 
0.9438 
(0.066) 
0.9233*** 
(0.026) 
0.9518 
(0.070) 
0.9269** 
(0.029) 
 
[0.01] [-0.04] [-0.04] [-0.10] [-0.03] [-0.09] 
      
Price  0.4204***  
(0.098) 
[-0.86] 
0.5211***  
(0.124) 
[-0.64] 
0.5247** 
(0.133) 
[-0.64] 
0.7448  
(0.1655) 
[-0.29] 
0.5106*** 
(0.129) 
[-0.66] 
0.7230 
(0.166) 
[-0.32] 
Education  
     
Secondary 
education 0.8944  (0.071) 
0.8908  
(0.072) 
0.8914  
(0.074) 
0.8881  
(0.075) 
0.8874 
(0.073) 
0.8839 
(0.074) 
Higher 
education 0.7000*** (0.054) 
0.6975*** 
(0.054) 
0.6838*** 
(0.059) 
0.6802*** 
(0.060) 
0.6808*** 
(0.059) 
0.6768*** 
(0.060) 
Gender 
     
Male 1.1317*** 
(0.029) 
 1.1324*** 
(0.030) 
 1.1274*** 
(0.028) 
1.1288*** 
(0.028) 
1.1250*** 
(0.026) 
1.1265*** 
(0.027) 
Nationality 
     
Swiss 0.9816 
(0.027) 
0.9786  
(0.027) 
 0.9973 
(0.033) 
0.9980 
(0.033) 
0.9984 
(0.034) 
0.9991 
(0.034) 
Coefficients are expressed in hazard ratios. N=4353. Robust SE in parentheses (adjusted for clustering 
within regions). Elasticities in brackets. Models also control for birth cohort (1970-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-
1985,1986-1992). Omitted categories are compulsory education, female, and non-Swiss. Model fit discussed 
in Appendix C. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Table 3.10: Cessation analysis – Discrete time hazard models (logit) 
 Without region fixed-
effects 
With region fixed-effects 
 Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Tobacco 
control 
0.1604***  
(0.037) 
0.0555*** 
(0.017) 
0.1462*** 
(0.044) 
0.0398** 
(0.016) 
 
[0.11] [0.08] [0.10] [0.06] 
     
Real price  0.9210***  
(0.217) 
[0.94] 
1.0791***  
(0.226) 
[1.10] 
0.9813*** 
(0.170) 
[1.00] 
1.2170 *** 
(0.128) 
[1.24] 
Education  
    
Secondary 
education 0.0888**  (0.041) 
0.0889 ** 
(0.041) 
0.0979 ** 
(0.038) 
0.0982 ** 
(0.038) 
Higher 
education 0.1659*** (0.032) 
0.1663*** 
(0.032) 
0.1741*** 
(0.037) 
0.1743*** 
(0.037) 
Gender 
    
Male 
-0.1081** 
(0.052) 
 -0.1089** 
(0.052) 
 -0.1095** 
(0.050) 
-0.1096** 
(0.049) 
Nationality 
    
Swiss 
-0.0691 
(0.045) 
-0.0709*  
(0.045) 
 -0.0760 
(0.048) 
-0.0761* 
(0.047) 
N=6464. Robust SE in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within regions). 
Elasticities in brackets. Models include one dummy variable for each possible 
observation time. Models also control for birth cohort (1931-1940, 1941-1950, 
1951-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1992) and recall bias (indicators for the 
following calendar years: 1997, 1992, 1987, 1982, 1977). Omitted categories are 
compulsory education, female, and non-Swiss. ***significant at 1%; **significant 
at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Table 3.11: Cessation analysis – Continuous time hazard models (Cox) 
 
 Without region fixed-
effects 
With region fixed-effects Stratified by region 
 Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
Annual exp. Cumulative 
exp. 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Tobacco 
control 
1.1672 *** 
(0.043) 
1.0542*** 
(0.017) 
1.1510*** 
(0.050) 
1.0377** 
(0.016) 
1.1471*** 
(0.054) 
1.0360* 
(0.019) 
 
[0.11] [0.08] [0.10] [0.06] [0.10] [0.05] 
      
Real price  2.4646***  
(0.527) 
[0.94] 
2.8897***  
(0.637) 
[1.11] 
2.6153*** 
(0.440) 
[1.00] 
3.3153***  
(0.412) 
[1.25] 
2.6502*** 
(0.495) 
[1.02] 
3.3606*** 
(0.503) 
[1.27] 
Education  
     
Secondary 
education 1.0906**  (0.044) 
1.0907**  
(0.044) 
1.1004**  
(0.041) 
1.1008**  
(0.041) 
1.1043*** 
(0.041) 
1.1046*** 
(0.041) 
Higher 
education 1.1759*** (0.037) 
1.1764*** 
(0.037) 
1.1855*** 
(0.043) 
1.1857*** 
(0.043) 
1.1944*** 
(0.044) 
1.1946*** 
(0.044) 
Gender 
     
Male 0.8999** 
(0.046) 
 0.8992** 
(0.045) 
 0.8987** 
(0.044) 
0.8986** 
(0.044) 
0.8970** 
(0.042) 
0.8970** 
(0.042) 
Nationality 
     
Swiss 0.9348 
(0.041) 
0.9331  
(0.041) 
 0.9285 
(0.043) 
0.9285 
(0.043) 
0.9249* 
(0.041) 
0.9249* 
(0.041) 
Coefficients are expressed in hazard ratios. N=6464. Robust SE in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within 
regions). Elasticities in brackets. Models also control for birth cohort (1931-1940, 1941-1950, 1951-1960, 1961-
1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1992) and recall bias (indicators for the following calendar years: 1997, 1992, 1987, 1982, 
1977). Omitted categories are compulsory education, female, and non-Swiss. . Model fit discussed in Appendix C. 
***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Figure 3.6 shows the baseline hazard in each region (strata) retrieved after the 
estimation of the stratified models (see Cleves et al. 2008 for details). Hazard rate is 
presented for the initiation analysis, while cumulative hazard rate is presented for the 
cessation analysis. In a region, a lower baseline hazard in the initiation analysis and a 
higher baseline hazard in the cessation analysis could reflect the influence of 
unobserved factors such as stronger anti-smoking sentiment.  
 
Figure 3.6: Estimated baseline hazard by region 
Initiation analysis 
 
Cessation analysis 
 
 
I perform a simple computation to estimate the number of avoided smokers 
attributable to tobacco control efforts in the country between 1997 and 2007. For this 
purpose, I used the Cox model with annual expenditures and region fixed-effects 
(Model 17) to predict the cessation probability of each individual in the sample. I also 
used the model to predict these probabilities assuming zero tobacco control 
expenditures on the period. The resulting average cessation probabilities, by year, are 
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presented in Figure 3.7. The black line depicts the cessation rate that would have been 
observed without any tobacco control spending. The difference between the two lines 
is multiplied each year by the number of potential quitters in the 15 and over 
population of smokers to obtain a rough estimate of the quitters attributable to 
tobacco control. If we sum all these quitters over years, we end up with 
approximately 110,000 additional quitters on the period. The total TC spending over 
the period amounted approximately to 95 million Swiss Francs. In other words, 
tobacco control generated an additional quitter for each CHF 875 spent.  
 
Figure 3.7: Impact of tobacco control (TC) spending on smoking cessation rates (1997-2007) 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, I investigate the sensitivity of our main coefficient of interest 
to changes in some assumptions. I focused the sensitivity analysis on the case of 
smoking cessation, because most of initiation models conclude to a non-significant 
impact of tobacco control expenditures. The robustness of our results was 
investigated according to two issues: the assumption about the level of tobacco 
control expenditure between 1990 and 1997 and the use of the semi-parametric Cox 
PH model. I estimated models using the following assumptions: 1) tobacco control 
expenditures were set to zero for all years before 1997; 2) tobacco control 
expenditures were set at the 1997 level between 1990 and 1997;  3) to address the 
influence of the Cox PH specification, I estimated the model in the parametric 
framework using the Weibull distribution for the baseline hazard; 4) I estimated the 
discrete time model using generalized linear model with binomial link and 
complementary log-log distribution. The sensitivity analysis gave rise to four new 
estimations of the tobacco control elasticity of smoking cessation, as presented in 
Table 3.12.  
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Table 3.12: Cessation models – Sensitivity analysis 
 Evolution of TC spending between 1990 and 1997 
 
No expenditure 1997 level 
Continuous time model  
  
Weibull   
(hazard ratios) 
1.30*** 
 (0.093)  
[0.14] 
1.19*** 
 (0.042)  
[0.07] 
Discrete time model 
  
Complementary log-log 0.23*** 
(0.074)  
[0.15] 
0.10*** 
 (0.026) 
 [0.08] 
Annual TC expenditures and region FE used in all models. All models control 
for price, education level, gender, nationality, cohort dummies, and recall bias 
indicators. Robust SE in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within regions). 
Elasticities in brackets. *** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant 
at 10%. 
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3.8. Discussion 
Using retrospective individual information about smoking-related behavior 
from a large nationally representative health survey, I assessed the influence of 
tobacco control expenditures on the propensity to start and to quit smoking. Smoking 
initiation and cessation decisions were modeled separately using several discrete and 
continuous time hazard models. I found no convincing evidence of a significant 
impact of tobacco control expenditures on smoking initiation, whereas the cessation 
analysis reveals a positive and significant association between tobacco control and the 
probability of cessation in all specifications. I also find evidence that cigarette price 
influences both the decisions to start and to quit smoking. However the effect of price 
has a stronger impact on cessation than on initiation. Our results are in line with those 
of Schaap et al. (2008), who showed that European countries with more developed 
tobacco control policies have higher cessation rates. Switzerland spends only about 
2% of its health financial resources on prevention in general, whereas some 
neighboring countries spend up to 3%. Moreover, if we compare the CDC 
recommendation that at least USD 9 per capita should be spent on tobacco control 
with the actual CHF of 2.7 (or USD 2.35) per capita spent in Switzerland, we 
highlight that the degree to which resources are allocated toward tobacco control in 
the country are limited. This could partly explain the current degree of prevalence of 
smoking, which is still high in international comparison. However, our results do not 
indicate the extent to which tobacco control spending have decreasing marginal 
returns, it is therefore difficult to decide on an optimal level of expenditure.   
The reader must take into consideration the following shortcomings. First, the 
use of self-reported retrospective information from a cross-sectional survey involves 
several problems, including that of inaccurate recall, and the impossibility to take 
account of a more comprehensive set of time-varying individual characteristics. 
Moreover, despite having clustered tobacco control spending in the regions, there 
might still be some “cross-border” effects that are not accounted for here. Another 
important point is that the decrease in prevalence observed during the period could 
have been more prominent if it had not been curbed by substantial tobacco industry 
promotion and advertising expenditures. Due to lack of data, I did not control for 
different degrees of exposure to tobacco industry advertising in the regions.  
A true panel (longitudinal) data set that includes the complete smoking 
history of individuals (initiation, cessation and relapse) and contains a set of 
individual characteristics that are evolving overtime, such as disposable income, 
residence, marital status or employment status, would improve the analysis of 
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initiation, cessation and relapse decisions and provide informative figures useful in 
developing effective tobacco control policies. In Europe, the SHARE19 dataset, which 
is similar to the American HRS, is in development, and will allow within and between 
countries analyses of the smoking behaviors of individuals aged 50 and over. This 
should provide interesting insights concerning the impact of tobacco control policies 
on this specific age group. Further research should also focus on the factors that drive 
smoking decisions – especially initiation – among young individuals. For this 
purpose, more recent data about youth smoking behavior and more detailed 
information about the tobacco control interventions targeted at this age group should 
be gathered. Moreover, the focus of the tobacco industry is moving towards young 
people. Traditional media campaigns account for a decreasing share of promotion 
expenditures for tobacco products, whereas direct marketing strategies are rapidly 
evolving. Future studies should also account for these changes.  
 
                                                            
19
 Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
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Appendix A:  Overview of tobacco control in Switzerland 
 
Measure Situation 
Price increase (through excise tax) 50% increase of real price from 1997 to 2007. Excise tax 
represented 56% of cigarette price in 2008, which is quite low 
in international comparison. 
Labelling of cigarette packs Since 2004, the use of “light” and “mild” terms is banned. 
Since 2008 (with transitional dispositions until end of 2009), 
picture health warnings on cigarette packs and other tobacco 
products are mandatory. In addition, the quitting help line 
contact information must be clearly mentioned.  
Information campaigns National information campaigns targeted at the general 
population (“Smoking hurts” 2001-2005, “BRAVO, life, not 
smoke” 2006-2008), school-aged children (“Non-smoking 
experience” 2000-2010) or sportive people (Cool & Clean). 
Smaller campaigns were regularly implemented in some 
cantons. 
Advertising ban Advertising bans that are in force in Switzerland are considered 
as partial bans whose effect on tobacco consumption is low or 
even null (Saffer and Chaloupka 2000). Some cantons took 
some more stringent regulation but they came into force only at 
the end of the period (in 2006 or 2007). 
Protection against environmental 
tobacco smoke (ETS) 
Launched in 2006, the “Smoke free work place” program 
encouraged firms to offer their employees a smoke-free 
environment. A federal law about ETS was discussed and voted 
on by the parliament in 2008. Although moving in a positive 
direction, the corresponding legislation is not very strict as it 
leaves room for several exceptions (e.g. smoking rooms are 
permitted). Some cantons, especially Ticino (Italian part of 
Switzerland), have taken the lead in terms of smoking bans in 
public places, but the corresponding measures came into force 
in 2007 only.  
Product accessibility Some cantons have taken provisions to reduce accessibility for 
young people (fewer than 16 or 18). Again, the measures came 
into force only at the end of our observation period (2006 or 
2007). 
Cessation support Smoking cessation therapies are not reimbursed by the social 
health insurance. A quitting help line is available at the national 
level since 2005. A website (www.stop-tabac.ch) is also 
available and provide council and information about smoking 
cessation.  
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Appendix B: Kaplan-Meier hazard rates by region 
 
 
Figure B1: Empirical hazard rate of initiation by region 
 
Figure B2: Empirical hazard rate of cessation by region 
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Appendix C: Cox model fit 
 
Model fit of Cox models was assessed by computing the cumulative Cox-Snell 
residuals (Cox and Snell 1968) and representing them against the cumulative hazard. 
A well-fitted model should produce a line with a slope of 1 that passes through the 
origin. In Figure C1, I present the results of this procedure for the models with fixed-
effects and annual expenditures (I obtained figures similar to those achieved using 
other models). We observe that the line departs from the 45-degrees line on the right 
side of both graphs. This phenomenon is mostly due to the lack of observations for 
high exposure times.  
 
Figure C1: Model fit (cumulative Cox-Snell residuals) 
Initiation analysis Cessation analysis 
  
 
The proportional hazard assumption was systematically tested by means of tests based 
on the analysis of residuals. I found no evidence of violation of the proportional 
hazard assumption.  
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4 Perception of smoking-related adverse effects 
among youths: a best-worst scaling approach 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses best-worst scaling, a survey based method, to rank 
the adverse effects of tobacco use according to their potential to 
deter 14-19 years old individuals from smoking. The relative 
importance of 15 items, including long-term and short-term health 
and non-health adverse consequences, was assessed. The results 
indicate that apart from lung cancer that is consistently rated a 
being of most concern, less mentioned health risks such as 
reduced physical capacity and sexual and fertility problems are of 
significant importance. Using subgroup analysis and results from a 
random parameter model, I highlight substantial heterogeneity in 
preferences. Also, using estimates of the relative importance of the 
items at the individual level, I show that respondents that have a 
higher level of concern for long-term health risks are less likely to 
be involved in unhealthy behaviors. 
 
Keywords: youth smoking, adverse effects, risk perception, best-
worst scaling, random parameter logit 
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4.1. Introduction 
The last decade witnessed an important reduction in tobacco use in 
Switzerland. Smoking among the population aged 15 and over decreased by five 
percentage points during the period, to reach 27% in 2009. This reduction is the 
combined result of changes in smoking initiation and cessation rates. While there is 
evidence that the increasing resources allocated to tobacco control in this period 
played a role in increasing cessation rates, there is only weak evidence that tobacco 
control efforts have influenced smoking initiation in Switzerland (see Chapter 3). I 
advance several arguments that could explain why, despite growing prevention 
efforts, the smoking initiation rate among 14- to 19-year-old individuals – i.e., the 
ages at which 80% of initiations occur – remains high. First, it is likely that young 
people are overoptimistic about their future smoking status or about their personal 
likelihood of being affected by tobacco-related risks, even if they are properly 
informed about these risks. Second, information campaigns may not emphasize the 
negative effects of smoking that are of greatest concern to young people. This 
argument holds especially regarding messages that focus on long-term health risks, to 
which present-oriented youths do not attach much importance. These factors may lead 
to an estimation of the marginal net benefit of consumption that does not reflect the 
true risks, resulting in excessive initiations. 
In this study, I assess the health and non-health adverse effects associated 
with tobacco use that are of primary concern to youths and that might deter them from 
smoking. In addition to focusing on the health risks that are cited most often (i.e., 
lung cancer and cardiovascular disease), I investigate the importance of less 
frequently mentioned health implications (e.g., effects on teeth, appearance, skin, 
weight and sexual dysfunction) and other negative effects that are unrelated to health, 
such as cost, dependence, or manipulation by the tobacco industry. I use a best-worst 
scaling methodology to investigate the relative importance of 15 negative effects 
associated with tobacco use. The sample consisted of 376 young people between 14 
and 19 years old living in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The young people 
were presented with a series of best-worst choice situations and asked to pick the 
most and the least deterrent smoking-related negative effects for each situation. Data 
on past and current smoking behavior and on demographics were also collected.  
The results show that in addition to lung cancer, which is consistently rated as 
being of highest concern, other less frequently mentioned risks such as sexual 
dysfunction and reduction of physical capacity are of great importance to young 
people. In a subgroup analysis, I show that, as noted by Hastings and MacFayden 
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(2002), “There is no ultimate deterrent in smoking, no mother of all health warnings.” 
It is therefore important not to focus on conveying one single message to the entire 
population, but rather to find the most suitable message for specific subgroups. 
Finally, I exploit results from a random-coefficient approach to study the association 
between individual levels of concern for four types of risks (long-term health risks, 
short-term health risks, externalities, and product-specific issues) and the smoking 
status of respondents. I find a significant negative association between the level of 
concern about long-term health risks and the probability of smoking. I find similar 
results when looking at the impact of the level of concern about long-term health risks 
on the frequency of alcohol use. Young individuals who are more concerned with 
long-term health risks are thus less likely to be involved in unhealthy behaviors. The 
level of concern for long-term health risk may then at least partly reflect how far-
sighted the individual are.  
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4.2. Background 
Youth smoking in Switzerland 
Smoking-related behavior in Switzerland is monitored in two general 
population surveys: the Swiss Tobacco Survey, which has been conducted each year 
since 2001, and the Swiss Health Survey, which has been conducted every five years 
since 1992. Detailed supplementary questions targeted at youths were asked 
repeatedly in 2001/2002, 2004/2005 and recently in 2007/2008 in the Swiss Tobacco 
Survey (Radtke et al. 2008). The first striking figure is the high initiation rate in the 
14-19 age group, which I illustrate in two graphs. First, I used the 2001 to 2007 
editions of the Swiss Tobacco Survey to compute the smoking prevalence in the 
cohort of individuals aged 14 in 2001 (15 in 2002, 16 in 2003, etc.). We observe a 
substantial increase in smoking prevalence from about 8% at the age of 14 to almost 
40% at the age of 19. This 30-percentage point increase in prevalence does not 
completely fade at older ages (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: Smoking prevalence by age (cohort of youth aged 14 in 2001) 
 
 
Using retrospective information about smoking behavior included in the 2007 
edition of the Swiss Health Survey, I computed the probability of initiation at each 
age, conditional on not having started smoking. The x-axis of Figure 4.2 is the 
number of non-smoking years and the y-axis is the empirical Kaplan-Meier hazard 
rate, computed as follows: 
i ih(t) = f / nˆ  .  (4.1) 
The rate corresponds to the yearly ratio of the number of people who have not started 
smoking (
i
f ) and the total number of people at risk starting the same year (
i
n ). We 
observe that the probability of initiation increases sharply from the age of 14 and 
decreases precipitously after the age of 20. Another interesting figure is that 80% of 
current and former smokers started at the age of 20 or earlier. 
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Figure 4.2: Initiation probability by age 
 
The most recent youth module of the Swiss Tobacco Survey provides detailed 
additional information about youth smoking-related behaviors and beliefs. The data 
show an association between education level and smoking participation, indicating 
that prevalence was 36% among individuals involved in an apprenticeship and only 
24% among high school students at the same age. The data also show that young 
individuals are overoptimistic about their ability to quit. Indeed, 44% of young 
smokers think they will probably no longer smoke within two years, even though we 
know that smoking prevalence among youth increases with age. Moreover, the data 
provide evidence of a strong link between the social environment and smoking-
related behavior. If both parents smoke, youth smoking prevalence is almost three 
times higher. Similar figures are found if one sibling smokes. We can also observe 
that smokers have a higher proportion of smokers among their friends. In the survey, 
young non-smokers were presented a Likert scale to rate several smoking-related 
negative effects that prevent them from smoking. The higher rated negative effects 
are the following: 1) smoking is unhealthy (95% strongly agree or agree); 2) I don’t 
want to become addicted (84% strongly agree or agree); 3) smoking causes a bad 
smell (80% strongly agree or agree). About 75% of young non-smokers say that they 
do not smoke because it is expensive. To summarize, the data described above show 
that the initiation rate in this age group is high, that there is a clear educational 
gradient, that there is some evidence of inter-temporal inconsistencies, and that young 
non-smokers are aware that smoking is unhealthy and creates addiction. 
 
Strategies to reduce youth smoking 
From an economic perspective, a young individual compares the benefits he 
draws from consumption (i.e., pleasure, peer acceptance, self-confidence) with the 
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present and future costs of tobacco use20 and decides to smoke if the benefits 
outweigh the costs. In this framework, possible strategies to curb smoking are aimed 
at increasing immediate monetary and non-monetary costs, improving youths’ 
awareness of the various risks of smoking and limiting youth exposure to tobacco 
industry advertising. While the existing literature provides insights about the 
efficiency of all of these approaches, the effect of price has been the most widely 
studied. Despite some opposing evidence (e.g., DeCicca et al. 2008a), a large number 
of studies have concluded that price increases influence smoking participation among 
youth and that this subgroup of the population is even more price-responsive than 
adults are (Chaloupka and Grossman 1997).21 Although the body of evidence 
supporting a negative effect of price on smoking participation among youth is 
significant, only a few studies have separated the effect on reduced initiation from 
that on increased cessation. Results related to the initiation decision are 
heterogeneous. Some studies conclude a negative effect of price on smoking initiation 
(Cawley et al. 2004, Tauras et al. 2001, Chapter 3), and an important number of other 
studies have found a modest or nonexistent impact of price on smoking onset (Lopes-
Nicolas 2002, Douglas 1998, DeCicca et al. 2002, Sen and Wirjanto 2009, DeCicca et 
al. 2008b). In a recent study on youth smoking, Fletcher et al. (2009) found that 
adolescents (grades 7 to 12) differ in their responsiveness to cigarette price changes 
depending on measures of self-control and time preferences. Their results support the 
development of strategies other than price changes to reduce smoking in this age 
group. 
Other non-monetary costs of tobacco consumption might influence the 
smoking decisions. Access restrictions were not proven to be very effective in 
reducing smoking participation (see Ficthenberg and Glantz 2002 for a review). 
Moreover, Schnohr et al. (2008) found that a purchase age limit for tobacco products 
could increase the probability of daily smoking. In Switzerland, 67% of young 
smokers aged 14-15 indicated that they buy cigarettes on their own, although sales to 
individuals under 16 are forbidden (Radtke et al. 2008). Another feature of the Swiss 
                                                            
20
 Present costs include the market price of the product and other “non-monetary” costs such as bypassing the parental 
ban, restriction of access, immediate health and non-health negative effects, and the costs associated with smoking 
bans. Future costs include health costs, i.e., potential loss of life expectancy and loss of quality of life. Future health 
costs are uncertain, however, and individuals do not face the same risks. Another central point concerning future costs 
is that they are not perceived equally by all individuals in terms of importance and probability of occurrence. 
Moreover, because youth are more present-oriented, they are more likely to heavily discount these costs when making 
their smoking decisions. 
 
21The authors suggested that youth would be more price-sensitive for several reasons. First, the “addictive stock” of 
youth is not very important, so they are more prone to quit when the price changes. Second, they advanced that price 
changes have a multiplicative effect for youth due to strong peer effects. Third, a larger share of young people’s 
income is spent on cigarettes. Finally, if we rely on the rational addiction model (Becker and Murphy 1988), the fact 
that young people are more present-oriented leads to a greater sensitivity to price changes. 
95 
 
context is that the tobacco industry operates freely and aggressively towards 
teenagers. In the 2007/8 period, it is estimated that almost one-third of young 
individuals aged 14-19 received a gift (i.e., cigarettes, lighter) from the tobacco 
industry (Radtke et al. 2008). 
An important body of empirical literature has studied the impact of 
information dissemination on the risks related to youth smoking. This information 
was disseminated to influence young people’s risk perception and to ultimately 
influence their smoking-related decisions. The link between risk perception and 
behavior was recently assessed by Song et al. (2009). The authors found that the 12- 
to 17-year-olds who had the lowest level of risk perception of long-term and short-
term health risks (measured by their subjective probability of experiencing a 
particular adverse effect, such as trouble breathing, lung cancer, etc.) were 
significantly more likely to start smoking. Different vectors of information 
dissemination exist, including media campaigns, school-based programs, and health 
warnings (Koval et al. 2005). Some studies have focused on particular campaigns. For 
instance, numerous studies have investigated the impact of the U.S. National Truth® 
campaign. Thrasher et al. (2004) showed that attitudes and beliefs against the tobacco 
industry increased significantly following the onset of this campaign. Changes in 
attitudes and beliefs resulting from the Truth® campaign and from an industry-funded 
campaign (“Think, don’t smoke”) were analyzed by Farrelly et al. (2008) and Davis 
et al. (2009). The authors found evidence that the Truth® campaign was effective and 
that the industry-funded campaign had counterproductive effects. In a recent study by 
Farrelly et al. (2009), the authors found an association between the degree of 
exposure to the campaign and a lower probability of smoking initiation. They 
estimated that more than 450,000 individuals avoided becoming new smokers thanks 
to this specific campaign in the United States. Other studies focusing on the impact of 
general budgets on youth smoking prevention have found a positive association 
between tobacco control spending and the number of quit attempts among college 
students (Ciecierski et al. 2010). Tauras et al. (2005) found a negative and significant 
association between state tobacco control spending and youth smoking prevalence. In 
Chapter 3, I provide some evidence that tobacco control expenditures do not have a 
major impact on smoking initiation.  
Pechman and Reibling (2000), also cited by Farrelly et al. (2003), argued that 
to be effective in changing behavior, an information campaign should have the correct 
content and be targeted to the appropriate population (i.e., it should rely on the most 
relevant message for the concerned subgroup). The content should be clearly 
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disseminated, and various messages should be used. Further, the budget should be 
large enough to allow adequate exposure of the target group. Several studies have 
attempted to assess the ability of different specific anti-smoking messages to change 
beliefs or behaviors. Using a focus-group approach, Goldman and Glantz (1998) 
asked adolescents and adults about the perceived effectiveness of several message 
“themes” in reducing tobacco use and denormalizing smoking. The themes studied 
were industry manipulation, secondhand smoke, addiction, cessation, youth access, 
short-term effects, long-term health effects, and romantic rejection. The authors 
conclude that industry manipulation and secondhand smoke have the highest 
perceived efficacy for achieving denormalization and a reduction in consumption. In 
a comprehensive review on youth tobacco prevention, Farrelly et al. (2003) classified 
the types of messages delivered by media campaigns on youth smoking. Their 
classification includes consequences (short-term, long-term, family and addiction), 
social norms and imagery, role models (e.g., celebrities), industry and product focus, 
secondhand smoke and youth access. The authors review the existing evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of various thematic content and conclude that it is 
currently difficult to highlight one particular message that would be more effective. 
In the present study, I focused on the thematic content of prevention messages 
and, more specifically, on the potential of various health and non-health smoking-
related consequences to act as deterrents to smoking for youths aged 14-19. This 
method has the virtue of providing a detailed assessment of the relative importance 
that young people attach to these consequences. Moreover, the estimation procedure 
allowed me to investigate preference heterogeneity and to relate the level of concern 
about certain type of risks to the smoking status of respondents.  
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4.3. Method 
Best-worst scaling 
Best-worst scaling (BWS) was originally introduced by Finn and Louviere 
(1992), and the theoretical foundations of the associated probabilistic models were 
developed in a reference paper by Marley and Louviere (2005). Recently, Flynn et al. 
(2007) provided a comprehensive overview of the method and its associated models 
with a focus on health economics. Some applications of BWS are presented as an 
alternative to traditional choice-based conjoint analysis. For instance, Flynn et al. 
(2008) studied patients’ preferences toward various aspects of dermatology 
consultations. Swancutt et al. (2008) described a BWS study protocol to assess the 
relative importance of the various attributes of a colonoscopy among women. Outside 
of health economics, an increasing number of studies use the BWS method to 
examine various topics (e.g., Auger et al. 2007, Cohen 2009, Louviere and Islam 
2008, Jaeger et al. 2008). 
A best-worst survey contains a series of choice tasks, each of which contains 
a different set of items. In each choice situation, respondents are asked to choose the 
“best” and the “worst” item. The terms “best” and “worst” can be replaced by any 
expression that is relevant to locate the item on the dimension of interest (e.g., “most 
important” and “least important” or “most useful” and “least useful”). The analysis of 
the choice data allows the researcher to measure each item on a common scale and to 
assess its relative importance. In this study, the respondents were presented with a 
series of “best-worst” tasks that required them to pick the most and the least deterrent 
adverse effect of smoking.  
In Figure 4.3, I schematically present the advantage of the best-worst scaling 
methodology over a Likert scale and a ranking task. In this example, it is assumed 
that the respondent had to evaluate 5 items. With a standard Likert scale, each item 
might be rated as important. If we ask the respondents to rank items, the answers will 
be essentially ordinal, without any assessment of the relative level of importance. 
Moreover, a ranking task is very demanding. The BWS methodology provides 
sufficient information to develop a precise scale and even to develop individual-level 
scales. 
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between Likert scale, ranking tasks and BWS 
 
We see that the information that can be obtained using BWS is much richer 
and more complete than the information that can be obtained using conventional 
methods. Furthermore, the BWS task has the advantage of being quite simple for 
respondents in comparison, for instance, with the traditional discrete choice paired 
comparisons for which the respondent must evaluate all dimensions simultaneously. 
The level of concern expressed by respondents may have different 
determinants. Specifically, I assume that it depends on the perceived probability to be 
affected, the perceived disutility associated with the consequences, and an individual 
discount factor. For an individual i rating an item j, we have:  
jt
ij i ij jConcern = δ π u          (4.2) 
Whereδ is the discount factor of individual i, t reflects the distance in time of the 
consequence, π is the subjective probability of individual i that consequence j occurs, 
and u is the perceived disutility associated with consequence j. 
 
Development of the survey 
On the basis of an extensive review of the literature about smoking-related 
consequences and interviews with tobacco prevention specialists,22 I developed an 
initial list of 36 negative effects of smoking, including long-term and short-term 
health risks, impacts on physical appearance, financial burden, impact on other 
individuals, and others. I then constructed a preliminary survey designed to evaluate 
these 36 implications independently using Likert scales. The surveys were completed 
                                                          
22
 In particular, I am thankful to Verena El Fehri at the Swiss Association for Smoking Prevention (AT-Suisse) and 
Dr. Pascal Gygax at Fribourg University. 
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by a sample of 50 young smokers and non-smokers between 14 and 19 years old. This 
procedure allowed me to select a sub-sample of items to include in the final analysis. 
After additional discussions with specialists to limit the questionnaire to a reasonable 
number of choice tasks, I chose to keep 15 negative implications. The final list of 
negative implications is provided in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Final list of smoking-related negative effects 
Negative effects 
Lung cancer 
Skin problems 
High expenditures 
Oral and dental problems 
Inhalation of chemicals 
COPD 
Addiction 
Weight gain after cessation 
Endangering relatives 
Sexual and fertility problems 
Tobacco industry manipulation 
Cardiovascular diseases 
Reduced life expectancy 
Disturbance of non-smokers 
Reduction of physical capacity 
 
To obtain a survey in which all issues occur equally often and in which the 
occurrence of one issue is independent of the occurrence of all other issues, I used an 
orthogonal main effects design based on an orthogonal array obtained from Sloane’s 
website (Sloane 2010). I show the complete design in Appendix A. The surveys 
contained 4 choice sets with 5 negative effects, 6 choice sets with 7 negative effects, 4 
choice sets with 9 negative effects and 2 choice sets with 11 negative effects, 
resulting in a total of 16 choice sets. For each choice situation, I provided a brief 
description of the items. An example of a choice set is shown below (Figure 4.4). The 
survey also included individual-specific characteristics such as gender, age, 
education, smoking status, smoking history, parental smoking status, and information 
on alcohol use. The survey was pre-tested with 20 individuals aged 14-19. No major 
understanding problem was detected, and the vast majority of respondents considered 
the choice tasks to be easy (18/20). 
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Figure 4.4: Example of a choice task 
MOST 
DETERRENT 
 
 
LEAST 
DETERRENT 
 
 
 
 
Lung cancer 
(smokers have a much higher risk of getting lung cancer than non-
smokers) 
 
 
 
 
Addiction 
(smoking creates addiction and craving symptoms are 
uncomfortable (headache, nervousness, etc.)) 
 
 
 
 
Oral/dental problems  
(smoking is bad for teeth and gums and causes bad breath) 
 
 
 
 
 
Weight gain after cessation 
(individuals who quit gain 2-3 kilos on average) 
 
 Endangering relatives 
(second-hand smoke is harmful to other individuals, especially 
relatives) 
 
 
Data collection 
Respondents were selected according to three criteria to achieve 
proportionality with the Swiss population aged 14-19: age, sex, and education level. 
Educational institutions were first contacted and surveys were collected in different 
classes. We collected 384 surveys between March and June in secondary schools, 
high schools, technical and professional schools, and tertiary education institutions. 
  
Econometric analysis 
The BWS task implicitly models the following process: in each choice 
situation, “respondents choose the pair that exhibits the largest perceptual difference 
on an underlying continuum of interest” (Finn and Louviere, 1992). In our case, the 
underlying dimension is the “degree of concern” related to the various negative 
effects of tobacco use. In terms of choice theory, it is assumed that the probability that 
a respondent chooses a pair in a particular choice set is proportional to the difference 
between the “most” and the “least” item on the scale of interest. Individuals are 
assumed to behave according to the following process: 1) identification of all possible 
pairs; 2) evaluation of the difference on the underlying dimension for every pair; 3) 
choice of the pair that maximizes this difference. 
In a choice set containing K items, there are K(K-1) possible “most-least” 
combinations that the respondent could select. Each choice set corresponds to K(K-1) 
lines in the database. The dependent choice variable equals one for the chosen pair 
and zero for other pairs in the choice set. In Table 4.2, I show an example of data 
output for a choice set containing 5 items (20 possible pairs). Each line corresponds to 
a particular “most-least” pair. Here, the respondent chose lung cancer as the item of 
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most concern (coded “1”) and endangering relatives as the item of least concern 
(coded “-1”).  
 
Table 4.2: Data output example 
Choice Lung 
cancer 
Addiction Oral Weight gain Relatives 
0 1 -1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 -1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 -1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 -1 
0 0 1 -1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 -1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 -1 
0 0 0 1 -1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 -1 
0 0 0 0 1 -1 
0 -1 1 0 0 0 
0 -1 0 1 0 0 
0 -1 0 0 1 0 
0 -1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 -1 1 0 0 
0 0 -1 0 1 0 
0 0 -1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 -1 1 0 
0 0 0 -1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 -1 1 
 
The probability of choosing a given pair is related to the distance on the 
underlying scale. In other words, it is assumed that the respondent will choose the two 
items that are most distant from each other. I first define the latent unobservable 
distance between items m (most) and l (least) as: 
ml ml mlD = δ + ε ,  (4.3) 
where
mlδ is the measurable difference between item m and l on the underlying scale, 
and 
mlε  is an error component. The probability of choosing the pair ml in a choice set 
C is therefore given by 
ml ml ij ijP(ml / C) = P(δ + ε > δ + ε ), for all ij ml in C≠
    
(4.4) 
The researcher has to make an assumption about the distribution of the error terms. If 
one assumes that they are iid Type 1 Extreme Value distributed, we end up with the 
multinomial logit (MNL) model: 
ml
ij
ij
exp(δ )
P(ml / C) = , for all ij ml in C
exp(δ ) ≠∑
     (4.5)
 
One can reformulate this expression by rewriting the observable difference as the 
difference between two locations (L) on the scale of interest:
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ml m lδ = L - L
         
(4.6) 
The probability is then expressed as: 
m l
i j
ij
exp(L - L )
P(ml / C) = , for all ij ml in C
exp(L - L ) ≠∑
     (4.7) 
In the estimation procedure, a reference location must be defined from which 
other items will be evaluated. Practically, the L value for the reference item is set to 
zero, i.e., the reference item is simply removed from the estimations. The level of 
concern for each negative effect is therefore estimated relative to one negative effect 
of reference. 
In using the MNL model, one assumes that each individual put the same 
weight on the negative effects, i.e., that the estimated coefficients are the same for 
each individual in the sample. Moreover, the MNL specification does not take into 
account that choices may be correlated because each respondent makes a series of 
choices. To overcome these limitations, we estimated the more flexible random 
parameter logit (RPL) model as suggested by Lusk and Briggeman (2009). With this 
specification, the estimated coefficients are assumed to be random. The estimation 
procedure provides an estimate of the mean and the standard deviation for each 
coefficient. We obtain the average weight that individuals place on each items plus an 
individual deviation from those average weights for each respondent a:   
a a
L = L + η
  
(4.8) 
A statistically significant standard deviation for a coefficient indicates preference 
heterogeneity in the population with respect to the specific item. The RPL model has 
to be estimated using simulation methods (see Train 2003 and Chapter 5). An 
interesting feature of the RPL model is that it allows the retrieval of individual-
specific estimates of the coefficients. 
Finn and Louviere (1992) showed that a simpler method to exploit BWS data 
leads to results similar to those obtained with logit models. The procedure involves 
counting, for each item, the number of times it was picked as being “of most concern” 
minus the number of times it was picked as being “of least concern.” These “most 
minus least” totals (or B-W totals, hereafter) are consistent with the Luce (1959) 
model, which is close to the MNL model. Below, we compare the results obtained 
from these two competing approaches.  
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4.4. Results 
Individual characteristics 
Among the 384 surveys collected, 8 were dropped due to missing data or 
incorrect responses in the BWS choice tasks (e.g., two items chosen as being of most 
concern), resulting in 376 surveys used in the analyses. Descriptive statistics of the 
whole sample and of variables collected only among smokers are presented in 
Appendix B. The mean age is 16.2 years old, and 47.1% are boys. More than one-
third (35.7%) of the respondents are smokers, among which 61.8% are daily smokers. 
Among smokers, 67.1% think they will certainly or probably quit in 5 years, and 
72.7% feel that they are able to quit, reflecting an optimism bias regarding future 
smoking status. Interestingly, almost one-third of the smokers (the youngest) do not 
buy their cigarettes but receive them from another individual. Almost 30% of 
respondents drink alcoholic beverages at least once a week.   
Choice models 
Table 4.3 shows the relative importance of the 15 negative effects associated 
with tobacco use as estimated by the MNL and RPL models. The importance of each 
item was estimated relative to the item “weight gain after cessation,” which was 
consistently rated as the least important item. In both models, the results show that the 
two negative effects that are of greatest concern to young individuals are lung cancer 
and cardiovascular diseases. Reduction of physical capacity, sexual dysfunction and 
reduced life expectancy are the next most important negative effects. All of the other 
items seem to be of intermediary importance except tobacco industry manipulation 
and disturbance of non-smokers, which are close to the reference item. The results of 
the RPL model, especially the standard deviations of the coefficients, reveal 
substantial heterogeneity regarding the relative importance of the negative 
consequences.  
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Table 4.3: MNL and RPL models and B-W total 
Negative implication MNL RPL 
Std. dev. of 
coefficients 
(RPL) 
B-W total 
Lung cancer 2.73*** 
(52.6) 
 
3.29*** 
(46.3) 
1.18*** 
(16.8) 
1259 
Cardiovascular 
diseases 
2.05*** 
(38.4) 
 
2.55*** 
(42.2) 
0.21* 
(2.22) 
588 
Sexual dysfunction  2.01*** 
(38.0) 
 
2.43*** 
(36.6) 
1.07*** 
(16.0) 
571 
Reduction of physical 
capacity 
2.00*** 
(37.9) 
 
2.48*** 
(32.4) 
1.47*** 
(24.2) 
541 
Reduced life 
expectancy 
1.97*** 
(37.2) 
 
2.31*** 
(34.2) 
1.13*** 
(15.0) 
526 
COPD 1.33*** 
(25.0) 
 
1.63*** 
(27.4) 
0.12 
(1.6) 
62 
Endangering relatives 1.21*** 
(23.6) 
 
1.55*** 
(24.4) 
0.99*** 
(17.8) 
0 
Addiction 1.20*** 
(22.9) 
 
1.47*** 
(22.8) 
1.02*** 
(16.0) 
-46 
Inhalation of 
chemicals 
1.06*** 
(20.3) 
 
1.32*** 
(22.0) 
0.67*** 
(11.32) 
-78 
Oral and dental 
problems 
1.00*** 
(19.4) 
 
1.22*** 
(21.1) 
0.08 
(0.8) 
-194 
High expenditures 0.96*** 
(18.7) 
 
1.24*** 
(18.3) 
1.31*** 
(20.0) 
-159 
Skin problems 0.93*** 
(17.8) 
 
1.11*** 
(18.8) 
0.31** 
(2.7) 
-270 
Tobacco industry 
manipulation 
0.17** 
(3.5) 
 
0.26*** 
(4.4) 
0.96*** 
(17.6) 
-925 
Disturbance of non-
smokers 
0.07 
(1.4) 
 
0.16* 
(2.33) 
1.30*** 
(20.5) 
-924 
Weight gain after 
cessation (origin) 
- - - -991 
***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
 
In Figure 4.5, I present a comparison between the logit coefficients (both 
MNL and RPL) and the B-W totals. We see that there is a good linear relationship 
between the logit coefficients and the figures obtained from the simpler method. 
Using these B-W totals, I represent the underlying scale of the level of concern for the 
different items. The origin of the scale is the item “weight gain after cessation” 
(Figure 4.6).  
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between logit coefficients and B-W totals 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Graphical representation of the underlying scale (“level of concern”) 
 
 
The size of the estimated coefficients is difficult to interpret directly due to 
scale factors (Train 2003). To overcome this problem, I estimated the probability for 
each item to be chosen as being of “most concern,” as suggested by Lusk and 
Briggeman (2009). Looking at the results for the RPL model in Table 4.4, we see that 
the item “lung cancer,” if present in a choice set, will be selected as the most 
important item 25% of the time. Moreover, lung cancer is twice as likely to be 
selected as the four following items (cardiovascular diseases, reduction of physical 
abilities, sexual dysfunction, and reduced life expectancy). Even if COPD, inhalation 
of chemicals and high expenditures have relatively low coefficients, they are still at 
least twice as likely to be chosen than the seven least negative effects. 
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Table 4.4: Estimated probability of being chosen as “of most concern” 
 Estimated 
probability 
Negative implication MNL RPL 
Lung cancer 22.0% 25.1% 
Cardiovascular diseases 11.1% 9.6% 
Sexual dysfunction  10.7% 11.5% 
Reduction of physical capacity 10.7% 13.8% 
Reduced life expectancy 10.3% 10.8% 
COPD 5.4% 3.8% 
Endangering relatives 4.9% 4.8% 
Addiction 4.8% 4.4% 
Inhalation of chemicals 4.1% 3.3% 
Oral and dental problems 3.9% 2.5% 
High expenditures 3.8% 4.2% 
Skin problems 3.7% 2.3% 
Tobacco industry manipulation 1.7% 1.5% 
Disturbance of non-smokers 1.5% 1.6% 
Weight gain after cessation 1.4% 0.7% 
 
Heterogeneity 
Results from the RPL model indicate the presence of substantial preference 
heterogeneity in the sample. I first investigate the issue by estimating the simple 
MNL model for various subgroups and by comparing the resulting choice 
probabilities. I successively compared boys and girls, smokers and non-smokers, 
individuals in three different age groups, and finally individuals with “high” and 
“low” mortality risk perception23 (Appendix C). We observe that girls have a higher 
level of concern regarding two long-term health risks (lung cancer and cardiovascular 
diseases) while boys are more concerned about physical capacity and sexual 
dysfunction. Older individuals seem to attach more importance to physical capacity 
and sexual dysfunction and less importance to life expectancy and lung cancer than 
their younger counterparts. Non-smokers are more concerned with long-term health 
risks (except COPD) than smokers, and smokers seem more concerned with short-
term consequences. Individuals with a high mortality risk perception attach more 
importance to the impact of tobacco on life expectancy than individuals with lower 
mortality risk perception.   
Heterogeneities were further investigated using the results of the RPL model. 
I assessed the association between the smoking status of individuals and the 
individual-specific estimates of their level of concern for the items, which were 
grouped into 4 categories: long-term health risks, short-term health risks, externalities 
                                                            
23
 Risk perception here is measured by the answer to the following question: “Among 100 smokers, how many do you 
think will die as a consequence of tobacco use?” 
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and product-specific issues. Long-term health risks included lung cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, COPD, reduced life expectancy, inhalation of chemicals, and 
skin problems. Short-term health risks included reduction of physical capacity, oral 
and dental problems (bad breath, etc.), and sexual dysfunction. Externalities included 
disturbing non-smokers and endangering relatives. Finally, product-specific issues are 
issues directly related to cigarettes, including addiction, expenditures, and tobacco 
industry manipulation. For each category, I added the individual-specific values of the 
corresponding coefficients, resulting in four indices that reflected individual-specific 
levels of concern associated with the category. The distributions of the four variables 
are shown in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7: Distribution of the level of concern by category 
Long-term health risks 
 
Short-term health risks 
 
Externalities 
 
Product-specific issues 
 
 
I used logistic regression to assess the association between individual 
smoking status (daily or occasional smoker vs. non-smoker) and the four indices, 
controlling for age, gender, peer smoking (parents, siblings and friends), and pocket 
money. I also used class indicators to control for class-specific unobserved 
characteristics. The results of the regression are given in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5: Association between level of concern and smoking status 
Category 
(level of concern) 
Smoking 
status  
(Logit) 
Long-term health 
risks 
0.85* 
(-2.01) 
 
Short-term health 
risks 
1.34** 
(2.38) 
 
Externalities  0.86 
(-1.73) 
 
Product-specific 
issues 
1.05 
(0.65) 
 
Coefficients for gender, age, peer smoking, 
pocket money, and class dummies not reported. 
Logit coefficients are expressed in odd-
ratios.***significant at1%; **significant at 
5%;*significant at 10%. 
We observe a significant negative association between the level of concern 
about long-term health risks and the probability of being a smoker, whereas a higher 
level of concern about short-term health risks is associated with a higher probability 
of smoking. In Appendix D, I present the results of an ordered probit regression of the 
frequency of alcohol consumption on the indices related to long-term and short-term 
health risks. I find similar results, i.e., individuals who put more weight on short-term 
health risks are more likely to be involved in unhealthy behaviors.  
I used an alternative strategy to construct an index that reflects how far-
sighted individuals are, and I assessed its association with respondents’ smoking 
status. I assumed that individuals have an unobserved underlying level of “far-
sightedness” that is correlated with their level of concern for items related to long-
term health risks (i.e., lung cancer, cardiovascular disease, COPD, reduced life 
expectancy, inhalation of chemicals, and skin problems). I conducted a factor analysis 
using the individual-specific estimates of the level of concern for these items as 
variables. In Table 4.6, I present the eigenvalues obtained for the resulting six factors. 
I decided to keep only the first factor in the analysis due to the substantial eigenvalue 
reduction between the first two factors. The resulting factor loadings for each 
dimension of the first factor are presented in Table 4.7. 
 
  
109 
 
Table 4.6: Eigenvalues 
Factor Eigenvalues Proportion  
1 0.27712 2.4977 
2 0.07275 0.6557 
3 0.02550 0.2299 
4 0.00025 0.0022 
5 -0.10597   -0.9551 
6 -0.15871 -1.4304 
 
Table 4.7: Factor loadings 
Item Factor loading 
 Complete 
set 
Restricted 
set 
Lung cancer 0.325 0.312 
Cardiovascular diseases 0.248 0.291 
Reduced life expectancy 0.255 0.249 
COPD 0.100 - 
Chemicals 0.100 - 
Skin problems 0.075 - 
 
Keeping the three items with the highest factor loading (lung cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, and reduced life expectancy), I conducted the factor analysis 
again, resulting in the restricted set presented in the last column of Table 4.7. The 
result is then used to compute individual-level factor scores that I interpret as 
individual-level “far-sightedness” and that I relate to respondents’ smoking and 
drinking behavior while controlling for age, peer smoking, pocket money, and class 
membership (Table 4.8). Again, the results indicate that more far-sighted individuals 
are less likely to be involved in unhealthy behaviors. 
 
Table 4.8: Far-sightedness, smoking, and drinking behavior 
 
Smoking 
status 
(Logit) 
Level of alcohol 
consumption (ordered 
probit) 
“Far-
sightedness” 
0.53** 
(0.281) 
 
-0.26** 
(0.131) 
Logit coefficient is expressed in odd-ratio. Coefficient for gender, 
age, peer smoking, pocket money, and class dummies not reported. 
Standard error in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 
5%;*significant at 10%. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
Using best-worst scaling, which is a choice-based survey method, I assessed 
the relative importance assigned by young individuals aged 14 to 19 years old to 
health and non-health smoking-related adverse effects. Subsamples of fifteen items 
were presented in choice sets that required respondents to choose the items that were 
most and least likely to deter them from smoking. Results show that developing lung 
cancer is consistently rated as being of most concern, followed by cardiovascular 
diseases, sexual dysfunction, reduction of physical capacity, and reduced life 
expectancy. Items such as impact on relatives, addiction or expenditures were rated as 
moderately important. Weight gain after cessation is consistently the least likely to 
deter respondents from smoking. Subgroup analyses show that girls are more 
concerned about long-term risks such as lung cancer, whereas boys seem more 
concerned about sexual dysfunction and physical capacity. These analyses also show 
that a higher risk perception of smoking mortality seems to be related to a higher level 
of concern about the impact of smoking on life expectancy. Using results from 
random-parameter logit (RPL) estimation, we find that more present-oriented 
individuals, defined here as the individuals who are most concerned about short-term 
health risks, are more likely to be involved in unhealthy behaviors. Messages used in 
youth-targeted prevention campaigns should therefore concentrate on the more 
immediate negative consequences of smoking and should address different themes for 
the various population subgroups, especially boys and girls. However, our method has 
some important limitations. A high level of importance associated with one item can 
result from a high level of concern or simply from high level of awareness. We must 
therefore think carefully about the implications of the results. It may be that health 
risks such as lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and reduced life expectancy are 
highly rated in part because past communication about these risks has been intense.  
 
 
  
111 
 
Appendix A: Experimental design 
 
 Two levels and strength 2 (16.15.2.2.4) on N.J.A Sloane's website 
 
 
 
Items Choice sets 
Number of 
appearances 
in the 
survey 
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 CS11 CS12 CS13 CS14 CS15 CS16 
I1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 8 
I2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 8 
I3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 8 
I4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
I5 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
I6 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 
I7 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 8 
I8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
I9 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 8 
I10 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 8 
I11 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 
I12 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 8 
I13 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 8 
I14 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
I15 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 8 
Number of 
items in the 
choice set 
5 7 7 7 9 7 5 9 7 9 5 9 7 5 11 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
112 
 
Appendix B: Sample characteristics 
 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics – whole sample (N=376) 
Variable Definition Mean 
 
Std. dev. 
 
 
  
GENDER =1 if resp. is a male 0.47  
    
AGE Age in years 16.2 1.4 
    
SWISS =1 if resp. is Swiss 0.81  
    
EDUCATION    
 Mandatory school (secondary school) 0.38  
 Apprenticeship or professional school 
  
0.30  
 High school or College 0.32  
    
SMOKE =1 is resp. is a smoker (occasional or daily smoker) 0.36  
    
PARENTS =1 if at least one parent smokes 0.45  
    
SIBLINGS =1 if at least one sibling smokes 0.28  
    
FRIENDS =1 if at least one friend smokes  0.90  
    
FUTURE Will you be a smoker in 5 years? 
 
  
 Certainly not 
 
0.49  
 Probably not 
 
0.33  
 Yes, probably 0.14  
 Yes, for sure 
 
0.04  
    RISK Among 100 smokers, how many will die from a 
consequence of tobacco use? 
0.46 27.1 
    
POCKET MONEY How much money do you have, per week, for your 
personal expenditures? 
  
 0 CHF 0.07  
 1-20 CHF 0.40  
 21-50 CHF 0.27  
 51-100 CHF 0.17  
 101-200 CHF 0.04  
 More than 200 CHF 0.05  
 
ALCOHOL How often do you drink alcoholic beverages?    
 Never 0.18  
 Once a month 0.29  
 Several times a month 0.24  
 Once a week 0.18  
 Several times a week  0.10  
 Every day 0.01  
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics – smokers (N=134) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
 
 
  
DAILY Respondent is a daily smoker 0.62  
    
QTT_CIG Number of cigarettes smoked, in average, per day   
 Less than 1 per day 0.27  
 1-5 0.27  
 6-10 0.24  
 11-20  0.20  
 More than 20 0.02  
    
AGE START How old where you when you smoked for the first 
time? 
14.6 1.4 
    
BUY_CIG Where do you buy your cigarettes (multiple answers 
allowed)? 
  
 Kiosk 0.78  
 Supermarket 0.28  
 Vending machine 0.28  
 Internet 0.01  
 Someone buy them for me 0.11  
 Someone give them to me 0.31  
    
QUIT_TRY Have you ever tried to quit smoking? 0.52  
    
QUIT_WILL Do you want to quit smoking? 0.61  
    
QUIT_CAN Do you feel able to quit smoking? 0.73  
    
FUTURE Will you be a smoker in 5 years?   
 Certainly not 0.12  
 Probably not 0.45  
 Yes, probably 0.34  
 Yes, for sure 0.09  
    
RISK Among 100 smokers, how many will die from a 
consequence of tobacco use? 
41.1 27.4 
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Appendix C : Estimated relative importance across groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Present orientation and alcohol use 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Boys Girls
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
14-15 16-17 18-19
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Smoker Non-smoker
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
low risk perception high risk perception
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Table D1: Association between level of concern and alcohol use – ordered probit 
Category 
(level of concern) 
Alcohol 
consumption a) 
Long-term health 
risks 
-0.12** 
(-3.08) 
 
Short-term health 
risks 
0.17** 
(3.12) 
 
Coefficient for gender, age, pocket money, and class 
dummies not reported. a)ordered categories for 
alcohol consumption are: never, once a month, 
several times a month, once a week, several times a 
week, and every day. ***significant at 1%; 
**significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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5 Assessing smokers' preferences for smoking 
cessation medications: A discrete choice 
experiment 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The use of smoking cessation medications can enhance long-term 
abstinence rates at a reasonable cost, but only a small proportion 
of quitters seek medical assistance. The objective of this study is 
to evaluate the factors that influence the decision to use such 
treatments, and the willingness-to-pay of smokers for improved 
cessation drugs. For this purpose, I conducted a discrete choice 
experiment among smokers in the French-speaking part of 
Switzerland. The choices consisted of two hypothetical 
medications described via five attributes (price, efficacy, 
possibility of minor side effects, attenuation of weight gain and 
availability) and an opt-out option. Various discrete choice models 
were estimated to analyze both the factors that influence treatment 
choice and those that influence the overall propensity to use a 
smoking cessation medication. The results indicate that there is 
potential demand for improved smoking cessation medications. 
Smokers are willing-to-pay for higher efficacy, less-frequent side 
effects and prevention of weight gain. Whether the drug is 
available over-the-counter or on medical prescription is of 
secondary importance. Broader usage could be reached through 
lower out-of-pocket price and greater efficacy. Secondary aspects 
such as side effects and weight gain should also be taken into 
consideration. In addition, I show that there are several individual-
specific factors influencing the decision to use such medications, 
including education level. 
 
 
Keywords: discrete choice experiments, smoking cessation, 
nested logit, random parameter logit, preference heterogeneity  
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5.1. Introduction 
Smoking is the leading preventable cause of death in most developed 
countries. Switzerland is no exception, with more than nine thousand deaths 
attributable to tobacco use each year (FSO 2009). The proportion of daily or 
occasional smokers in the population between 14 and 65 years old was approximately 
27% in 2009, which is quite high in comparison with other countries (Keller et al. 
2010). This high rate is partly due to permissive tobacco legislation. This was 
confirmed in a study by Joossens and Raw (2006) grading tobacco control intensity at 
the country level, in which Switzerland was ranked 18th among 30 European 
countries, mainly due to low prices and a lack of restrictions.  
A lower prevalence of smoking could be achieved by increasing the success 
rate of individuals who try to quit. Indeed, many smokers are motivated to quit and do 
make the attempt,24 but only a few succeed over the long term. One reason is that few 
seek assistance, even though the long-term abstinence rate can be considerably 
enhanced with appropriate cessation support. The estimated cold turkey (i.e., smoking 
cessation without assistance) quit rate is approximately 5%, while a 10-20% long-
term quit rate can be achieved with the most effective interventions (Fiore 2000). 
Among the wide range of smoking cessation interventions, we distinguish non-
pharmaceutical interventions (including medical counseling, group therapies, books, 
help lines, and acupuncture) from pharmaceutical treatments (nicotine replacement 
therapies25 (NRTs) and nicotine-free medications26). This study focuses on nicotine-
free smoking cessation medications, and its main objective is to assess smokers’ 
preferences for such products. I used a discrete choice experiment (DCE) – a stated 
preferences (SP) technique – which consists of presenting a sample of smokers with 
choices between several hypothetical treatments. The medications were described 
with respect to five attributes (price, efficacy, side effects, effect on weight gain, and 
availability). The respondents were asked to choose several times between two 
alternative treatments and an opt-out option. I analyzed choice data starting from the 
simple multinomial logit model (MNL) as the benchmark model. I then estimated 
more complex models that were able to take into account the specifics of the choice 
                                                            
24
 In 2007, 54% of Swiss smokers wanted to quit, but only 10% within the next thirty days and 30% within the next 
six months (Keller et al. 2010). 
 
25
 NRTs partially relieve the withdrawal symptoms that people experience when they quit by compensating for the 
lack of nicotine in the organism. There are several NRTs currently available over-the-counter in Switzerland, 
including patches, gum, inhalers, lozenges and nasal sprays.  
 
26 Two nicotine-free medications are available in Switzerland by medical prescription only (A-list): bupropion (brand 
name Zyban ®), whose exact mode of action is still unclear (Compendium of Swiss Drugs 2002), and varenicline 
(brand name Champix ®), which relieves symptoms of nicotine withdrawal and blocks the reinforcing effect of 
continued nicotine use through antagonist and agonist actions (Gonzales et al. 2006). 
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process and the panel structure of the data (i.e. each respondent makes several 
choices). Using the nested logit (NL) framework, I analyzed both the influence of the 
product's characteristics on choice and the impact of individual characteristics on the 
propensity to use such medications. Then, random parameter logit (RPL) models 
allowed me to take unobserved heterogeneity into account. The results consistently 
show that smokers value medications that have improved efficacy and less frequent 
side effects and that prevent weight gain after cessation. In addition, I show that there 
are several observed and unobserved individual-specific factors that influence the 
decision to use such medications. I also show the importance to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity when analyzing choice data. This information should help 
guide the efforts of smoking cessation actors (pharmaceutical industry, public health 
decision makers) to improve treatment acceptance and usage and thereby achieve 
higher cessation rates in the population. 
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5.2. Related work 
Researchers have applied DCE extensively in the fields of marketing, 
transport, and environmental economics. In health economics, the number of DCE 
studies has sharply increased during the past decade (see e.g., Berchi et al. 2006, Brau 
and Bruni 2008, Ryan et al. 2006, Zweifel et al. 2005, Kerssens et al. 2005). More 
specifically, many DCE applications have aimed to evaluate the health and non-health 
dimensions of medical treatments. In Table 5.1, I provide a non-exhaustive list of 
empirical papers using DCEs to value medical interventions (mostly preventive 
interventions) along with the dimensions that were valued. 
Pharmaceutical smoking cessation treatments have been analyzed from an 
economic point of view, especially with respect to cost-effectiveness (Bertram et al. 
2007, Hall et al. 2005, Warner 1997), and all studies have concluded that these 
treatments lead to a low cost per life-year saved. In a cost-effectiveness study 
conducted in six western countries, Cornuz et al. (2006) found a cost per life-year 
saved of US$792 for a 45-year-old smoker using Zyban® (bupropion) in Switzerland. 
Researchers have also examined the demand for smoking cessation medications by 
focusing on various determinants. Tauras and Chaloupka (2003) found that 
decreasing the price of NRTs would lead to an increase in sales of these products 
(estimated average price elasticity of -2.33 for patches and of -2.46 for gums). The 
effects of conversion to over-the-counter (OTC) status for nicotine patches and gums 
were analyzed by Keeler et al. (2002). These authors estimated that after the 
conversion, the use of both therapies would increase substantially (78-92% for 
patches and 180% for nicotine gum). Halpin et al. (2007) investigated the demand of 
the general population for health insurance coverage extension to cover treatment for 
tobacco dependence, and they found that most people were willing to accept an 
increase of at least US$3 in their basic health insurance premium to finance the 
coverage. Avery et al. (2007) analyzed the impact of smoking cessation product 
advertising on the purchasing of such products and on smoking behavior. They found 
that the probabilities of attempting to quit and of quitting were positively associated 
with higher exposure to such advertising.  
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Table 5.1: Published studies using DCE to value medical interventions 
Authors Treatment Dimension valued 
Ryan et al.  
(1997) 
Miscarriage 
management 
Pain, time in hospital, time to return to normal 
activities, cost, complications 
 
Hall et al. (2002) Varicella vaccination Risk of mild side effects, risk of severe side effects, 
vaccine effectiveness, health authority support, 
location for vaccination, price of vaccination 
 
Aristides et al. (2004) Insulin mixtures Timing of injection before meal, two-hour 
postprandial blood glucose, effect of prandial dosing, 
nocturnal hypoglycemic frequency 
 
Mark et al. (2003) Alcoholism 
medication 
% of treated population who remained abstinent, % of 
patients who had no incidence of heavy drinking, % of 
patients that experienced mild side effects, % of 
patients who complied at a high rate, mode of action, 
route of administration, price per day 
 
Marshall et al. (2007) Colorectal cancer 
screening 
Process, preparation, pain, specificity, sensitivity 
 
 
Roux et al. (2004) Weight loss programs Program cost, travel time to program, amount of 
doctor involvement, program components emphasized, 
focus of program 
 
Bryan et al. (1998) Knee injury detection % chance of requiring arthroscopy, time from initial 
consultation to end of treatment, % chance that knee 
problem is completely resolved, total cost to the 
patient 
 
Watson et al. (2004) Lower urinary tract 
symptoms 
Time to symptom improvement, treatment decreases 
prostate size, sexual side effects of treatment, 
nonsexual side effects of treatment, treatment cost, % 
chance of surgery 
 
 
Two studies used stated preferences methods to investigate individual 
preferences for smoking cessation treatments. Busch et al. (2004) applied contingent 
valuation (CV) to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for medications that are more 
effective and that attenuate weight gain associated with smoking cessation. About 
80% of the respondents were willing to pay for greater effectiveness, and two-thirds 
of these individuals were willing to pay more if the treatment had an impact on 
weight gain. These authors also estimated that the mean WTP for a 100% effective 
treatment – i.e., the value of a statistical quit - was US$538. The major limitation of 
CV is that it does not allow many dimensions of the good to be estimated at a time. 
The good has a value per se, and it is not possible to assess the relative importance of 
its dimensions (how individuals are willing to trade off between these dimensions). 
Paterson et al. (2008) overcame this limitation by applying labeled discrete choice 
experiments to the choice of smoking cessation therapies (nicotine gum, nicotine 
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patch, nicotine inhaler and Zyban®).27 They used cost, success rate and treatment 
length as variable attributes, with doses per day and availability as fixed 
characteristics. The flexibility of the model specifications they applied allowed the 
authors to investigate preference heterogeneity. They found that effectiveness was a 
primary consideration. Light and heavy smokers were both willing to pay substantial 
amounts for improved success rates (i.e. CAN$500 and CAN$300 to achieve a 40% 
success rate). 
 
  
                                                            
27
 Also known as alternative-specific choice experiments. DCEs that use generic titles for the alternatives (such as “A” 
and “B”) are called unlabeled DCEs, contrary to labeled choice experiments, where each alternative refers to a 
particular commodity (e.g., Zyban®). 
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5.3. Framework for analysis 
A majority of current smokers positively value the benefits associated with 
smoking cessation, resulting in a desire to quit and in frequent quit attempts. Most of 
these attempts are made cold turkey and thus have a relatively low long-term success 
rate (around 5%). Relapses are frequent, particularly because of the significant costs 
associated with nicotine withdrawal. The use of a smoking cessation drug partially 
relieves the craving symptoms, resulting in increased success rates.  
The demand for such a product depends on the perceived additional net 
benefits it provides over alternative methods. For simplification purpose, I assume 
here that the only available alternative method is cold-turkey cessation. The 
additional benefit of the treatment is the value the individual attaches to smoking 
cessation multiplied by the increased probability of successfully quitting that the 
treatment provides. The benefits also include additional features of the medication, 
such as its ability to reduce weight gain associated with smoking cessation. The 
perceived value of quitting u is defined as “the difference between the lifetime utility 
from quitting and the lifetime utility from continuing to smoke” (Avery et al. 2007). 
The probability of long-term abstinence depends on the withdrawal costs: the higher 
the withdrawal costs the lower is the success rate. The medication precisely increases 
the success rate by decreasing these withdrawal costs. I define x as the amount of 
treatment (x might be continuous, or simply a binary variable indicating medication 
intake) and wc as the withdrawal costs. The probability of successfully quitting using 
a medication is then (with x continuous): 
med cP = P(w (x)) , with 
2
c c
2
c
dw d w dP
< 0, > 0, < 0
dx dwdx
    
(5.1) 
The cold turkey quit rate is defined as: 
ct c
P = P(w (x) x = 0 ) .        (5.2) 
The additional probability of successfully quitting is the difference between the 
success rate with medication ( medp ) and the cold turkey quit rate ( ctP ). The benefits 
of the medication over cold turkey are then given by: 
med ct medB = u(p - p ) + b .        (5.3) 
where
medb are the additional valuable features of the medication. The benefits are 
compared to the treatment costs (C), that include both the out-of-pocket cost, and 
other non-monetary costs such as side effects, and time and effort to purchase the 
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treatment (which is related to treatment availability). A smoker will decide to use a 
smoking cessation treatment when making a quit attempt if the perceived net benefits 
are positive, i.e., if B is higher than C. I expect potential quitters to positively value 
efficacy and the additional benefits of the medication and to negatively value side 
effects and access costs.  
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5.4. Data collection (DCE survey) 
The DCE method is based on the hypothesis that any good or service can be 
described as a set of characteristics or attributes. Consistent with Lancaster’s theory 
of value (Lancaster 1966), individuals do not appreciate commodities globally, but 
rather as a sum of attributes.28 In contrast to revealed preference techniques that 
analyze choices observed in reality, DCEs – as a stated preference technique – consist 
of presenting hypothetical choice situations (“choice sets,” hereafter) to a sample of 
respondents. Each choice set contains two or more alternatives that vary according to 
the level of their attributes. It is assumed that individuals select the alternative from 
which they derive the highest utility. The probability of an alternative being chosen is 
then modeled in accordance with the random utility framework (McFadden 1981). 
Applying appropriate econometric techniques to analyze observed decisions, the 
researcher is able to retrieve the indirect utility functions of individuals in the 
attribute-space. To illustrate the process simply and to make the link with consumer 
theory, below I present several choice sets described with only two attributes that can 
take various levels (Figure 5.1). If the respondent chooses successively between 
choice set A and all other choice sets, according to the axioms of revealed preferences 
one can retrieve quite accurately the indifference curve passing through A.  
 
Figure 5.1: Indifference curve in the attribute space 
 
 
The researcher is then able to estimate the relative importance of the 
attributes (marginal rates of substitution). When a monetary attribute is included, it is 
possible to estimate marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) for improvements in 
attributes and, by extension, global WTP for improved medications. Individual-
specific characteristics that might influence the choice can also be included in the 
                                                          
28
 “Goods possess, or give rise to, multiple characteristics in fixed proportions, and it is these characteristics, not the 
goods themselves, on which the consumer’s preferences are exercised” (Lancaster 1966). 
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models. As mentioned by Ryan et al. (2008), a complete DCE study is a complex 
process that involves three main steps prior to the econometric treatment: 1) 
definition of attributes and attribute levels; 2) experimental design and construction of 
choice sets; and 3) data collection. 
 
Definition of attributes and attribute levels 
From the existing literature, I initially developed a list of attributes of 
pharmaceutical smoking cessation treatments (Wu et al. 2006, Peters and Morgan 
2002, Henningfield et al. 2005) that seemed the most relevant to our research goals: 
price, efficacy, length of treatment, possibility of minor side effects, attenuation of 
weight gain and availability. Meanwhile, I convened focus groups and conducted pre-
tests to identify important attributes and prevent the omission of salient ones. The 
length of the treatment was found to be of very low importance, and was therefore 
excluded.  
The next step consisted of assigning levels to each attribute. The literature 
recommends that these should be realistic, well-defined, plausible and should 
potentially involve trade-offs (Ryan et al. 2008). The first three attributes describe 
continuous dimensions, whereas the latter two are dichotomous. Levels for price were 
defined on the basis of true market prices. For instance, the out-of-pocket cost of a 
comprehensive treatment course with Zyban® (bupropion) is about CHF 300 
(Compendium of Swiss Drugs 2002). A central advantage of DCE is that it allows 
larger attribute variability. The price attribute was therefore described with four 
possible levels within a plausible interval (CHF 200 to CHF 500).  
We can express long-term efficacy in an absolute or relative way. Many 
studies report the efficacy of a medication relative to a placebo or relative to an 
alternative treatment in terms of odds-ratios (Wu et al. 2006), while evaluations of 
absolute long-term abstinence rate are also possible (Fiore 2000). Because it is 
difficult for respondents to interpret odds-ratios,  I chose to use the following 
definition of efficacy: the proportion of quitters who still do not smoke one year after 
treatment. The quit rate at one year is approximately 5% for smokers without 
assistance (Fiore 2000), 15% for those with bupropion and 22% for those with 
varenicline (Gonzales et al. 2006, Jorenby et al. 2006). Selected levels for the 
medications were 15% (close to bupropion), 25% (close to varenicline), 40% and 
50% (improved efficacy). The most commonly reported benign side effects of 
bupropion and varenicline are insomnia, nausea and dry mouth (Fiore 2000, Gonzales 
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et al. 2006, McEwen et al. 2004), and these are quite frequent (30% for bupropion 
and 50% for varenicline). In addition to these two side-effect levels, I chose a third 
(10%) to depict an improved medication. Weight gain is strongly associated with 
smoking cessation, with the average gain after cessation reaching approximately 4-5 
kg (Froom et al. 1998, Klesges et al. 1997, Williamson et al. 1991). Some smokers 
are discouraged from cessation because of this tendency. An improved medication 
could include components that prevent weight gain (Meyers et al. 1997). Finally, 
medications are either available over-the-counter or are obtainable only with a 
medical prescription. All the attributes and their respective levels are presented in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Attributes and levels 
Attribute Definition Levels 
Price (Price) Price for the complete treatment 
CHF 200, CHF 300, 
CHF 400, CHF 500 
Efficacy (Eff) Abstinence rate at one year  15%, 25%, 40%, 50% 
Side-effects (Side) Probability of experiencing 
minor side effects  10%, 30%, 50% 
Weight gain (Weight) 
 
Does the treatment prevent 
weight gain associated with 
smoking cessation? 
yes, no 
Availability (Avail) 
Is the treatment available over-
the counter or only under 
medical prescription? 
over-the-counter, 
medical prescription 
   
 
Experimental design 
The choice sets presented to respondents contained two unlabeled alternatives 
(“medication A” and “medication B”). Because the target population had not 
necessarily decided to use such a medication at the time of the study, I also included 
an opt-out option to allow individuals to be non-demanders (Ryan and Skatun 2004). 
With two four-level attributes, one three-level attribute and two dichotomous 
attributes, the full factorial design gives rise to 192 (42x3x22) possible hypothetical 
medications. I used a fractional factorial design to reduce the possible combinations. 
Choice sets were generated starting from a resolution 3 orthogonal array obtained on 
Sloane’s website (Sloane 2007) and using the method proposed by Street and Burgess 
(2007). The design produced sixteen distinct choice sets that were divided into two 
blocks of eight choice sets (Hensher et al. 2005). Each respondent was then assigned 
randomly to either of the two blocks.   
To verify the consistency of responses, it is customary to add constructed 
scenarios to the main design. Thus, I created two additional choice sets containing a 
dominant alternative. Dominance is achieved when one alternative is superior for at 
least one attribute while the other attributes are at the same level.29 Respondents are 
supposed to choose the dominant (or the opt-out) alternative if rationality holds. In 
summary, I presented ten choice sets to each respondent, two of which were 
consistency checks (Lancsar and Louviere 2006, Miguel et al. 2005). 
 
 
                                                            
29
 For instance, if we compare two medications, the one that has a lower price, higher efficacy and fewer side effects 
with other attributes at the same level is considered dominant. 
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Data collection 
Two hundred and thirty subjects were recruited from the French-speaking 
part of Switzerland. The main inclusion criteria were age between 15 and 64 years 
and being a daily or occasional smoker. The respondents also had to express an 
interest in quitting smoking. The sample was representative of the French-speaking 
Swiss population of smokers with respect to age, gender and education level.  
The questionnaire was divided into two parts: the choice experiments and the 
collection of individual information. In the DCE part, respondents were asked to 
imagine the following scenario (in brief):  
 
“You have decided to quit smoking, and you have the possibility to be supported by a 
smoking cessation medication that can improve your chance of quitting (without any 
help, the success rate at one year is 5%) … You will be presented with 10 situations 
in which two medications are described. Please choose, for each situation, if you 
would buy medication A, medication B or neither.” 
 
I then gave a detailed description of each attribute and presented their 
respective levels. The same information was provided in the presentation of each 
choice set, an example of which is shown in appendix A. In the second part of the 
questionnaire, I gathered information about smoking history, quitting history, health 
status and socio-economic characteristics.  
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5.5. Econometric analysis 
Discrete choice modeling relies on random utility theory, where the utility 
that individuals derive from an alternative is divided into two components: a 
systematic (observable) and a stochastic (unobservable) one. It is assumed that the 
former depends linearly on attribute levels while the latter is due to unobserved 
information and measurement errors. More formally, we denote the utility that 
individual i derives from alternative j by: 
ij ij ijU = V + ε ,         (5.4) 
where
ijV is the observable component and ijε the random error. With k attributes, 
assuming a linear attribute utility function, we have the following functional form: 
ij 1 ij1 2 ij2 k ijk ijV = β X + β X + ...+ β X = X ′ β .      (5.5) 
Under the assumption of rationality, individuals choose the alternative from which the 
utility derived is the highest. Therefore, alternative j will be chosen over alternative q 
if 
ij iqU > U .         (5.6) 
From this, we derive the probability that individual i chooses alternative j among p 
alternatives:  
ij ij ij ip ipP = Prob(V + ε > V + ε p j)∀ ≠ .      (5.7) 
Identically, 
ij ij ip ip ijP = Prob(V - V > ε - ε p j)∀ ≠ .      (5.8) 
The resulting choice model depends on the way the opt-out option is included 
and on the assumption made about the distribution of the error terms ε . Below, I 
present the two approaches used to model the opt-out decision. Then, I describe three 
choice models that differ in their complexity: the multinomial logit model (MNL), the 
nested logit model (NL) and the random parameter logit model (RPL). 
 
Modeling the opt-out option 
The opt-out option can be seen as an alternative with specific levels for each 
attribute or as a first-step choice option with no associated attributes. In the MNL and 
RPL specifications, the opt-out option is considered as an alternative in the choice 
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sets with the attributes and levels shown in Table 5.3. In this case, the attribute levels 
of the opt-out option reflect what smokers face when quitting cold turkey. An 
alternative-specific constant for opting-out (opt-out ASC hereafter) is included in 
some of our MNL and RPL specifications in order to account for the intrinsic 
propensity to opt-out among respondents, even when differences in attributes are 
accounted for. 
 
Table 5.3: Description of the opt-out option   
Attribute Value for the 
opt-out option 
Price CHF  0 
Efficacy 5% 
Side effects 0% 
Weight gain attenuation No 
“Availability” unrestricted 
 
 
In the NL specification, the opt-out option is modeled as a dichotomous 
choice that depends on individual-specific characteristics and on the attributes of the 
medication alternatives. In this case, the opt-out option has no associated attributes.  
 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) 
If we assume that the errors ε are independent and identically distributed 
(IID) Type I Extreme Value, we obtain the standard multinomial logit (MNL) 
specification. After some algebraic manipulations (see McFadden 1974 or Train 2003 
for details), we obtain the following expression for the choice probabilities: 
ij
ij
ipp
exp(X )
P =
exp(X )
′
′∑
β
β
.        (5.9) 
The IID assumption induces the independence from irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) axiom, which means that the relative probability of choosing one alternative 
over another is unaffected by the presence of additional alternatives in the choice set. 
In other words, the IIA property implies that all alternatives are perfect substitutes. In 
this case, the choice sets included three alternatives (medication A, medication B and 
the opt-out option). If IIA holds, this would mean that (for example) an improvement 
in medication A would lead to proportionate decreases in the frequencies at which 
medication B and opting out are chosen. Here, it is likely that an improvement in 
medication A would produce a larger decrease in the probability of choosing 
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medication B than of choosing the opt-out option.30 Another limitation of the simple 
MNL specification is that it does not take into account the fact that each respondent 
faces several choice situations and that there might be correlation across choice sets 
faced by a single individual. To handle these limitations, I estimated two additional 
models allowing for more complex substitution patterns and for possible correlation 
across choice situations.  
 
Nested Logit (NL) 
In this specification, similar alternatives are partitioned into subsets called 
nests. For any two alternatives (a and b) in the same nest, iaε  is correlated with ibε , 
whereas for any two alternatives in different nests, the unobserved portion of utility is 
uncorrelated.31 In our case, the first nest holds the medications (A and B), while the 
second nest contains only the opt-out option.32 For clarity, we can visualize each 
choice as the result of two decisions. First, individuals decide whether or not to opt 
out. Then, conditional on not having chosen the opt-out option, they choose a 
medication according to the attribute levels. A suitable way to illustrate the model 
structure is with a tree diagram (Figure 5.2). The “branches” denote the alternative 
subsets within which IIA holds, and the “leaves” are the alternatives.  
 
Figure 5.2: Nested logit tree structure 
 
 
The probability that individual i chooses alternative j within nest n (which 
contains 
n
J  alternatives) can be depicted as the product of two probabilities 
(McFadden 1981): the probability of choosing nest n among N nests and the 
conditional probability of alternative j being chosen (given that nest n is chosen):  
                                                          
30
 The medication alternatives (A and B) are more similar to each other than to the opt-out option. 
 
31
 IIA holds in the same nest but not across different nests. 
 
32
 In such a case where one nest contains only one alternative, we talk about a NL model with partial degeneracy. 
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ijn nest n j|nest nP = P P⋅         (5.10) 
with  
'
n n n
'
n n n
z γ+τ IV
nest n N z γ+τ IV
n=1
eP =
e∑
       (5.11) 
and 
'
j|n
'
n j|n
x β
j|nest n J x β
j=1
eP =
e∑
,        (5.12) 
Where z is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, x is a vector of medication 
attributes, γ  and β  are vectors of parameters, and IV is the so-called inclusive-value 
with its associated inclusive-value parameter τ (see Appendix B for details). The 
inclusive value (IV) parameter is an indicator of the degree of substitutability between 
the alternatives. When it equals one, all alternatives are perfectly substitutable. In this 
case, the model collapses to the simple multinomial logit model (MNL), and there is 
no need to use a more flexible specification. If the IV parameter equals zero, this 
means that the choice among nests is completely independent of the choice among the 
alternatives. In such a case, one independent choice model per decision can be 
estimated. The use of the NL specification is appropriate when the IV parameter lies 
between zero and one because this means that alternatives within a nest are closer 
substitutes for each other than for alternatives in other nests (see Train 2003 for 
details). 
 
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) 
The random parameter logit model (RPL), also referred as mixed logit, allows 
for more flexible substitution patterns and takes into account the influence of 
unobserved individual characteristics on choices. In this framework, the choice 
probability is a weighted average of the multinomial logit choice probabilities, where 
the weights are the possible values of β . The researcher must then specify a 
distribution for the coefficients with parametersθ , i.e. f(β θ) : 
ij
ij
ipp
exp(X )
P = f(β θ )dβ
exp(X )
 ′     ′  
∫ ∑
β
β
      (5.13) 
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Most commonly, it is assumed that the β ’s are normally distributed. The log-normal 
distribution is also often use, in particular for the coefficients that are assumed to be 
strictly positive. We can interpret the RPL model as a model in which the parameters 
are randomly distributed across individuals. The utility of the j-th alternative for an 
individual i can be written as: 
ij ij i ijU = X 'β + ε         (5.14) 
Where the iβ ’s are the random coefficients that we can decompose into two parts, as 
follows: 
i iβ = β + η          (5.15) 
Where β  is the population mean and 
iη  is a stochastic deviation representing 
preference heterogeneity. Re-writing the model, we obtain: 
ij ij ij i ijU = X 'β + X 'η + ε         (5.16) 
The stochastic portion of utility (i.e., ij i ijX 'η + ε ) is correlated across choice situations 
due to the common influence of
iη . Since the integral in (5.13) has no closed-form, 
simulation is used to estimate the parameters33. 
 
Final specifications 
In all the models, the choice among alternatives depends on the five 
attributes: price (Price), efficacy (Eff), side effects (Side), effect on weight gain 
(Weight), and availability (Avail), all as defined above in Table 5.2. The utility 
function is simply defined by: 
ij 1 ij 2 ij 3 ij 4 ij 5 ij ijU = β Price + β Eff + β Side + β Weight + β Avail + ε .   (5.17) 
In addition, in the NL model, the opt-out decision is assumed to depend on a series of 
individual-specific characteristics and on the five attributes (see (11)). Individual-
specific variables include the number of years the respondent has smoked (Years_sm), 
the previous use of any smoking cessation help (Help), gender (Gender), whether the 
                                                            
33
 In short, draws from f(β θ )  are used to get a simulated value of the log-likelihood 
function. This is done for different values ofθ , until we obtain the maximum simulated 
likelihood (Train 2003).  
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respondent is anxious (Anx), educational level (Sec and Sup), and the presence of any 
children in the household (Child).  
In the RPL model, the parameters were assumed to be normally distributed: 
ij 1i ij 2i ij 3i ij 4i ij 5i ij ijU = β Price + β Eff + β Side + β Weight + β Avail + ε    (5.18) 
with ki k kβ N(β ,σ )∼ . 
To go further into the investigation of preference heterogeneity, I estimated 
models that include interaction terms between individual-specific characteristics and 
some attributes, as suggested by Ryan et al. (2005). I created an interaction between 
price and indicators corresponding to three levels of monthly income, i.e. Price x Inc1, 
Price x Inc2, and Price x Inc3, where Inci is an indicator for the i-th of the following 
income groups: < CHF 4500, CHF 4500 to 8500, and > 8500 CHF. I created an 
additional interaction term between body mass index and the attribute Weight, using 
two subgroups (Bmi1: up to 25 kg/m2 and Bmi2: over 25 kg/m2). The general form of 
the utility function including interaction terms was: 
ij 1 i j 2 2 ij 3 3 ij 4 ij 5 ij
6 ij 7 2 ij 8 ij ij
U = δ Price + δ (Price x Inc ) + δ (Price x Inc ) + δ Eff + δ Side
+δ Weight + δ (Weight x Bmi ) + δ Avail + ε
.  (5.19) 
Because individuals with higher income are supposed to have a lower marginal 
valuation of money, I expect 2δ  and 3δ  to be positive (leading to a smaller negative 
impact of price on utility in these income groups). I also assume that individuals with 
BMI over 25 attach a higher value to the Weight attribute, i.e., that 7δ  is positive. 
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5.6. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Between March and April 2008, 230 paper-and-pencil questionnaires were 
mailed. A response rate of 60% was achieved (138 surveys collected). I excluded five 
respondents due to missing data, making the total number of valid questionnaires 133. 
Only two individuals failed the dominance test, i.e., chose the non-dominant 
alternative. I excluded them from the sample, resulting in 131 individuals who were 
used for the model estimations (yielding 1,048 observations). Among the 1,048 
(131x8) choice responses, the opt-out option was selected 491 times (46.9%). In the 
sample, 24 individuals always chose the opt-out option (no treatment). This subgroup 
is defined as serial non-participants (Haefen et al. 2005). Some authors suggest 
dropping these individuals from the sample to carry out the estimations, because some 
of these individuals are likely to opt out as a way of protesting. Deleting these 
responses can lead to inconsistent estimates, and the nested logit structure used here 
allows us to explain the factors that influence non-participation; therefore, I did not 
drop these respondents. 
Table 5.4 summarizes statistics about smoking and quitting history, health 
status and socio-economic characteristics. The mean age of the sample is 38.8 years; 
the distribution among the different age groups is close to the distribution in the 
French-speaking Swiss population of smokers. Respondents with higher education 
levels were slightly overrepresented, to the detriment of the population with only 
secondary education. Only five respondents had a Fagerström Test for Nicotine 
Dependence (FTND) score over seven. On average, the respondents had smoked for 
20 years, and two-thirds of them had already tried to quit at least once for at least two 
weeks. Among these unsuccessful quitters, the mean number of quit attempts was 
2.63 (std.dev. 2.52), and 23% of the individuals had already used a pharmaceutical 
smoking cessation therapy, mostly NRT. A large majority of the respondents (67%) 
were confident about their ability to quit, although only 24% were actually planning 
to quit within the next six months. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics (N=131) 
Variable Definition Mean Std.dev. 
Smoking history 
   
Years_sm Number of years smoking 19.9 11.88 
Lowdep =1 if FTND score <4 0.67  
Middep =1 if FTND is between 4 and 7 0.29  
Highdep =1 if FTND >7 0.04  
 
 
  
Smoking cessation  
 
  
Help =1 if have ever used NRT or Zyban  0.23  
Attempts Number of previous quit attempts 2.72 2.50 
Ability =1 if confident about ability to quit 0.67  
Quit 6 months =1 if plans to quit within the next 6 
months 
0.24  
    
Health state 
 
  
Health =1 if feels in excellent health 0.22  
Bmi Respondent’s body mass index 23.9 3.29 
Anx =1 if very anxious  0.08  
 
 
  
Household 
characteristics 
 
  
Hhinc Household monthly income (CHF) 6393.1 3021 
Child =1 if there are any children 0.35  
    
Respondent’s 
characteristics 
   
Gender =1 if resp. is a male 0.56  
Age Age in years 38.7 12.13 
Prim =1 if primary education 0.21  
Sec =1 if secondary education 0.57  
Sup =1 if higher education 0.22  
 
Choice modeling 
The results from the MNL and NL models are presented in Table 5.5, results 
from the RPL models are in Table 5.6, and results of the models that include 
interactions are presented in Table 5.7. All estimations were performed using Stata 
version 10.0 (Stata Corp., Texas, USA). 
In all models, the coefficients of the utility function are highly significant and 
of the expected sign except for availability, which is significant only in the RPL 
model without opt-out ASC (Model 5). The magnitude of these coefficients varies 
proportionally across models due to a scaling factor (Train 2003). The interpretation 
in terms of the relative importance of attributes is therefore not affected by this factor. 
First, focusing on the results of the simple MNL model (Model 1), we 
observe that higher price and a higher prevalence of side effects both give rise to 
lower utility, while long-term efficacy is positively valued. An interesting result is the 
relative size of the coefficient of the variable Weight. Potential quitters attach 
considerable importance to the presence of an effect on weight gain. The two 
additional MNL models include an ASC for the opt-out option, as a fixed effect in 
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Model 2, and as a random effect in Model 3. The ASC is significant and positive in 
both cases, indicating an intrinsic propensity to opt-out in the population. In the first 
column of Table 5.5, I provide the results of the Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman 
and McFadden 1984), which tests the IIA assumption. The procedure consists of re-
estimating the model based on a subset of alternatives. If IIA holds, the parameters in 
both models should be the same. The Hausman-McFadden statistic tests the equality 
of the parameters, and its associated statistic is assumed to follow a chi-square 
distribution. The high value of the chi-square statistic indicates that the assumption of 
IIA (and thus, the MNL model) is not sustainable in this choice context (p<0.05). 
This result supports the use of a more flexible specification.  
Looking at the NL specification (Model 4), we notice that the IV parameter 
associated with the treatment branch is significant and lies between zero and one,34 
indicating that the separation of alternatives into nests is appropriate. Then, I focus on 
the second part of the NL model (opt-out decision). Because I modeled the 
probability of opting out, a negative significant coefficient associated with a variable 
means that an increase of that variable decreases the probability of opting out (or, 
similarly, increases the probability of choosing any medication). This is the case for 
the variable Child (p<0.05); individuals who have children are less likely to opt out. 
An explanation would be that those individuals are more motivated to quit because 
they include their children’s future health status in their decision process. The 
coefficient for higher education is also significant and negative (p<0.01), the 
reference category being primary education. This could denote better perception and 
understanding of the potential benefits of smoking cessation among more educated 
individuals. By contrast, two variables have a positive and significant coefficient. 
Smokers who have smoked for a greater number of years are more likely to opt out 
(p<0.05). This result is difficult to explain because these individuals are more 
strongly addicted and thus should benefit more from a medication that relieves 
withdrawal symptoms. Possible explanations could be that long-term smokers are 
simply reluctant to use drugs to handle their smoking habit, that they are 
overconfident about their future ability to quit, or that their perceived benefits of 
cessation are low. Anxiety has a positive impact on opting out (p<0.01). This could 
reflect lower perceived benefits of cessation among anxious individuals because of a 
stronger psychological addiction.   
The estimation results of the RPL models are presented in Table 5.6. In 
Models 5 and 6, all coefficients are assumed to be normally distributed, while in 
                                                            
34
 The IV parameter associated with the opt-out option was set to one. 
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Models 7 and 8, the coefficients for Price and Eff, are assumed to follow a log-normal 
distribution. Unlike in previous models, the coefficient associated with availability is 
positive and significant (p<0.05), but only in Model 5. This result provides some 
evidence that individuals would positively value a switch to “OTC status” for these 
drugs. Because we have random coefficients, I also provide estimates of the 
associated standard deviations. Their significance (except for Avail) and their 
magnitude indicate the presence of preference heterogeneity. Taking this 
heterogeneity and possible correlation across choices into account seems to bring 
significant improvements in terms of goodness-of-fit. Model 6 is the preferred 
specification regarding the log-likelihood, and both the AIC and BIC criteria. Models 
that include interactions between the price attribute and income and between the 
weight attribute and BMI are presented in Table 5.7. The results consistently show 
that the relative importance of the price attribute is lower for individuals with higher 
income. Moreover, we see that overweight individuals (BMI >25) value the fact that a 
treatment prevents weight gain more highly, but not significantly. 
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Table 5.5: Estimation results – MNL and NL models 
 
 MNL MNL MNL NL 
Utility function Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Opt-out ASC (fixed) - 0.6289** - - 
  (0.2637)   
Opt-out ASC(random) - - 0.6675* - 
   (0.4018)  
   [2.78***]  
Price -0.0044*** -0.0036*** -0.0051*** -0.0033*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
     Eff 0.0543*** 0.0590*** 0.0821*** 0.0434*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0062) (0.0057) 
     Side -0.0358*** -0.0320*** -0.0377*** -0.0266*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0047) 
     Weight 0.7545*** 0.7653*** 0.9347*** 0.5610*** 
 (0.1055) (0.1085) (0.1235) (0.1103) 
     Avail 0.0124 0.0970 0.0312 0.0004 
 (0.0933) (0.1022) (0.1169) (0.0733) 
Opt-out choice (NL only)     
     Years_sm    0.0126** 
    (0.0052) 
     Help    -0.1243 
    (0.1456) 
     Gender    -0.0316 
    (0.1292) 
     Anx    0.6767*** 
    (0.2538) 
     Sec    0.0051 
    (0.1479) 
     Sup    -0.5852*** 
    (0.1882) 
     Child    -0.3159** 
    (0.1374) 
     IV parameter    0.6698*** 
(0.1136) 
     
     
IIA test     
Hausman-McFadden chi2 6.40    
(p-value) (0.011)    
     
N 1048 1048 1048 1048 
AIC 1904.4 1900.6 1520.5 1884.8 
BIC 1934.8 1937.0 1563.0 1975.9 
ll -947.2 -944.3 -753.2 -927.4 
In the MNL models, the opt-out option is defined with specific values for the attributes. In the NL model, 
the opt-out option has no associated attribute value. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of 
random coefficients in brackets. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Table 5.6: Estimation results - RPL models 
 
 
    
Utility function Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Opt-out ASC  0.4534  0.5903 
 - (0.4198) - (0.4407) 
  [2.5180***]  [2.9714***] 
     
Price -0.0095*** -0.0074*** -0.0093*** -0.0082*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
 [0.0078***] [0.0040***] [0.0111***] [0.0069***] 
     
Eff 0.1033*** 0.1086*** 0.1026*** 0.1113*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0090) 
 [0.0553***] [0.0665***] [0.0532***] [0.0516***] 
     
Side -0.0694*** -0.0662*** -0.0583*** -0.0564*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0070) 
 [0.0562***] [0.0511***] [0.0515***] [0.0352***] 
     
Weight 1.3851*** 1.2978*** 1.1942*** 1.1317*** 
 (0.2274) (0.2103) (0.1980) (0.1904) 
 [1.9810***] [1.6125***] [1.2652***] [1.3486***] 
     
Avail 0.3104** 0.2261 0.2050 0.1367 
 (0.1416) (0.1573) (0.1298) (0.1426) 
 [0.1186] [0.2147] [0.0082] [0.2086] 
     
N 1048 1048 1048 1048 
AIC 1463.3 1442.6 1473.7 1451.7 
BIC 1524.0 1515.6 1534.5 1524.6 
ll -721.6 -709.3 -726.9 -713.9 
In the models, the opt-out option is defined with specific values for the attributes. In Models 5 and 6, 
all coefficients are normally distributed. In Models 7 and 8, the coefficients for Price and Eff are 
log-normally distributed; all other coefficients are normally distributed. Thus, in Models 7 and 8, the 
parameters for Price and Eff are the means and std. dev. of the coefficients derived from the mean 
and std. dev. of the logarithm of the coefficients (see e.g. Train 2003 for the appropriate 
transformation). Standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation of random coefficients in 
brackets.***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant at 10%. 
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Table 5.7: Estimation results – models with interactions 
 MNL NL RPL 
Utility function Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
    
Opt-out ASC 0.6626*  0.2729 
 (0.3942) - (0.4130) 
 [2.6752***]  [2.2787***] 
    Price -0.0074*** -0.0052*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0015) 
   [0.0053***] 
Price x Inc2 0.0027*** 0.0021*** 0.0034** 
 (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
   [0.0020*] 
    Price x Inc3 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0060*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0016) 
   [0.0032] 
    Eff 0.0826*** 0.0470*** 0.1109*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0097) 
   [0.0457***] 
    Side -0.0379*** -0.0261*** -0.0582*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0066) 
   [0.0311***] 
    Weight 0.8116*** 0.5461*** 1.1101*** 
 (0.1483) (0.1253) (0.2331) 
   [1.5877***] 
    Weight x Bmi2 0.3507 0.1124 0.0996 
 (0.2189) (0.1342) (0.4132) 
   [1.5815***] 
    Avail 0.0437 0.0518 0.2088  
 (0.1174) (0.0794) (0.3822) 
   [0.3822] 
Opt-out choice (NL only)    
    Years_sm  0.0142***  
  (0.0053)  
    Help  -0.1074  
  (0.1509)  
    Gender  -0.0678  
  (0.1340)  
    Anx  0.4791*  
  (0.2640)  
    Sec  0.0999  
  (0.1544)  
    Sup  -0.3342*  
  (0.1982)  
    Child  -0.1041  
  (0.1443)  
    IV parameter  0.7171*** 
(0.1131) 
 
N 1048 1048 1048 
AIC 1517.5 1850.8 1450.9 
BIC 1578.2 1948.1 1560.3 
ll -748.7 -909.4 -707.5 
In the MNL and RPL models, the opt-out option is defined with specific values for the 
attributes. In the NL model, the opt-out option has no associated attribute value. The MNL 
model include a random opt-out ASC (normally distributed). All coefficients in Model 11 
are assumed to be normally distributed. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviation 
of random coefficients in brackets ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%;*significant 
at 10%. 
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Using the simple NL model (Model 4) and the preferred specification (Model 
6), I predicted the choice probabilities associated with the opt-out alternative after 
changes in price, efficacy and prevalence of minor side effects. I then computed the 
average opt-out probability in the sample that I report in table 5.8. This approximates 
the evolution of the proportion of non-demanders after the following scenarios: a 20% 
decrease in price; a 20% increase in efficacy; a 20% decrease in the prevalence of 
minor side effects; and the three effects combined. 
 
Table 5.8: Average predicted opt-out probabilities. Four scenarios 
 NL (Model 4) RPL (Model 6) 
Scenario Average opt-
out probability Variation 
Average opt-
out probability Variation 
Status quo 0.47 - 0.47 - 
20% decrease in 
price 0.40 -0.07 0.43 -0.04 
20% increase in 
efficacy 0.39 -0.08 0.42 -0.05 
Side effects 20% 
less frequent 0.43 -0.04 0.44 -0.03 
Three effects 
combined 0.32 -0.15 0.35 -0.12 
 
 In the last line of the table, we see that combined improvements of the 
attributes would result in a 0.12 to 0.15 decrease in the average probability to opt-out, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Welfare measures 
The ratio between any two coefficients in Equation 17 (or 18) allows us to 
quantify the relative importance of the corresponding attributes, i.e., the marginal rate 
of substitution between them. If the price coefficient is included as the denominator, 
we obtain a marginal willingness-to-pay (mWTP) for the variation of an attribute. For 
example, we can value the improvement of the efficacy of a treatment by computing
( )2 1- β β  ceteris paribus, i.e., the WTP for a 1-percentage-point increase in efficacy.  
To compute mWTP estimates, I rely on the coefficients of the models without 
interactions (specifically, I rely on estimates from Models 1, 3, 4, and 6). Dividing the 
estimated coefficients of non-monetary attributes by the negative of the price 
coefficient gives rise to mWTP estimates. These are presented in Table 5.9. As 
suggested by Hole (2007), I applied the Krinsky-Robb method (Krinsky and Robb 
144 
 
1986) to compute confidence intervals. This method, which is also referred to as 
parametric bootstrap, consists of taking draws from a multivariate normal distribution 
with means and covariance given by the estimated coefficients and the associated 
variance-covariance matrix. In our case, I performed 10,000 draws to obtain 10,000 
values of the coefficients from the joint distribution. I used these values to compute 
10,000 mWTP estimates for each non-price attribute. The 95% confidence interval is 
then defined by taking the upper and lower 2.5 percentiles of the distribution. 
 
Table 5.9: WTP estimates 
Attribute Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 Model 6 
Eff 12.3 16.2 13.0 14.6 
 [10.8;14.1] [12.7;21.5] [10.5;16.8] [11.2;19.6] 
Side -8.1 -7.4 -7.6 -8.9 
 [-10.6;-6.2] [-10.0;-5.4] [-10.4;-5.5] [-12.2;-6.4] 
Weight 170.9 184.0 164.8 174.9 
 [125.1;221.8] [133.8;252.9] [115.4;224.8] [121.4;246.4] 
Avail 0 0 0 0 
 [-] [-] [-] [-] 
95% Krinsky-Robb confidence intervals in brackets. 
 
 
 We see that an individual is willing to pay from CHF 12.3 to CHF 16.2 for a 
1-percentage-point (p.p.) increase in efficacy. Individuals also value the absence of 
side effects and would be willing to pay between CHF 7.4 and CHF 8.9 for a 1 p.p. 
reduction in the probability of occurrence of minor side effects. The fact that the 
medication prevents weight gain associated with smoking cessation is valued between 
CHF 164.8 and CHF 184.0, depending on the specification. In Table 5.10, I report the 
estimates of marginal WTP in the three income groups that stem from the RPL model 
with interactions (Model 11). 
Table 5.10: WTP estimates by income group 
Attribute Income groups (CHF) 
 <4,500 4,500-8500 >8,500 
Eff 8.6 14.8 22.6 
 [6.4;12.5] [11.4;20.4] [14.5;45.8] 
Side -5.3 -9.0 -13.7 
 [-7.8;-3.7] [-12.8;-6.4] [-28.6;-8.4] 
Weight  117.8 201.9 307.8 
(individuals with bmi<=25) [76.4;182.0] [132.9;296.7] [182.7;610.4] 
Weight  123.4 211.5 322.4 
(individuals with bmi>25) [76.2;196.8] [137.4;318.4] [179.0;668.1] 
95% Krinsky-Robb confidence intervals in brackets. Estimated coefficients and variance-covariance 
matrix from the RPL model with interaction used (Model 11). WTP for Avail not reported (the 
associated coefficient is not significant).  
 
 
 Making some simple computations, one can derive from the estimated WTP 
the incremental value of a smoking cessation medication over cold-turkey smoking 
cessation. Using WTP estimates from the preferred specification (Model 6) and 
assuming a linear relationship between WTP and increased efficacy and between 
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WTP and the prevalence of minor side effects, I compare cold-turkey cessation (for 
which the attributes are shown in Table 5.3) with a medication that has the following 
characteristics: 50% efficacy, 10% prevalence of minor side effects, attenuation of 
weight gain and restricted availability (medical prescription). I then multiply this 
amount by 0.54 (i.e., 1 minus the estimated proportion of non-demanders). I obtain an 
incremental value of the improved hypothetical smoking cessation treatment over 
cold-turkey cessation of around CHF 400. It is worth noting that I make the 
conservative assumption that the treatment has a value of zero for all non-demanders, 
as in Busch et al. (2004).  
 From the RPL models estimated, it is possible to obtain individual-specific 
values for the coefficients conditional on the choice actually made and the value of 
the attributes (Train 2003, Hole 2008). I exploit this information in two ways. First I 
use individual-specific values of the coefficients to plot distributions of WTP (Figure 
5.3). Moreover, to further investigate the opt-out decision, I use the results from the 
models that include a random opt-out alternative-specific constant to retrieve 
individual values that reflect individual levels of the intrinsic propensity to opt-out 
(Figure 5.4), and regress them on the same respondents’ characteristics used to model 
the opt-out decision in the NL specifications (Table 5.11). We see that the number of 
smoking years and the variable Anx have a positive impact on the intrinsic propensity 
to opt-out. Having already used a smoking cessation support, having child in the 
household, and the level of education have a negative impact on opting-out.  
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Figure 5.3: Distributions of WTP 
 Models without Opt-out ASC Models with Opt-out ASC 
Eff 
 
 
Side 
 
 
Weight 
 
 
Avail 
 
 
The corresponding models are those presented in Table 5.6. 
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Figure 5.4: Distributions of opt-out ASC 
 
The corresponding models are presented in Table 5.5 and 
5.6. 
 
 
 
Table 5.11: Determinants of the intrinsic propensity to opt-out (OLS) 
 Model used to obtain the individual-
level values of the opt-out ASC 
Variables Model 2 Model 6 
Year_sm 0.1167***  
(0.0038) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0025) 
Help -0.3173*** 
(0.0982) 
-0.3612*** 
(0.0634) 
Gender -0.0968  
(0.0883) 
-0.4236*** 
(0.0576) 
Anx 0.977*** 
(0.1694) 
0.9486*** 
(0.1104) 
Sec -0.3797*** 
 (0.1196) 
0.0306 
(0.0779) 
Sup -1.2629*** 
(0.1394) 
-0.4732*** 
(0.0908) 
Child -0.7331*** 
(0.0925) 
-0.2013*** 
(0.0603) 
Constant 1.2660*** 
(0.1534) 
0.7951*** 
(0.0999) 
The dependent variable is the value of the opt-out ASC 
obtained from Model 2 in one case and from Model 6 in 
the other case. SE in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; 
**significant at 5%;*significant at 10%.  
 
  
148 
 
5.7. Discussion 
I used discrete choice experiments to analyze smokers’ preferences for 
hypothetical cessation medications. My goal was threefold: to assess the value that 
smokers attach to attribute improvements, to highlight the most important factors that 
influence the decision to use such treatment, and to compare multinomial models. My 
results clearly show that there is potential demand for improved smoking cessation 
medications. Even if a considerable proportion of smokers who express interest in 
quitting are not willing to purchase such medications (opt-out rate of 47%), 
individuals are willing to pay substantial amounts for ameliorations of the relevant 
attributes. In line with the findings of Busch et al. (2004) and Paterson et al. (2008), I 
find that the probability of success (quit rate) is a fundamental characteristic. Indeed, 
according to the preferred specification, smokers are willing to pay CHF 14.6 for a 1 
percentage point increase in the long-term success rate. Furthermore, I estimate that 
smokers are willing to pay to reduce the chance of experiencing minor side-effects 
(WTP of around CHF 8 to decrease the probability by 1 p.p.), and that weight gain 
prevention associated with smoking cessation is highly valued (WTP between CHF 
164.8 and CHF 184 for a medication that prevent cessation-associated weight gain, 
depending on the specification). Broader usage could therefore be reached through 
lower out-of-pocket price and greater efficacy. Secondary aspects such as side effects 
and weight gain should also be taken into consideration. Models including 
interactions between the price attribute and household income show that the marginal 
valuation of money declines with income, the resulting WTP for improved attributes 
therefore increase with income. Coverage of such treatments by the basic health 
insurance plan, or a subsidy targeted at the most deprived smokers, whose average 
rates of successful cessation are significantly lower than those of the rest of the 
population, are some of the possible policy options that are likely to lead to higher 
smoking cessation rates.   
The results also highlight the limitations of the simple multinomial logit 
model when analyzing data from an unlabeled discrete choice experiment that 
includes an opt-out option, and they support the use of more sophisticated models. 
Using the NL framework, I was able to analyze two interdependent decision 
processes: whether to choose a treatment and which treatment to choose. Concerning 
the decision to opt out, I showed that long-term smokers are more likely to opt out 
and that higher-educated individuals have a smaller probability of choosing the opt-
out option. Using the RPL specification, I show the central importance of accounting 
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for unobserved preference heterogeneity and potential correlation across choices, 
when analyzing choice data from a DCE.  
However this study has notable limitations. First, the respondents did not 
stem from a random national sample and the sample is not very large; their 
preferences may therefore not be representative of those of the general Swiss 
population of smokers. Further investigation should be carried out on the national 
level. Second, the use of a stated preference method raises the issue of hypothetical 
bias. With this in mind, it could be useful to use real market data (revealed 
preferences (RP) data) about smoking cessation medication sales and merge them 
with stated preference data resulting from a DCE. This would combine the advantages 
of both methodologies, i.e., the real market equilibrium assessment of RP data with 
the analysis of trade-offs between attributes of SP data. Other extensions would be to 
analyze preferences using a labeled DCE as Paterson et al. (2008) did, including 
Champix® (varenicline) as an additional alternative, and to apply Latent Class 
Models to further investigate preference heterogeneity (Mentzakis et al. 2010). 
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Appendix A: Example of choice set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attributes Medication A Medication B Neither  
Price 
Price of the comprehensive 
treatment in CHF 
500 CHF 200 CHF 
  
Efficacy 
% of quitters who still do not 
smoke one year after the treatment  
25% 40% 
  
Side effects 
% of patients who encounter 
minor side effects (insomnia, dry 
mouth and so forth) 
30% 50% 
  
Does the medication 
prevent weight gain 
associated with smoking 
cessation? 
no yes 
  
Availability Over-the-counter 
 
Medical 
prescription 
 
  
Your choice: 
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Appendix B: Nested Logit and the IV parameter 
 
I define factors (attributes or individual-specific variables) that influence nest choice 
by 
n
z  and factors that influence specific alternative choice by j|nx . The unconditional 
probability of choosing alternative j (among 
n
J alternatives) in nest n (among N nests) 
is: 
' '
j|n n
' '
n j|n n
x β+z γ
jn N J x β+z γ
n=1 j=1
eP =
e∑ ∑
       (B1) 
 
We can re-write this expression as the product of two probabilities, 
 
' '
n j|n n' '
j|n n
' ' ' '
n nj|n n j|n n
J Nx β z γ
x β z γ j=1 n=1
jn j|n n NJ N Jx β z γ x β+z γ
n=1j=1 n=1 j=1
e e
e eP = P P =
ee e
                                    
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
  (B2) 
 
We define the inclusive value (IV) for the n-th branch as: 
 
'
n j|nJ x β
n j=1IV = ln e∑         (B3) 
 
From this we get: 
 
' '
j|n n n n
' '
n j|n n n n
x β z γ+τ IV
j|n n NJ x β z γ+τ IV
n=1j=1
and
e eP =   P =
ee ∑∑
     (B4) 
 
where nτ  is the inclusive value (IV) parameter, which is an indicator of the degree of 
substitution between the alternatives. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
 
This dissertation addresses various aspects of smoking-related decisions from 
an economic perspective. The document consists of three empirical essays, preceded 
by an introductory chapter in which I present the decision to smoke from an economic 
perspective and review the recent literature on the available policies aimed at 
reducing tobacco use, with references to the current situation in Switzerland. The 
objective of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the dissertation, to 
summarize the main findings related to the three essays and to highlight the various 
difficulties and challenges encountered while conducting the research. I also present 
the main limitations of each study and propose potential extensions and suggestions 
for future research. 
 
6.1. Introductory part  
The traditional microeconomic framework, with its underlying assumptions 
of utility maximization, rationality, and stability of preferences, has prompted 
substantial amounts of empirical work on smoking decisions and has allowed for the 
development of a sophisticated understanding of the determinants of tobacco use. 
However, the recent theoretical contributions pertaining to substance use tend to 
depart from the standard settings, in particular from the rational addiction model 
proposed by Becker and Murphy in 1988, and deliver novel insights on the 
determinants of addictive consumption, the potential impact of policies, and their 
economic justification. Recent studies incorporate aspects of behavioral economics, 
such as time-inconsistencies and lack of self-control. The incorporation of 
psychological aspects in consumption models also leads to the extension of the notion 
of externalities to “intrapersonal externalities” or internalities. The lack of rationality 
of individuals can justify stronger policy intervention, which is therefore seen in this 
context as a desirable commitment device. In contrast, some authors also relying on 
behavioral theories conclude that interventions such as price increases would not be 
effective for certain types of individuals and would therefore be clearly welfare 
reducing. The various models lead to important differences in policy prescriptions. 
The optimal level of intervention is therefore still subject to debate and remains an 
open theoretical and empirical question. 
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On the empirical side, the recent literature on the “best-practice” interventions 
aimed at reducing tobacco use and exposure to ETS provides many interesting 
insights and has implications for Switzerland. The literature agrees that price has a 
significant effect on behavior. However, concerns are raised regarding compensatory 
behaviors, such as the use of substitutes (hand-rolled cigarettes), and equity issues 
following a tax increase. Tax regressivity is of particular concern due to the 
concentration of consumers in the most deprived subgroups of the population and the 
potential lack of price responsiveness for some types of individuals. Importantly, 
while the authors widely agree on the impact of price on smoking cessation, the 
results are mixed with respect to smoking initiation.  
Information dissemination on smoking-related risks has had a significant 
impact on the reduction of smoking rates in developed countries, but it is likely that 
the conventional messages are no longer effective in changing behaviors. Choosing 
the right messages, ensuring a proper understanding of the future consequences of 
consumption (including addiction and the potential loss of quality of life), targeting 
the right groups of the population, and finally, measuring the impact of the measures 
implemented is challenging. Additionally, there is a clear imbalance between the 
resources of producers of prevention messages and those of tobacco advertisers. This 
raises the issue of advertising by the tobacco industry. The literature shows that 
partial bans, such as those implemented in Switzerland, are not effective because the 
industry develops indirect and sophisticated means of communication to circumvent 
legal restrictions. 
Exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is the most obvious 
traditional externality associated with tobacco use. The literature mostly shows that 
smoking bans in bars and restaurants are effective in reducing exposure without 
negatively affecting the hospitality sector. However, concerns are raised about ETS 
exposure at home that could be handled only by second-best policies, such as 
information on the consequences of ETS and tax increases. In Switzerland, the 
gradual implementation of smoking bans in the cantons, and finally at the national 
level since April 2010, still needs to be evaluated, both from a public health 
perspective (reduction in ETS exposure, smoking rates, and short-term health risks) 
and with respect to the economic activity of the hospitality sector. 
Finally, economic studies on smoking cessation devices show that 
pharmaceutical products, such as NRT and nicotine-free cessation drugs, are effective 
in increasing successful cessation rates and generate a good value for money. 
However, their use is still low in Switzerland in comparison with the substantial 
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number of individuals who express a desire to quit. As these products are privately 
delivered and advertised if sold OTC, a public intervention in this market must be 
cautiously justified. 
 
6.2. Empirical essays 
Each of the three empirical essays looks at specific aspects of smoking-
related decisions and tries to shed some light on some of the issues mentioned above. 
The first essay looks at the impact of tobacco control spending on smoking behavior, 
which in part reflects information dissemination. In 2004, Switzerland devoted 
approximately 2.2% of its health care spending to prevention and health promotion 
expenditures of all types. This proportion is 2.7% on average in OECD countries, 
with up to 4.8% in Germany and 5.5% in the Netherlands (WHO 2006). The main 
federal prevention programs are related to tobacco, alcohol, illicit drug use and 
HIV/AIDS. In the field of tobacco, the recently implemented national smoking ban 
indicates a clear political will to strengthen tobacco control in the country. In the 
meantime, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) recognized the lack of 
economic evaluation of prevention interventions in the country and mandated several 
studies aimed at laying the foundations for more systematic assessments, with the 
upcoming development of a law on prevention in mind. I developed the first essay as 
a part of the mandate on tobacco, with a main objective of assessing whether 
spending on tobacco control has impacted behavior and also of highlighting the 
difficulties and shortcomings associated with such evaluations. 
The study addresses the impact of overall financial resources dedicated to 
tobacco control on smoking-related decisions, exploiting the regional differences in 
tobacco control efforts and their evolution over time. Specifically, the objective was 
to assess whether and to what extent prevention expenditures incurred mainly 
between 1997 and 2007 in Switzerland influenced the probability of smoking 
initiation and the probability of smoking cessation. Large panel data sets that include 
information on smoking-related behaviors are not available in Switzerland. Therefore, 
I resorted to a second-best strategy and used self-reported retrospective data on 
smoking from the cross-sectional Swiss Health Survey to reconstruct individual 
smoking histories, which I then analyzed with discrete and continuous time hazard 
models. An important work of data collection was also necessary regarding tobacco 
control expenditures as there is no centralized information source on this issue.  
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In 2007, approximately 2.6 Swiss Francs per capita were spent on tobacco 
control interventions, including information and public awareness campaigns, 
cessation support, protection against ETS, and knowledge management. In 
comparison with the counterfactual of zero expenditure, I estimate that between 1997 
and 2007, non-price-related tobacco control interventions produced roughly 110,000 
additional quitters in the country. I find a cessation elasticity of 0.10 in the preferred 
specification. In contrast, I do not find convincing evidence that tobacco control 
expenditures have influenced smoking onset. The results consistently show that price 
matters both with respect to smoking initiation and cessation. In terms of elasticity, 
price effects are of greater magnitude than tobacco spending effects. I find a price 
elasticity of smoking initiation of around -0.6, and a unit price elasticity of smoking 
cessation. I also find evidence of a significant educational gradient in both initiation 
and cessation decisions. In comparison with their less educated counterparts, 
individuals with higher education are 30% less likely to start smoking and 17% more 
likely to quit. In addition, I show that males are more prone to start smoking and less 
prone to quit than women.  
Both continuous and discrete time proportional hazard models give rise to 
similar results. However, the estimated effects are sensitive to the assumptions made 
on the impact over time of tobacco control expenditures, i.e., between using current or 
cumulative expenditures. The use of region fixed-effects to account for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity improves the models and therefore seems appropriate. 
Additionally, the use of a stratified Cox regression as an alternative to region fixed-
effects brings additional insights with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. 
One can also read the results in light of production theory, where the inputs 
are prevention measures and the output is the modification of behaviors. In this 
framework, the public authorities and the NGOs are seen as producers of prevention. 
In reality, the inputs are heterogeneous, whereas I only have information on the 
overall resources dedicated to tobacco control, a homogeneous measure. Clearly, our 
data do not allow us to identify the effectiveness of specific interventions in changing 
behavior. In other words, although I was able to show that the overall inputs produced 
additional quitters in the population, I was not able to assess the allocative efficiency 
of the “production” process. Are the right combinations of inputs used in terms of the 
nature of the measures implemented and in terms of targeted sub-populations? The 
difficulties faced in collecting the data and the lack of accuracy of certain information 
highlighted a need for a more centralized monitoring of prevention measures. 
Moreover, the results do not allow for the identification of the possible diminishing 
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marginal impact of prevention spending. It is therefore difficult to determine an 
optimal level of expenditure. Nevertheless, we can rely on the CDC minimum 
recommendations of USD 8.43 per capita and on the CHF 15 per capita spent on 
advertising by the tobacco industry to infer that the actual level of expenditure in still 
relatively low in the country. The World Health Organization, in their 2006 report on 
the Swiss Health System, pointed out the lack of a clear designation of 
responsibilities in the field of prevention and also a lack of incentives to invest in 
prevention activities. Financial resources used in a certain year that will produce 
improved health effects only in the distant future and the lack of evaluation regarding 
the effectiveness of the measures are obviously the central deterrents. 
In addition to the obvious problems related to the impossibility of breaking 
down our tobacco spending data into more specific categories, the study has several 
other limitations. I assumed that tobacco control expenditures were nonexistent before 
1990, which is a reasonable assumption regarding the scarcity of prevention 
intervention in this period. In contrast, the assumption regarding tobacco control 
expenditures between 1990 and 1997 is more debatable. I relied on a body of 
information to reconstruct the trend over the period in each region. The resulting data 
are therefore inaccurate, but I provide a sensitivity analysis according to two extreme 
assumptions at the end of the chapter. Finally, the use of self-reported retrospective 
data on smoking from a cross-sectional survey raises the problem of recall bias. 
Additionally, it makes it impossible to use time-varying individual data, such as 
income, marital status, self-assessed health status, self-control measures, and 
individual rate of time-preferences that could potentially have a significant impact on 
decisions. Data available on prevention spending are clearly not sufficiently accurate 
or detailed enough to conduct a more systematic, targeted, and comprehensive 
evaluation of the implemented programs. I would recommend a more systematic and 
mandatory monitoring of tobacco control expenditures. Further research should also 
focus on the political economy of prevention and on the forces and incentives that 
could lead to a better allocation of resources in the domain. 
The lack of evidence of any impact of tobacco control expenditures on the 
initiation decision has prompted the second strand of research. I apply best-worst 
scaling–a survey-based stated preferences method–to assess how adolescents between 
14 and 19 years old consider the potential negative consequences of tobacco use. The 
method allows for the construction of a scale that reflects the degree of concern and 
therefore allows for the consideration of the relative importance of the negative 
consequences. The motivation was also to develop the first application of best-worst 
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scaling in the field of tobacco. From a methodological point of view, the choice tasks 
were seen as simple for the vast majority of respondents and were well understood. 
The resulting data provides rich information on the relative importance of the items 
considered and even allows for the assessment of individual-level preference scales. I 
also illustrate how such choice data can be easily analyzed with a simple technique 
that does not necessitate the estimation of any statistical choice model. 
The relative importance of 15 items, including long-term and short-term 
health and non-health consequences, was assessed. In addition to focusing on the 
health risks cited most often (e.g., lung cancer and cardiovascular disease), I also 
investigated the importance of less-mentioned health implications (e.g., effects on 
teeth, appearance and sexual dysfunction) and other negative non-health effects, such 
as cost, or dependence. Lung cancer was consistently ranked first, followed by 
concern about the loss of physical capacity, cardiovascular disease, sexual 
dysfunction, and reduced life expectancy. Items of more moderate but still significant 
importance include addiction, COPD, endangering relatives, inhalation of chemicals, 
expenditures, oral and dental problems, and skin problems. The disturbance of non-
smokers, tobacco industry manipulation, and concern about weight gain after 
smoking cessation were of weaker importance.  
Heterogeneities in the rankings of the items were first assessed by comparing 
choice probabilities for boys and girls, smokers and non-smokers, different age 
groups, and different levels of smoking-related mortality perception. I find that boys, 
smokers, and older individuals tend to put more weight on short-term health risks, 
while girls, younger individuals, and non-smoking respondents tend to be more 
concerned by lung cancer. I also find that the higher the mortality risk perception, the 
higher is the level of concern for reduced life expectancy. Then, grouping the items in 
different categories and exploiting the results from the random-coefficient approach, I 
show that current smoking is positively associated with the level of concern for short-
term health risks and negatively related with the level of concern for long-term health 
risks. I find a similar association between the frequency of alcohol consumption and 
the same covariates. Finally, I used a factor analysis to construct an index of far-
sightedness among individuals and show that, controlling for gender, age, peer 
smoking, discretionary income (pocket money), and class membership, the more far-
sighted the individuals are, the less likely they are to engage in unhealthy behaviors.  
However, the study has several caveats that must be kept in mind. First, even 
if respondents were asked to choose the greatest and least deterrent in each choice set, 
the true underlying motivation for them to pick a given item is unclear. The lower 
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relative concern of long-term health risks may be observed among smokers because 
they start to experience short-term consequences and the perceived potentially 
underestimated disutility of these risks becomes a true experienced disutility. Or 
instead, the significantly and consistently higher level of concern for lung cancer may 
be partly explained by the disproportionate media communication on this specific 
health risk, which leads to the overestimation of the perceived risks. An extension of 
this research would be to collect data on subjective probabilities for the relevant 
consequences and to have a measure of individual time-preferences to isolate the 
perceived disutility associated with each item. Another extension would be to rate the 
perceived benefits of smoking to better understand the motivation of youth to engage 
in such behavior. 
The third essay focuses on the valuation of improved pharmaceutical smoking 
cessation drugs. Such treatments primarily act by reducing the withdrawal symptoms 
of smoking cessation, therefore leading to increased success rates among users 
compared to “cold-turkey” quitters. However, these products are costly, they are not 
yet reimbursed by social health insurance, they cause frequent minor side-effects, and 
they are not available over the counter. I used a discrete choice experiment to assess 
smokers’ preferences for hypothetical smoking cessation medications described with 
five attributes: the price of a complete treatment, the efficacy measured in terms of 
the probability of becoming a successful, long-term quitter, the occurrence of minor 
side-effects, whether the drug prevents weight gain associated with smoking 
cessation, and whether the product is available OTC. The method allows for the 
estimation of the relative importance of each attribute. In addition, the use of a price 
attribute allows for the estimation of willingness-to-pay for marginal variations of 
each non-price attribute.  
In line with previous findings, efficacy is a central feature. Individuals are 
willing to pay approximately CHF 12 to 16 for a one percentage point increase in the 
long-term success rate. This result indicates that the perceived net benefits of quitting 
are important, at least for demanders. Potential minor side effects, such as dry mouth 
or nausea, for instance, dampen usage and are thus negatively valued. A one 
percentage point reduction in the probability of experiencing minor side effects is 
valued at around CHF 8 by respondents. A striking figure is the substantial value 
(between CHF 160 to CHF 180, depending on the specification) that smokers attach 
to the fact that the drug contains an active ingredient that prevents cessation-related 
weight gain. The impact on weight gain of smoking cessation, as an immediate “cost” 
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of smoking cessation, seems to be of central importance in the smoking cessation 
decision.  
I also find a substantial opt-out rate (47%) in the survey. I show that opting-
out is influenced by several individual characteristics. Longer-term smokers and 
individuals reporting frequent anxiety are more likely to opt-out, whereas individuals 
with higher education and with children in the household are less likely to opt-out. 
Even current smokers who previously used a smoking cessation support (i.e., 
unsuccessful quitters) are less likely to opt-out. This may indicate that they better 
perceive the potential benefits of using such products or simply that they have 
particular underlying characteristics that influence their choice and that are not altered 
by previous experience with the good. The monetary value of significantly improved 
hypothetical cessation drugs is approximately equivalent to the actual market price of 
available drugs. This pinpoints a substantial problem of affordability, especially 
among the most deprived smokers. Moreover, I show that WTP decreases quite 
sharply with income.  Potential subventions to match actual price and WTP should 
therefore be consequential to enhance use among low-income smokers.  
From a methodological point of view, I show the limitations of the simple 
multinomial logit model and therefore the importance of using more sophisticated 
models to study data from a discrete-choice experiment. Taking unobserved 
heterogeneity into account significantly improves the models. Of course, the main 
limitation is related to the use of stated preference data, which raises the problem of 
hypothetical bias. However, the method provides many insights about the 
determinants of choice and allows for the capturing of the effects of features that are 
simply not available on the market or that do not vary enough across current 
alternatives. 
It is important to keep in mind that I focus here only on the preferences of 
potential consumers. A number of other agents are involved in the smoking cessation 
drug market, including pharmaceutical companies that have incentives to promote 
their products, general practitioners that have a central influence in delivering the 
right to purchase (at least for drugs that are not sold OTC), and also public health 
authorities, who play a role in increasing the perceived benefits of smoking cessation 
and in deciding drug reimbursements. According to the 2007/2008 Swiss Tobacco 
Survey results, almost 80% of all smokers have already discussed tobacco use with 
their general practitioner or dentist. One in five smokers in Switzerland has been 
proposed cessation support from their physician; a vast majority of advice was 
focused on NRTs (35%) and books (25%). Zyban® and Champix® were proposed 
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only 8% and 5% of the time, respectively. A potential extension of this research 
would be to study physicians’ behavior and incentives to prescribe such drugs and to 
assess what part of the decision is induced by potential quitters and what part is 
caused by the physician. The implications of a possible reimbursement contingent on 
successful cessation that could provide the best incentive for people to engage in 
quitting behavior should also be analyzed in the Swiss setting.   
 
6.3. Potential future projects 
The research conducted in this dissertation, the attendance at international 
conferences, the interesting talks with other Ph.D. students and professors during the 
doctoral courses in health economics at the Swiss School of Public Health, and the 
contacts with Federal Office of Public Health have sprouted a large number of ideas 
for future research and collaborations. Some of these research projects are concretely 
on the agenda and will be started this year, while others are only ideas. 
I plan to exploit the quasi-experimental setting offered by the gradual 
implementation of smoking bans in Switzerland to study their impact from an overall 
perspective. Indeed, while previous studies have looked separately at different 
outcomes, my aim is to develop a detailed assessment of this policy in terms of the 
reduction of health risks and the impact on the economic activity of the industry. I 
also plan to study smoking cessation behavior among individuals aged 50 and over in 
Europe, particularly with respect to the various tobacco control policies implemented 
in the countries and with respect to the potential “private” information on the smoking 
risks they experience, with a focus on heterogeneities in responsiveness to personal 
health shocks. This research will be possible with the availability of the recent 
longitudinal Survey on Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which 
includes detailed information, including retrospective life events. I also plan to exploit 
the recently available Transitions to Education and Employment (TREE) dataset, 
which contains longitudinal data on youths in Switzerland. The objective will be to 
relate cognitive abilities, schooling and employment decisions, critical life events, and 
substance use (mainly tobacco, cannabis and alcohol). Working on other topics in 
health economics, such as obesity, efficiency measurement, and DCE applied to other 
questions, is also part of my research objectives. 
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